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Preface
’Oh, all that I know,
There’s nothing here to run from,
And there, everybody here’s got somebody to lean on.’
(Coldplay- Don’t Panic)
So far, my academic career has been a rather rocky road. Some ten years ago, I called 
my parents from Rockville, Maryland, asking them to cancel my enrolment for the 
upcoming academic year. I had become a roadie for a punkrock band, and wanted to 
quit university for a while. The European tour was to start in mid-September, which left 
only one day to cancel my registration. Astonishingly, my parents agreed, even though 
they were seriously afraid that I would become a college dropout. Fortunately I proved 
them wrong, and I dutifully graduated a couple of years later. At that point I definitely 
forsook my roadie ambitions, having met the man of my dreams, even if he wasn’t a 
punkrock star. I decided to stay in the Netherlands, and got the chance to pursue a 
PhD at Leiden University. This track again turned out to be a rather rock-strewn, when 
in 2003 our daughter Roos was born. Again several people feared I would drop out. 
Even I felt quite unsure about whether I could pull everything off. For this reason, I feel 
extremely relieved now that my dissertation is finished. I somehow ‘survived’ this period 
without ending as a ‘censored case’, to use some nutty statistical terms. Yet I would never 
have gotten this far without the support of the following people.
Sacha Prechal introduced me to the legal aspects of transposition. The statistical 
analysis was conducted with the support of Margo Crucq and Bastiënne Karel (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs), Victorine Verkruissen (Asser Instituut), and Nancy Vanhaverbeke 
(European Commission) who all provided me with data for the statistical analysis. On 
this count, I am also extremely thankful to Jeroen Weesie- not just for coaching me on 
the survival analysis, but also for helping me to sharpen my analytical skills. In addition, 
I would like to thank all the respondents who generously shared their precious time 
with me. In particular, I would like to mention Bert-Jan Clement from the Central 
Department of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Transport, who generously provided access 
to dossiers, introduced me to the key players at the Ministry, and let me spend some time 
at his department. Not until then did the topic of transposition really come alive, even 
though I should also credit Ine here for our hilarious lunch conversation on transposition 
problems. I want to thank Jeremy Miles for teaching me how to teach and for giving 
me the great opportunity to become his assistant at the 2002 Essex summer school. 
Special thanks to John Gerring, Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman for their inspiring 
lectures on qualitative methods. Finally, I would like to thank all the members of the 
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Dutch transposition research group, the AIO seminar and the European Impact group 
at Leiden University, the European Research Colloquium, and the 2004 research agenda 
section of the 4th Arizona State University Institute on Qualitative Research Methods for 
stimulating and helpful discussions on previous versions of this manuscript.
My years in Leiden would not have been as fun without the following people. Tine, 
Ton en Betty, Sylvia, and the Tuna Feminina Universitaria de Leiden- thanks for making 
me feel at home in Leiden- too bad the Boeings drove us out. Don’t forget that you 
still owe me an explanation for the strange color of grass in Leiden. Torsten, thanks 
for introducing me to the fascinating world of EU studies and for always joining me 
for coffee - even though the stuff you drink can hardly be qualified as such. Mendeltje, 
I really enjoyed our trips to Brussels, The Hague, Hoogeveen, and Zeist; I hope we 
will work again in some way some day. Anne Greet, Fleur, Celesta, Sanneke, Mette en 
Willeke, it was fun watching the academic ‘sandbox’ rituals together- even though the 
things going on there weren’t always funny. I greatly value the way we have stuck together 
since August 30, 2004, sharing our grief as well as our fond memories. Petra, you were 
my best colleague ever- because you were so much more than a colleague. I miss you 
enormously and cherish all the lessons you taught me.
Chantal, thanks for regularly distracting me and cheering me up- let’s go on a 
‘stippenkorting’ shopping spree soon again. Renske- you have become my best friend. 
I think it is a miracle how we can always talk endlessly- about the world, life, children, 
social science, academia, and all other things that either excite or frustrate us. Please come 
back to the Netherlands so we can start a second hand toy store together! Mom and Dad, 
this thesis might not have been written if it weren’t for you. Thanks for the unconditional 
support and love you have always given me- not to mention all the babysitting you 
have done over the last three yearsJ. René, I want to thank you for Awking, to use yet 
another nerdy term, but especially for always being there for me. I don’t think I would 
have gotten through everything without your boundless support and optimism- if often 
slightly unrealistic. Roos en Lodewijk, lieve kleine schatjes, mama heeft nu eindelijk tijd 
om met jullie in de zandbak te spelen!
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1 The black hole1
‘A Minister’s signature on a Directive should be 
a firm commitment, not a vague aspiration.’ 
(Charlie McCreevy, 2005)
The EU has an impressive track record. What started out as a plan for bringing peace 
and prosperity to Europe has evolved into a potent regime that regulates an astonishing 
variety of policy areas. These policies are often decided by a majority of the member states, 
thus breaking with the traditional unanimous voting that characterizes ‘regular’ schemes 
of international cooperation. In addition, the EU has developed strong mechanisms to 
enforce its policies. These mechanisms are unprecedented and do not have a parallel in 
other international organizations. The EU seems to be the living proof that international 
organizations may become more than the sum of their national parts. This defies the 
central tenet of realism, which holds that international organizations are mere mirrors of 
their members’ interests. Yet, many scholars have a hard time ignoring their realist reflexes. 
Could it be that the member states try to evade the EU’s invasive influence by shirking their 
duties? Add to this the European Commission’s alarms about the ‘implementation deficit’ 
and a fascinating topic for research is born. The question remains: to what extent do the 
member states really try to ‘make European policies work’ (Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988)?
The alleged implementation deficit has attracted vast academic attention. The general 
assumption is that European integration is haunted by a ‘pathology of non-compliance’ 
(Weiler, 1988, 340). Over the last decades, various researchers have looked into the extent 
and causes of such EU implementation problems (Maas and Bentvelsen, 1978; Krislov, 
Ehlermann and Weiler, 1986; Anderson, 1988; Ciavarini Azzi, 1988, 2000; Siedentopf 
and Ziller, 1988; Weiler, 1988; Collins and Earnshaw, 1992; Metcalfe, 1992; Bekkers et 
al., 1993a, 1993b; From and Stava, 1993; Jacobson and Weiss, 1995; Snyder, 1995; Baas, 
1996; Mendrinou, 1996; Richardson, 1996; Duina, 1997; Olsen, 1997; Haas, 1998; 
Jordan, Ward, and Buller, 1998; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998; 
Jordan, 1999; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000; Grant, Matthews, and Newell, 2000; 
Demmke, 2001; Dimitrakopoulis, 2001a, 2001b; Glachant, 2001; Mbaye, 2001; Bursens, 
2002; Mastenbroek, 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Sverdrup, 2004; Beach, 2005; Bugdahn, 2005; 
Falkner et al., 2005; Steunenberg, 2005, 2006; Berglund, Gange, and Van Waarden, 2006; 
Hille and Knill, 2006; Kaeding, 2006; Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; Mastenbroek and 
Van Keulen, 2006; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2006; Steunenberg and Voermans, 2006; 
Haverland and Romeijn, in press; Thomson and al, in press).
The European Commission, in its capacity as ‘guardian of the European treaties’, views 
belated and incorrect implementation of EC directives as one of the main problems in 
1 Parts of this chapter have been adapted from Mastenbroek (2005b).
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developing the EC legal order. Already in 1992, Metcalfe (1992, 117) remarked that uneven 
implementation is one of the most pressing problems for the European Commission. Non-
compliance reduces the credibility of EC law and jeopardizes the central objective of European 
integration, the creation of an internal market (McCreevy, 2005, 2). It deprives businesses 
and consumers of the full benefits of the internal market (European Commission, 2004, 3). 
It puts a drain on the Commission’s scarce time and personnel, as enforcement of EC law is 
cumbersome and time-consuming. Finally, uneven compliance has been argued to hinder the 
realization of the Lisbon criteria, as it hampers economic growth (McCreevy, 2005).
1.1 Historical background
The implementation deficit most clearly manifests itself when it comes to directives, 
which are the Community’s chief legal instrument. These acts, making up about 80% 
of all community legislation (Dinan, 2000, 421) are not binding in their entirety, but 
only ‘as to the result to be achieved’. This, in turn, provides national governments with 
‘the choice of form and methods’ (art. 249 EC). The fact that the member states have to 
transpose these pieces of law into their national legislation makes them more susceptible 
to non-compliance than directly binding legislation, such as regulations and decisions. 
Most academic and political attention has therefore concerned transposition problems.
The transposition deficit first came to the fore during the process of internal market 
building in the late 1980s. The objective of this undertaking, the development of a 
single European market, was to be accomplished by means of an impressive legislative 
program comprising around 300 measures, mostly directives. Whereas progress at the 
legislative stage had been impressive, compliance with the program turned out to be far 
from smooth. In 1991, less than a year before the agreed date of commencement, the 
transposition rate of the twelve member states averaged 65%; a mere 24 directives had 
been transposed by all member states (Pelkmans, 1991, 52).
Alarmed by the low transposition rate, the European Commission formed a 
committee, chaired by former commissioner Peter Sutherland, to develop a strategy to 
ensure the proper functioning of the Internal Market (Dinan, 2000, 442). In 1992 the 
Sutherland Group delivered its report. It called for more transparency and enforcement 
(Dinan, 2000, 442) and better cooperation between the Commission and the member 
states to prevent the uneven transposition of directives (Young and Wallace, 2000, 102-
103). The Commission praised the report and promised to implement many of the 
report’s guidelines. Specifically, it set out to make more use of green papers to publicize 
contemplated legislation, to improve consultation of stakeholders, and to publish an 
annual report on the internal market, which saw its first release in March 1994 (Dinan, 
2000, 442). In so doing, the Commission shifted its emphasis from drafting new 
proposals to enforcing existing legislation (Richardson, 1996, 288; Dinan, 1999, 275).
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Despite the Commission’s measures, the transposition of EC directives has remained 
patchy. It is still one of the Commission’s major concerns. In its 1999 Internal Market 
Strategy, the Commission stated that ‘the failure to transpose agreed directives (…) remains 
a focus for urgent attention’ (European Commission, 1999a, 13). Bolkestein, Internal 
Market Commissioner from 1999 to 2004, consistently stated that he took ‘a tough stance’ 
on transposition. ‘A zero deficit – and soon – has to be the ultimate target for all Member 
States’ (European Commission, 2001b). His successor Charlie McCreevy has taken a 
similar stance, making timely and correct transposition and application his top priority 
(McCreevy, 2004, 2). Other key European institutions have joined the Commission in 
fighting against the deficit. The Commission’s main ally is the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), which over time has become ‘an enthusiastic enforcer’ of EC law. Its threat of legal 
action has become more and more dissuasive for prospective cheaters (Richardson, 1996, 
288; Tallberg, 2002). The ECJ takes a very strict stance on enforcement, accepting barely 
any excuses for late transposition (Anderson, 1988, 104).
Why is timely and correct transposition so important? Even if defection is only temporary 
in nature, it may have serious consequences on the competitiveness of a market when the 
transposition of Community law is uneven across the EU. By not transposing EC law, if only 
temporarily, a member state can favor its own businesses over others. Conversely, by transposing 
faster than others, a member state may put its own industry at a temporary disadvantage, which 
may have important effects on long-term competitiveness. By transposing late, member states 
may deny their citizens important social, economic, or environmental benefits. In addition, 
late or incorrect transposition may impose financial and reputational costs on the government 
concerned. Provisions of non-transposed directives may be invoked directly before national 
courts in many cases, which deprives governments of their discretion in transposing directives. 
Moreover, since the 1991 Frankovich judgment established the principle of state liability for 
non-transposition, individuals may sue member states for damages (Craig and De Búrca, 
2003, 227), which may be a rather costly affair. Finally, member states may be taken to the 
ECJ by the European Commission, which is a costly affair, if only because of the lengthy 
procedures and the damage on a member state’s reputation.
National governments are well aware of the negative consequences of late and faulty 
transposition. Yet, the majority of them have taken a half-hearted approach to battling 
the deficit. For a long time, there was a ‘conspiracy of silence’ regarding the issue, because 
the member states were unwilling to draw attention to their own or other member states’ 
failings (Jordan, 1999, 73). However, some member states put the issue on the agenda 
during their Council presidencies. The British have played a particularly active role: they 
are not averse to ‘naming and shaming’ in order to improve their partners’ compliance 
(Dinan, 1999, 375). Another phenomenon is that member states tend to brush up their 
compliance records in the face of an upcoming presidency; a phenomenon Voermans 
(2004, 57) calls the method ‘Olympic Committee’.
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In recent years the member states have taken a more active stance towards transposition. 
In 1995, the European Council attached a declaration to the Maastricht Treaty, which 
expressed the member states’ intention to transpose Community directives timely, fully 
and accurately, and to apply Community law with the same rigor as national law (TEU, 
Declaration on the Implementation of Community Law). At their April 2001 Stockholm 
summit, the European heads of state urged each other to accord high priority to transposing 
internal market directives into national law, setting a transposition target of 98.5% for the 
2002 Spring Council meeting (European Commission, 2001a, 6). This target, repeated 
in Barcelona in 2002, and Brussels in 2003 and 2004 (European Commission, 2003) has 
become the yardstick for the Council and the Commission in assessing the deficit. To what 
extent do the member states succeed in reaching this self-imposed target?
1.2 Size of the deficit
In seeking to battle non-compliance with EC directives, the Commission relies primarily 
on monitoring. The Secretariat General issues an annual report on the compliance 
with Community law, containing information on transposition rates and infringement 
procedures.2 Every two months, it publishes the state of affairs for these indicators. These 
reports are widely used by observers to stake their claims about the existence of a transposition 
deficit. Especially popular are the transposition rates, indicating which proportion of 
directives has been transposed at a certain point in time (see e.g. Lampinen and Uusikylä, 
1998; Barnes and Barnes, 1999; Ciavarini Azzi, 2000; Börzel, 2001; Dimitrakopoulos, 
2001a; Bursens, 2002; Tallberg, 2002; Giuliani, 2003; Sverdrup, 2004).
What do the Commission data tell us? As is shown in table 1, contrary to expectation, 
the recent data do not suggest a severe transposition deficit. The performance of the member 
states is actually more than impressive: the mean percentage of transposed directives amounts 
to a staggering 99%, which means that most member states reached the Stockholm target 
of 98.5%. In addition, cross-country variance is marginal, the difference between champion 
Lithuania and laggard Luxembourg is less than 3%. This outcome is not exceptional, as the 
averages have been consistently good over the last five years. The bad performance in the 
early 1990s hence appears to be a temporary phenomenon, caused by the vast increase in the 
number of directives applicable.
However, this cheerful view must be put into perspective, because the Commission’s 
data suffer from serious shortcomings (Börzel, 2001). To begin with, they are based entirely 
on notification by the member states, which makes them unreliable. The Commission, in 
2  Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law. The reports can be found at http://
ec.europa.eu/community_law/eulaw/index_en.htm. In addition, individual Directorate Generals compose 
their own regular scoreboards. DG Internal Market twice a year publishes an Internal Market Scoreboard, and 
publishes an Annual Survey on the Implementation and Enforcement of Community Environmental Law.
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   4 05-03-2007   15:52:40
Chapter 1 The black hole

addition to having a limited staff, in most policy areas has no systematic means to collect 
information (Collins and Earnshaw, 1992, 231). Given the many incentives not to transpose, 
one may question the member states’ honesty in doing so. Some states may be tough on 
themselves; others may take transposition less seriously. Member states may cheat, for instance 
by notifying as soon as a transposing measure is enacted, even when transposition requires 
the enactment of several measures. Consequently, the Commission data do not tell the full 
story.
Table 1 Transposition rates as of 7 September 2005 (European Commission, 2005)
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A second and more serious problem of the Commission’s data is their validity in light of 
the alleged problem with transposition. Instead of measuring the time actually needed for 
transposition, they merely reflect the proportion of directives that have been transposed 
at a certain point in time. The data are probably biased, because since 1960 some 2500 
directives have been enacted. The current transposition rates consist to a great extent of 
old directives, which leads to an upward bias.
In all probability, therefore, the Commission data severely underestimate the 
transposition deficit in terms of timeliness. Some researchers have therefore resorted to 
data on infringement procedures, as concerning either the timeliness or correctness of 
transposition, or actual application3 (Mendrinou, 1996; Ciavarini Azzi, 2000; Börzel, 
2001; Mbaye, 2001; Bursens, 2002; Tallberg, 2002; Giuliani, 2003; Falkner et al, 2004; 
Bugdahn, 2005; Beach, 2005). This has led to a fascinating research agenda, focusing 
on the opening up and course of infringement proceedings. However, infringement data 
reveal only the tip of the iceberg of non-compliance. As Falkner et al (2005, 257) show for 
the field of labor policy, there is a tremendous lack of information from the Commission 
concerning delayed and incorrect transposition and application. ‘Commission statistics 
3 No systematic data exist on the correctness of transposition and on actual application.
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(…) only represent the bit of non-compliance the Commission can see and wants to 
publicize’ (ibid, 18).
All in all, the size of the transposition deficit is still a ‘black hole’ (Weiler, 1991, 
2465). We are in the dark about the actual extent to which the member states dodge 
EC law by not transposing directives. We have no reliable data on the timeliness of 
transposition, let alone on correctness and actual application.4 As Demmke (2001, 11) 
observes, ‘Everybody talks, but nobody knows.’ 
1.3 Causes of the deficit
Many students of European integration claim that the ‘black hole’ concerns not only the 
size of the transposition deficit, but also its causes (e.g. Duina, 1997, 155; Knill, 2001, 
12; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002, 255). In my view, though, this claim is not altogether 
true. Since the late 1980s numerous students of European integration have studied 
the ‘paradox of non-compliance’ (Weiler, 1988, 347) or the question ‘why states fail to 
implement measures they have previously agreed upon in the context of the Council of 
Ministers’ (Mendrinou, 1996, 4). Over time, we can distinguish three waves of research 
into this question.
The first wave started in the late 1980s, when legal scholars Krislow, Ehlermann, and 
Weiler (1986) drew attention to the growing and acute problem of compliance. The 
first empirical study was presented by Siedentopf and Ziller (1988), who analyzed the 
transposition of 17 directives in the twelve member states in so doing, they inspired a host 
of legal scholars and students of public administration. Scholarship in this period lacked 
strong theoretical frameworks, combining insights from implementation research and 
legal studies. Most of this literature implicitly portrayed compliance as a rather apolitical 
process, which at times grinds to a halt because governments are not able to live up to EU 
policy demands, due to legal or administrative problems. The factors suggested in this 
first wave are at play at both the EU-level, such as the ambiguity and complexity of many 
directives, and at the national level, for instance a lack of administrative capacity.
Compliance research took on a stronger theoretical character with the second wave of 
scholarship, which materialized in the mid- and late 1990s. Students of Europeanization, 
who rooted their research in historical institutionalism, then took up the issue. Seeking 
to explain the differential impact of the EU on the member states (Héritier et al, 2001), 
the key hypothesis was that successful compliance depends on the fit between European 
policy requirements and existing policies and institutions at the national level (Knill 
and Lenschow, 1998; Duina, 1997; Duina and Blithe, 1999; Green Cowles, Caporaso, 
4 But see Kaeding (2006), Berglund, Gange, and Van Waarden (2006), Steunenberg and Rhinard (2006), and 
Haverland and Romeijn (in press), which all were published after completion of the present study.
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and Risse, 2001; Héritier et al, 2001; Börzel, 2003a; Börzel and Risse, 2003). This 
goodness of fit hypothesis was derived from an article by Héritier (1995), who asserted 
that member states try to minimize the costs of compliance by uploading their national 
policies to the EU-level. Some academics presented the goodness of fit as a primarily 
rationalist argument, focusing on costs of adaptation (Héritier et al, 2001; Knill and 
Lenschow, 1998; Börzel, 2003a; Duina, 1997). Others mixed this with a sociological 
argumentation, stressing domestic norms (Duina and Blithe, 1999; Green Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003).5
Despite its intuitive appeal, the empirical results for the goodness of fit hypothesis 
have been rather disappointing (Knill and Lenschow, 1998, 600-602; Haverland, 2000). 
In a recent study, Falkner et al (2005, 261-262), in a thorough analysis of six labor law 
directives in all member states, found that France and Germany, two countries with a 
remarkably good fit, are among the worst transposers, whereas the UK and Ireland tend 
to comply fast and well despite a high degree of misfit. Taken together, the various case 
studies have pointed out the limited explanatory value of the hypothesis. The reason 
for this disappointing result may be that the hypothesis is rather static in nature. As 
Treib (2003) has argued, it is unwarranted to assume that national actors always want 
to maintain the status quo. In reality they often want to change existing policies and 
institutions, possibly even using European requirements to this effect (Smith, 1997; 
Kallestrup, 2002).
In other words, we need to bring domestic politics back in to explain EU compliance 
(see Mair, 2004, 344; Falkner et al, 2005, 329). Currently, a third wave of scholarship 
is taking shape. Adherents to this wave try to explicitly theorize and test the role of 
domestic politics. To begin with, Haverland (2000) argues that the key to explaining 
compliance is with the presence or absence of institutional veto positions that allow 
domestic actors to hinder compliance. This line of research has been taken up further 
by Mbaye (2001) and Giuliani (2003), who investigate the effect of the number of 
veto players on member states’ compliance performance. Along slightly different lines, 
Treib (2003) argues that the likelihood of compliance depends on the party political 
preferences of national governments.
Rather than looking at structural veto positions, Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2000) 
present a spatial voting model of transposition in which various domestic veto players 
have to cooperate. This line of research, which has recently been further fleshed out by 
Steunenberg (2005, 2006) explicitly models the process in which domestic actors must 
cooperate to transpose a directive into national law. Along these lines, we could also 
envisage other formal models applied to EU compliance, such as bargaining or principal-
agent models.
5 It needs to be said that the goodness of fit literature is divided on the exact character of the variable; whereas 
early authors regarded a good fit as a necessary condition for smooth adaptation, later ones tended to view a 
misfit as a necessary condition for change.
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Also, EU compliance is increasingly modeled along the lines of sociological 
institutionalism. Here, we can conceive the contours of at least two avenues. The first 
approach extends the work done in the broader field of international compliance. Here, 
a school has emerged that theorizes compliance as a process of substantive assessment of 
international rules in the face of pre-existing domestic norms and beliefs. Such studies 
start from the assumption that a rule will be complied with if it is deemed appropriate 
by a member state. It resembles the goodness of fit hypothesis, with the difference that 
the latter looks at the institutions and norms erected on the basis of these norms. If 
there is a difference, compliance will not be automatic and hence more time-consuming, 
dependent on a process whereby the rule becomes internalized through socialization, 
persuasion, or learning (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 2001; Checkel, 2001; Risse, 
2000; Sending, 2002; Adler, 1998; Checkel, 1998, 2001; Haas, 1989, 1992; Ruggie, 
1998; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2000). Haas (1998) was the first one who applied 
this insight to EU compliance. A recent contribution along these lines is the paper by 
Dimitrova and Rhinard (2005), who propose a sociological institutionalist framework of 
norm change to explain transposition delay.6 
The majority of these sociological institutionalist contributions more or less explicitly 
take a unitary actor perspective, focusing on national states or governments and their norms, 
and the attempts of international actors or domestic advocacy coalitions to steer them into 
compliance. Alternatively, we could develop constructivist theories that more explicitly 
model the deliberations between domestic actors who have different normative points 
of view concerning a certain directive, using the insights of deliberative theory (Elster, 
1986, 1991, 1998; Page, 1996; Habermas, 1984; Steenbergen et al, 2003; Gutmann and 
Thompson, 2004).
The academic relevance of this thesis follows from the state of play of the theoretical 
literature discussed above. However rich the theories in the field of compliance, empirical 
testing has been quite patchy. If at all, most hypotheses have been tested using case 
studies. This strategy has not yielded much insight, because it allows for testing only a 
few variables at a time. So far, only a few studies (e.g. Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998; 
Demmke, 2001; Mbaye, 2001; Giuliani, 2003; Falkner et al, 2005) have evaluated the 
explanatory value of several variables at the same time. Unfortunately, these studies have 
necessarily been restricted to those variables that can be measured quantitatively. For 
this reason, the empirical record is not conclusive. Demmke (2001, 15), for instance, 
finds that non-compliance with EC water directives is rarely a result of intentional 
defection, but more so of organizational, legal, technical and financial causes. Lampinen 
and Uusikylä (1998, 249), in contrast, discover that both efficient domestic politico-
administrative institutions and political culture play a role in explaining non-compliance. 
6 Alternatively, we could apply sociological institutionalism to the meta-level, and view transposition as a gradual 
process of administrative routinization (Berglund, Gange, and Van Waarden, 2006).
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   8 05-03-2007   15:52:41
Chapter 1 The black hole

Mbaye (2001), analyzing cross-national variance in infringement proceeding counts, 
demonstrates a positive effect between political power and non-compliance. Falkner et al 
(2005) conclude for the field of labor policy that administrative and legal problems are 
more common than ‘opposition through the backdoor’. The question is, therefore, what 
is the relative explanatory value of the various theories developed so far?
Second, the academic relevance of the thesis stems from a more fundamental theoretical 
issue: EU compliance is neither a purely supranational nor an intergovernmental process. 
Whereas the European Commission plays a role in monitoring and enforcement, it is the 
member states that are responsible for transposition. Compliance problems hence cannot 
be properly analyzed using only traditional IR theories or theories from comparative 
politics/public administration. What we need instead are theories that combine the two 
dimensions, opening up the black box of the state while remaining sensitive to the, partly 
supranational setting within which compliance takes place. 
From the theoretical overview above, it appears that not all theories succeed in 
combining these two views. The first wave of research does not offer an integrated 
view of the way supranational and domestic explanations interact. Some authors focus 
on shortcomings at the EU-level, whereas others zoom in on characteristics of the 
national legal-administrative system. This changed with the second wave, when authors 
linked the notion of member states uploading national policies to the EU-level to the 
consecutive stage of compliance. The third wave of transposition research has a mixed 
character. Both the classical rationalist and constructivist IR approach bracket domestic 
politics, portraying the member states as unitary actors. By contrast, the multiple actor 
contributions have a stronger dual character, in that they explicitly try to model the 
domestic political process as taking place within the parameters set by EU institutions 
and policies. For example, Steunenberg (2005) nicely models the transposition process 
in the shadow of enforcement by the European Commission. In sum, this thesis aims at 
developing and testing these theories stemming from international relations theory and 
comparative politics/public administration. In doing so, it seeks to shed light on how the 
several theories might work together to explain transposition problems.
1.4 Problem definition
To sum up, the transposition deficit still is a black hole, regarding both size and causes. 
This study seeks to fill this hole by compiling reliable descriptive data on the timeliness of 
transposition. The central question has a diagnostic as well as an explanatory dimension: 
how big is the problem with delayed transposition, and how can we explain variance in 
timeliness? In addition, how can we explain problems with correctness?7 
7  As I will explain below, the correctness of transposition is not diagnosed quantitatively.
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In seeking to answer these questions, this study focuses on the Netherlands. Even 
though the Dutch have always been a constructive and supportive member state, they 
have struggled with timely transposition since the late 1970s. I believe the Netherlands 
offers an interesting puzzle, because it is a least likely case for transposition problems to 
occur. That is, like the Scandinavian states, the Netherlands has often prided itself for 
its ‘culture of compliance’. In addition, the Netherlands is known for having a generally 
strong administrative capacity. The puzzle is in the question why this committed 
member state, known for its generally strong administrative capacity, has not been able 
to effectively counter the problem of delays, which began to appear in the late 1970s. 
In addition, there is a more general theoretical reason for studying the Netherlands. 
In the unitary state of the Netherlands, both the negotiations and transposition stages 
are controlled by national government. In federal systems such as Germany and Spain, 
by contrast, lower levels of government play an important role in transposition, while 
national government representatives carry out the negotiations. Implicitly, it should 
not surprise us that transposition problems arise in such countries. The puzzle of non-
compliance is greater for a unitary state such as the Netherlands.
Obviously, the downside of a single case design is with external validity. It will be 
impossible to generalize the outcomes of this study to other member states. There are 
two reasons, though, to opt for a single-case design. First, there is a dearth of reliable 
data on transposition. Gathering reliable data for the fifteen member states for a large 
number of directives would be extremely time-consuming, as the member states have 
rather different ways of reporting transposition data, if they do so at all. Most researchers 
conducting comparative work on EC transposition therefore resort to the Commission 
data discussed above, which has been shown to be unreliable. A quick comparison of 
the Commission’s database with the Dutch legal databases used for the present study 
yielded stark differences. The Commission’s dataset only partly overlapped with the 
national data, at some points not listing relevant transposing measures, while at other 
points listing legal measures that did not qualify as transposition. In order to increase 
the reliability of the findings, I choose to focus on one member state only. Focusing on 
a single member state allows for immersion in the data to an extent impossible in multi-
country studies, which are often ‘data thin’ (Collier, 1999). Hence, by focusing on the 
Netherlands, I increase reliability at the expense of external validity.
A second reason for preferring a single case design concerns the multi-level structure 
of transposition data. The causes of transposition problems operate at several hierarchical 
levels, namely the directive, the national level, and the individual transposition process. 
By keeping constant important national level characteristics, such as the culture of 
compliance (Falkner et al, 2005), administrative capacity (Mbaye, 2001), and corporatism 
(Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998), it becomes possible to single out the effects of lower-
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level variables.8 Thus the present single case study will still be comparative in nature, 
systematically analyzing within-country variance.
1.5 A mixed methods design
As said, this study seeks to analyze the variance in timeliness and, to some extent, 
correctness of transposition in the Netherlands. In order to do so, an important 
methodological decision must be made, concerning the choice between quantitative 
and qualitative methods. For decades, the social sciences have been plagued by a turf 
war between qualitative and quantitative researchers. Researchers embracing the former 
strategy study a small number of cases in depth, whereas quantitative researchers gather 
data on a large number, thus allowing for more rigorous testing and greater external 
validity. A weakness of quantitative analysis is that its measures tend to be low in validity, 
because they are not well developed. Typical for social science are so-called thick concepts 
such as democracy (Coppedge, 1999, 468), which comprises multiple dimensions that 
cannot be reduced to a singular one. Thick concepts cannot be measured adequately for a 
large number of cases, if only because we lack the resources to score the cases on multiple 
indicators. Quantitative researchers facing this problem can either omit these, or use 
already available or easily constructed indicators with a low validity. Both solutions are 
unsatisfactory in that they yield at most a partial glimpse of the truth (ibid, 467).
In general, qualitative research is better geared towards measuring ‘thick concepts’, 
because the feasibility of scoring on multiple indicators depends on the N studied. 
Besides, it allows for more careful concept construction, when the exact conceptual 
structure of certain variables is not yet clear. Then again, qualitative analysis has its own 
shortcoming, namely external validity. The findings for a small number of cases generally 
do not represent the larger population, especially because many theories in social science 
are of a probabilistic, rather than a deterministic nature. In addition, this type of in-depth 
research runs the risk of explanatory openness, due to the ‘many variables, small number 
of cases’ problem (Lijphart, 1971, 685). Social science theories usually involve numerous 
variables, the testing of which requires a large number of cases. As a consequence, we 
can usually find evidence supporting various conjectures (Achen and Snidal, 1989, 145). 
8  In order to sort out the effects of variables at different hierarchical levels, it is recommended to carry out a 
multi-level analysis, a statistical method designed to disentangle the effects of both macro- and micro-level 
variables time, as well as their interaction effects. Unfortunately, such an analysis is infeasible due to the low 
number of EU member states. Even including the new member states, the N(25) would be too low. In addition, 
information for these countries has only been available for a relatively short time. An alternative would be to 
run a fixed effects model, including the member states as dummy variables. However, this strategy has other 
downsides: it does not allow for estimating different slopes across countries, and it increases the number of 
parameters to be estimated (Bowers and Drake, 2005, 306-307).
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Whereas qualitative research can help us to sketch a picture of the truth, this too is at 
most a partial glimpse.
In brief, both quantitative and qualitative analyses suffer from shortcomings. If not so 
much intrinsic to the two designs, they result from the lack of resources many researchers 
face, which forces them to choose between either scope or depth of the study. For this 
reason, the insight is gaining ground in political science that we should mix the two 
methods.9 If both qualitative and quantitative analyses offer a partial glimpse of the 
social world, it could be attractive to combine the two, so as to reap the benefits from 
both approaches and correct their respective weaknesses. This approach is popular in 
evaluation studies and education, but it is now making inroads into the methodology of 
political science (see Achen and Snidal, 1989; Tarrow, 1995; Coppedge, 1999; Lieberman, 
2005; Collier, Brady, and Seawright, 2004; George and Bennett, 2005; Bennett and 
Braumoeller, 2005; Gerring, 2004).
A specific form of mixed methods is nested analysis (Lieberman, 2005). In this design, 
which Creswell (2003, 215) calls a sequential transformative strategy, qualitative research 
is nested within the outcomes of quantitative research.10 Typically, such research starts 
with a quantitative analysis, aiming to explain as much of the variance and including 
as many variables as possible. Once the model has been estimated, the residuals can be 
plotted to assess the model's fit to the data. Usually, there will be some outliers, or cases 
that defy our expectations on the basis of the theory used. In the case that these are 
numerous, i.e. more than can be expected on the basis of the level of significance used, 
these cases can be studied in greater depth using qualitative information, so as to find out 
why they diverged from the larger sample (Creswell, 2003, 221; Lieberman, 2005). This 
study will employ such a design.
1.6 Data and method
The present study will consist of two stages. First, a quantitative analysis of timeliness 
will be carried out, in order to diagnose the Dutch transposition deficit and answer 
the question how we can explain the variance in time needed for transposition. The 
methodological design is very much y-oriented, in that the purpose is to explain as 
much as the variance possible, instead of starting with a particular theory. Inspiration 
9   As Tarrow (1995) rightly notes, mixed methods research rests on the assumption that qualitative and quan-
titative methods share the same logic of research. According to Read and Marsh (2002, 241), we may only 
combine quantitative and qualitative methods if both are based on the same epistemological and ontological 
position. For instance, we cannot complement a foundational quantitative analysis with an interpretist quali-
tative study. In the present research this problem does not arise, because the research is based on one and the 
same positivist and foundational position.
10   Vice versa, the quantitative stage may be nested within the qualitative study. In that case, qualitative analysis is 
used for theory development and/or concept formation, so as to inform a subsequent statistical analysis.
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for the quantitative analysis will be drawn from two related sources: the Dutch political 
discourse on the transposition deficit and the first wave of scholarship on transposition 
problems. The Dutch political discourse, as developed over time by subsequent Dutch 
governments, is closely tailored to the Dutch situation, and at the same time has close 
parallels to the ‘first wave’ of scholarship, with its eclectic representation of legal-
administrative causes of transposition problems. The two agendas will be combined 
to inform the quantitative analysis. This makes it possible to answer the question to 
what extent the Dutch image of perfectionist compliance can stand the empirical test, 
as well as the political and academic assertion that problems with compliance are largely 
a consequence of legal-administrative shortcomings. For this first part of the analysis, 
I have constructed a unique data set consisting of 229 directives adopted from 1995 
through 1998, as well as the Dutch transposing measures enacted.
After the quantitative analysis, I will assess the extent that the legal-administrative 
paradigm suficiently captures the variance observed, taking the existence of a significant 
number of outliers as an indicator of omitted variables. By carefully studying some of 
these outliers, I will evaluate whether or not the findings of the second and third wave 
of scholarship, revolving around the goodness of fit and domestic politics respectively, 
should be added to the statistical framework. Those variables will not be included in 
the statistical analysis for the reasons mentioned above: they are multidimensional 
concepts, for which the construction of indicators would be highly laborious, especially 
because there is no consensus on the conceptualization of these variables, which makes 
measurement virtually infeasible. Instead, the effects of these variables will be assessed 
through a most similar systems design, where the transposition processes of outliers and 
control cases are compared in a qualitative manner.
What about correctness? Unfortunately, this is also one of those variables that would 
take years of steady work to measure. This variable is very hard to measure for a large 
number of cases, due to the technical character of directives, which makes them practically 
unintelligible for a layman. Expert advice would be required to score this variable, but 
due to the highly subjective character of the variable, various experts would have to be 
consulted for each directive. As a second-best option, correctness will be assessed in the 
qualitative stage of the study, though in a rather explorative fashion.
1.7 Plan of the book
The plan of the book is as follows. In chapter two, I discuss the legal aspects of 
transposition, so as to ground the topic in the legal literature, and to pave the way for the 
theoretical discussion. In chapter three I set out the Dutch discourse on transposition, 
as developed by governments over time, linking this to the first wave of transposition 
scholarship, which focused on legal-administrative shortcomings. In chapter four I 
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present the statistical analysis of timeliness, assessing the strength of the various legal-
administrative causes mentioned over time. As the analysis yields various outliers, I 
proceed by presenting possible omitted variables, using insights from the goodness of fit 
literature and the third wave of scholarship, which focuses on domestic politics. Using 
chapter six to operationalize these variables and to design the case studies, I present 
the qualitative analyses in chapters seven and eight. In the last chapter I integrate the 
findings of the quantitative study and the focused comparisons.
Chapter 1 Legal preliminaries
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This chapter presents the legal preliminaries of this study. It explains the relationship 
between European and national law, and defines the key concepts of transposition, 
timeliness, and correctness. In so doing, it paves the way for the investigation of the legal 
causes of transposition problems, the operationalization of timeliness and correctness, 
and the drawing of a sample for the statistical analysis.
2.1 EC law and the national legal order
The European Community is based on international treaties, concluded between sovereign 
member states. Yet the EC is different from a regular international organization in that it 
constitutes an autonomous legal order, independent of those of the member states. This 
principle of autonomy, which is crucial for understanding transposition, originates in the 
ECJ’s landmark Van Gend en Loos judgment2. The ECJ ruled that the European Community 
‘constitutes a new legal order in international law, for whose benefit the states have limited 
their sovereign rights (…) and the subjects of which comprise not only the member states 
but also their nationals’. This legal order, the ECJ subsequently stressed in its seminal Costa/
ENEL judgment, forms integral part of the national legal systems of the member states (Craig 
and De Búrca, 2003, 277). Consequently, transformation of EC law is not necessary, in 
contrast to regular international law, regardless of the system of reception of the member states 
(Bekkers et al, 1993a, 92). The member states cannot autonomously decide whether or not 
to comply with EC law: they have voluntarily and irreversibly transferred certain legislative 
powers to the Community and are obliged to comply with the legal provisions arising from 
the use of these powers (Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, 1998, 81).
The principle of autonomy has proved crucial for the process of European integration. 
It is supported by three further general principles of EC law: supremacy, direct effect, and 
Community loyalty. First, EC law has supremacy over provisions of national law, even if these 
have the form of statutes or constitutional provisions (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000, 118; 
Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, 1998, 85). This principle is highly important, as it 
implies that the member states cannot unilaterally go against the EC legal order (Lauwaars 
and Timmermans, 1999, 30-31). In its Costa/ENEL judgment, the European Court of 
1 The EC legal order comprises the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic 
Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The EU’s other second and 
third pillars, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), do not form 
part of the EC legal order. I hence purposely refer to EC law and EC directives in this dissertation. At the same 
time, I speak of EU policies and EU compliance, because these concepts are common usage in the field of EU 
studies.
2 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 1.
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Justice maintained that no national legal provision may be adduced against EC law (Kapteyn 
and VerLoren van Themaat, 1998, 85). If national law is inconsistent with EC law, national 
courts are to give priority to the latter (Craig and DeBùrca, 2003, 278).
The second principle of EC law is that of direct effect. This principle denotes that 
citizens of the member states can directly rely on Community provisions, i.e. without 
intervention of a member state. As the ECJ stated in its Van Gend en Loos judgment: 
‘(…) the states have acknowledged that Community Law has an authority which can 
be invoked by their nationals before those (national) courts and tribunals’. Not all 
provisions of EC law lend themselves to direct effect, though: they have to fulfill some 
basic conditions of justiciability (Craig and De Búrca, 2003, 227). First, the provision 
of EC law must be unconditional and sufficiently precise (Jans, De Lange, Prechal and 
Widdershoven, 1999, 44). Second, the content of the obligation must be sufficiently 
clear, i.e. may not leave discretion in the transposition of obligations (Kapteyn and 
VerLoren van Themaat, 1998, 532).
Last but not least, the relationship between EC and national law is shaped by the 
principle of Community loyalty3. On the basis of this principle, the member states are 
obliged to ‘facilitate the achievement of the Commission’s tasks’ (Craig and De Búrca, 
2003, 419). They are required to adopt those measures necessary for EC legal provisions 
to take effect, and to refrain from all actions marring this effect. This principle comes 
down to a duty to implement EC law (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000, 259).
2.2 Sources of law
The implementation duty applies to all three sources of EC law: primary law, secondary 
law and the general principles of EC law. Primary law is highest in the hierarchy and 
consists of all the founding treaties, including attachments and protocols, as well as the 
treaties and decisions amending or supplementing these (Lauwaars and Timmermans, 
1999, 98). Secondary law, for its part, refers to all the legal instruments adopted by the 
Community institutions, their authority to do so arising from specific treaty provisions. 
The instruments of secondary law differ greatly with regard to addressees, scope of 
binding force and effect in national legal orders (Prechal, 1995, 15).4 A regulation, to 
begin with, is addressed to abstract categories of people. It is directly applicable within 
3   As such, the principle of Community loyalty does not follow from the doctrine of autonomy. Yet it is an 
important characteristic of the relationship between EC and national law (Jans, De Lange, Prechal and Wid-
dershoven, 1999, 21).
4   Article 249 is not exhaustive. For instance, there also exist so-called sui generis decisions. Examples are decisi-
ons on the modification or supplementation of treaties, decisions concerning the internal organization of the 
institutions and the inter-institutional accords (Lauwaars and Timmermans, 1999, 100). These do form part 
of secondary law, but their addressees, scope of binding force and effect in national legal orders needs to be 
established case by case, on the basis of their contents and wording. 
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the member states and ‘binding in its entirety’ (art. 249 EC). A directive, for its part, 
‘shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it 
is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods’ 
(art. 249 EC). It thus addresses a definite number of member states and is binding as to 
the result it specifies, while leaving discretion in the form and methods of transposition. 
The third binding instrument, the decision, is addressed to a limited number of member 
states and/or private parties, upon whom, like regulations, it ‘shall be binding in its 
entirety’ (art. 249 EC)5. The other two instruments, opinions and recommendations, are 
non-binding in character and hence are not subject to the implementation duty.
The third source of EC law is for the greatest part unwritten and concerns the general 
principles of Community law. First, these are the general principles of EC law, most 
notably the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. A second group of 
important principles are the fundamental rights. Third, and more importantly for the 
transposition of directives, are the principles of a public legal nature, guiding legislation, 
administration, and judicial procedures (De Moor-Van Vugt and Vermeulen, 1998, 63). 
Some of these principles, such as legality and legitimate expectations, represent important 
parameters to the implementation duty.
2.3 The directive
Even though all binding EC instruments are subject to the implementation duty, this 
duty most clearly manifests itself for the directive. This instrument differs fundamentally 
from directly binding regulations in that it leaves the member states the choice of form 
and methods to realize a particular result. The instrument is regarded as respectful of 
the sovereignty of the member states, since it leaves the member states considerable 
discretion. It meets the need of decentralized decision-making, owing to the ‘diversity, 
changeability and complexity of the situations to be dealt with, aspects which the central 
body is unable to oversee’ (Prechal, 1995, 5). Hence its use is in line with the principle 
of subsidiarity, which holds that matters should be regulated at the lowest possible 
governmental level. This principle, codified in the Treaty of Maastricht, is to be regarded 
as a political principle, expressing the concern of the member states about the increasing 
activity of the EC and the loss of national sovereignty this entails. From this perspective, 
the directive is an appropriate legislative instrument, since it leaves the choice of form 
and methods to the member states.
The main function of directives is to bring about harmonization (Prechal, 1995, 4; 
101 Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, 1998, 328), or ‘the approximation of the laws 
5   Througout this book, the term ‘decision’ is often used in a more general sense, referring to any concrete provi-
sion of EC law issued by the relevant institutions.
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of Member States to the extent required for the functioning of the common market’ 
(art. 3:1 sub h EC).6 The goal of harmonization is to remove trade barriers stemming 
from differences in national legislation, such as regulations concerning the production 
and distribution of goods (Bekkers et al, 1993a, 25). Harmonization is a form of limited 
intervention, as opposed to the introduction of uniform rules. It implies that the 
member states are merely obliged to do justice to a certain Community interest, related 
to the functioning of the internal market (Prechal, 1995, 4; Kapteyn and VerLoren 
van Themaat, 1998, 328). It is not stipulated exactly how the desired result should be 
brought about, a characteristic that rather well fits the description of directives.7 
To say that directives may only lay down the result to be reached does not mean that 
they are not specific. Many directives stipulate in great detail the ends that the member 
states have to achieve. In addition, a harmonizing directive may leave the member states 
more or less discretion, depending on the kind of harmonization specified. In case of 
optional harmonization, the directive contains certain norms that products need to meet 
in order to be admitted to the markets of the member states. Parallel to these, member 
states may impose their own norms on domestic products. Products meeting the European 
norms must be admitted to any European state; those meeting the national norms must 
be admitted to the market of that member state. Second, often minimum norms are set 
that foreign producers have to meet in order to be admitted to national markets; national 
governments are free to impose higher norms on their own producers. A third important 
technique is that of mutual recognition, which means that a product that is legally put 
on the market in one of the member states, must be admitted to other EC markets. The 
final technique, full harmonization does not leave national governments any discretion 
whatsoever: the directive fully replaces national norms (Bekkers et al, 1993a, 26-27).
Last but not least, directives often contain specific instructions about the form and 
methods to be used. According to Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat (1998, 329), this 
is justified, as long as these instructions are necessary with a view to the result prescribed. 
Similarly, the ECJ stated in its Enka judgment8 that member states’ jurisdiction may be 
limited by the result the Council and Commission wish to reach (Lauwaars and Timmermans, 
1999, 105). Yet legal scholars seem to share the view that there should remain some room 
for national maneuvering. To quote Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat (1998, 329): ‘A 
directive can never oblige a member state to introduce an exhaustive set of rules entirely 
unconnected with the national legislation (…).’
6   The technique of harmonization has become widely used in other policy areas, such as environment and social 
policy.
7   This is not to say that directives are the only instrument that may be employed for harmonization; Article 
100a, for instance, makes it possible to use regulations to bring about harmonization. Yet, regulations hardly 
ever are used towards this end, as the Commission prefers the use of directives (Kapteyn and VerLoren van 
Themaat, 1998, 779).
8  Case 38/77 Enka v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1977] ECR 2203.
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2.4 The implementation duty
The member states thus are obliged to achieve the result specified by a directive. 
Implementation refers to the process of doing so, and may be defined as ‘the entire 
process by which the obligations under Article 189(3)9 are fulfilled’ (Prechal, 1995, 
5).10 In the literature on transposition, we can distinguish several classifications of the 
activities required for implementation. According to Prechal, (1995, 5), the process of 
implementation consists of the three consecutive stages of transposition, application, and 
enforcement. Transposition refers to ‘the process of transforming directives into provisions 
of law by the competent legal body or bodies.’ Application stands for the administration 
of the national measures transposing a directive in a concrete case. Enforcement refers to 
the process of compelling observance of the national measures transposing the directive. 
In addition, Mortelmans and Van Rijn (1992, 78-79) distinguish the realization stage. 
Placed after transposition, this stage comprises the adoption of procedural legal measures 
complementing the material provisions, such as provisions for application or enforcement. 
Together with transposition, realization forms the abstract stage of implementation; the 
concrete stage comprises application and enforcement.11
The so-called ‘EC Checklist’ (Ministry of Justice, 2002) provides further insight 
into the implementation process. This document, intended to aid Dutch lawyers when 
implementing EC law, partitions implementation into four stages. First, the rights 
and obligations incorporated in the EC decision need to be laid down in national law. 
Second, national regulations at odds with the EC decision need to be adapted. Third, 
structures for application and enforcement have to be created. Finally, the Commission 
has to be notified of implementation decisions. This classification is adopted by Eijlander 
and Voermans (1999) and by and large followed by Bekkers et al (1993a, 37), who add 
some elements to it. Table 2 presents the four different classifications. In the remainder 
of this study, the focus is on transposition in the broad sense, thus comprising both thin 
transposition and realization.
9  Currently this is article 249(3) EC. 
10   It must be remarked, though, that legal scholars commonly use the term ‘implementation’ to refer to transpo-
sition, as defined above.
11   It is not entirely clear whether Prechal’s definition comprises the realization stage. But since it clearly does not 
form part of any of the other stages she mentions, I take realization to be an aspect of transposition.
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Table 2 Conceptualizing implementation
Prechal (1995) Mortelmans and 
Van Rijn (1992)
EC Checklist (2002) and 
Eijlander and Voermans (1999)
Bekkers et al (1993a)
- transposition - transposition -  establishment of rights and 
obligations in national law
-  establishment of rights and obligations in 
national law
-  adaptation of national legisla-
tion at odds with directive
-  adaptation of national legislation at odds 
with directive
- referral to the directive
- realization -  creation of structures for 
 application and enforcement
-  adoption of measures elaborating the 
material law
-  appointment of an implementation 
agency
-  establishment of rules for admin. 
 application
-  establishment of provisions for enfor-
cement
-  establishment of provisions for judicial 
protection
- application - application
- enforcement - enforcement
2.5 Timeliness 
Member states are obliged to transpose directives in due time (Prechal, 1995, 21). Each 
directive specifies a deadline before which implementation has to take place. The rationale 
behind such deadlines is that the choice of form and methods requires some time, whereas 
regulations automatically take effect in the national legal order after entering into force.
The deadline refers to the overall process of implementation, thus including 
application and enforcement, unless specified otherwise. An example of such a case is 
directive 96/25/EC on processed cereal-based foods and baby foods, which contains 
separate deadlines for transposition and for application. Moreover, some directives 
grant different implementation periods to different member states, such as in directive 
95/7/EC on value added tax, which granted Luxemburg and Germany an extra year 
for implementation. Finally, one directive may contain several deadlines, referring to 
distinct provisions.
The Commission and ECJ take timely implementation very seriously, because of the 
adverse effects on the European legal order: late implementation implies the continued 
existence of discriminatory practices and thus endangers the uniform application of 
Community law. The Commission actively battles late implementation by intensive 
monitoring and (the threat to use) the infringement procedure specified in article 226 EC. 
The ECJ, for its part, accepts barely any excuses for belated implementation. Member states 
may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances in the internal legal system, practical 
financial or administrative difficulties, problems of interpretation, non-compliance by 
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other member states, or doubts about the validity of the directive (Prechal, 1995, 26-38). 
Implementation may at most be postponed in view of contradictory obligations arising 
from international law (Prechal, 1995, 29) or in view of serious internal disturbances or 
force majeure. A case in which the latter applied concerned a bomb attack in Italy, which was 
acknowledged by the ECJ to present ‘insurmountable difficulties’ for the Italian authorities 
to implement a particular directive (Craig and De Búrca, 2003, 426). ‘In this case, however, 
it was of no avail for the Italian government, as the ECJ found that the government could 
not rely on this event to justify continuing failure to comply with the directive concerned 
several years after the bomb attack had occurred’ (Prechal, 1995, 28).  
2.6 Correctness
Transposition needs to be not only timely, but also correct: the national transposing 
measures have to concur with the directive.12 This obligation is much more ambiguous 
than that of timeliness. Nonetheless, the ECJ takes a rather rigorous stance on correctness, 
and accepts hardly any excuses pled by the member states. One possible exception refers 
to the question whether implied or even explicit approval by the Commission of the 
implementing measures may constitute an excuse for incorrect transposition. In principle 
such approval may not excuse a member state, as the ECJ concluded in Case 288/83 
brought by the Commission against Ireland. Yet, when it comes to the legal consequences 
of the establishment of incorrect transposition, the principle of legitimate expectations 
has led the ECJ to be somewhat lenient on the member state, releasing it from state 
liability (Prechal, 1995, 39-40). When assessing correctness, the ECJ distinguishes three 
dimensions, namely the content of the national transposition measures, form and methods 
wed, and their provisions for effective application and enforcement (Prechal, 1995, 35). 
Contents of implementing measures
First of all, the contents of the transposition measures have to be in line with those of 
the directive. Since member states typically do not have any discretion in the result to 
be reached13, the transposition process must start with a careful reading of the directive. 
The elements of a directive are listed below, and illustrated for directive 96/93/EC on the 
certification of animals and animal products.
12   Please note that the conditions of timeliness and correctness are closely interrelated. That is, when transposi-
tion is not correct after the deadline has expired, it is by definition not timely. Correctness hence is a sine qua 
non for timeliness.
13   In some cases member states do have some room for maneuver with respect to the result, namely when the 
directive explicitly grants the member states discretion, or when this implicitly follows from the fact that a 
directive regulates a topic only globally (Veltkamp, 1998, 17).
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Usually, the directive starts out with a preamble, consisting of various recitals, stating 
the basis on which the decision-making competence rests, as well as the motives and 
the goal of the directive. These preambles tend to be fairly long, partly because of the 
increased importance of the principle of subsidiarity, which makes it necessary to indicate 
why the directive was called for at all (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000, 262-263). As such, 
the preamble does not require implementation. For directive 96/93/EC the preamble is 
(see table 3): 
Table 3 Example of a preamble (directive 96/93/EC)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 43 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1), 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2), 
Whereas Council Directive 89/662/EEC of 11 December 1989 concerning veterinary checks in intra-Com-
munity trade with a view to the completion of the internal market (3) and Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 
26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community trade in certain 
live animals and animal products with a view to the completion of the internal market (4), put the responsibil-
ity on the Member State of production or dispatch to ensure that veterinary checks, and where applicable, 
certification, are carried out in an appropriate manner;  
Whereas to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market in live animals and animal products, Member 
States should be able to rely completely on the integrity of certification at the places of production and dispatch;  
Whereas this objective cannot be achieved by Member States individually; whereas, therefore, common rules 
should be adopted on the obligations of competent authorities and certifying officers and with respect to the 
certification of animal and animals products in accordance with Community legislation;  
Whereas it is appropriate to ensure that the rules and principles applied by third-country certifying officers 
provide guarantees which are at least equivalent to those laid down in this Directive;  
Whereas effective measures must be taken to prevent misleading or fraudulent certification, 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
The preamble is followed by various articles and possibly annexes, which contain the 
substantive rules. Several types of substantive rules exist. First, they may specify either a 
legal or a factual situation, to be realized by the national governments. Directives that only 
contain provisions referring to factual behavior are very rare: most directives also require 
that legal provisions be changed (Prechal, 1995, 45-46). Second, they may involve either 
prohibitions or obligations. Third, directives may leave some discretion in the result to 
be achieved, namely when they allow for derogations or for national interpretation (Ibid, 
48-49). In that case, member states have discretionary freedom regarding not only the 
form and methods, but also the result. Fourth and rather confusingly, the substantive 
rules may refer to either a substantive or a procedural result to be realized in the national 
legal order. In other words, the result to be reached may comprise procedural aspects, 
which on the basis of article 249 should actually be for the member states to decide 
on. In reality, therefore, the distinction between result and form and methods is not 
as clear-cut as article 249 leads on to believe. Table 4 reproduces one of the articles of 
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directive 96/93/EC, so as to give an example. This article contains several substantive 
rules referring to a legal situation, both of a substantive and a procedural nature (art. 
4:3). These rules intend to create obligations for the member states itself (art. 4:1) and 
for individuals, namely the certifying officers (art. 4:2).
Table 4 Example of substantive rules (directive 96/93)
Article 4  
1.  The competent authorities shall take all necessary steps to ensure the integrity of certification. In particular 
they shall ensure that certifying officers designated by them: 
(a) have a status which ensures their impartiality and have no direct commercial interest in the animals or 
products being certified or in the holdings or establishments in which they originate;  
(b) are fully aware of the significance of the contents of each certificate which they sign.
2.  Certificates shall be drawn up at least in a language understood by the certifying officer and at least in one 
of the official languages of the country of destination as provided for in Community legislation.
3.  Each competent authority shall be in a position to link certificates with the relevant certifying officer and 
ensure that a copy of all certificates issued is available for a period to be determined by it.
Besides the substantive provisions, directives usually contain so-called ancillary provisions 
(see table 5). These are just as binding upon the member states as the substantive 
provisions, but they are of a different nature: they complement the substantive provisions 
by specifying member states’ obligations towards each other and towards the Commission. 
For instance, they relate to the deadline before which implementation has to take place, 
the requirement that the member states are to take the measures necessary for realizing 
the specified result, and the duty to notify the Commission of the measures that have 
been adopted to implement the directive (Prechal, 1995, 50-51).
Table 5 Example of ancillary provisions (directive 96/93/EC)
Article 9  
1.  Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply 
with this Directive before 1 January 1998. They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or shall be 
accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such 
reference shall be laid down by Member States.
2.  Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of domestic law 
which they adopt in the field governed by this Directive.
A third category of provisions is not addressed to the member states, but to the Community 
institutions themselves. For instance, directives may delegate further implementation 
to the Commission, detail procedures for amendments, or request the Commission to 
report on the actual application (Prechal, 1995, 53-54). Directive 96/93/EC offers the 
following example (table 6):
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Table 6 Example of provisions addressed to the Commission (directive 96/93/EC)
Article 8  
Before 31 December 1998 the Commission shall submit a report to the Council, accompanied by proposals 
on the possible use of secure methods of electronic transmission and certification. 
The Council shall act by qualified majority on those proposals.
After establishing which provisions require implementation, the member state has to choose 
how to do so. Basically, the choice is between verbatim transposition, i.e. literal adoption of 
the text of the directive, and translation of the contents into national legal concepts and 
terminology. When opting for literal translation, the member state must take into account 
the ECJ’s jurisprudence, which specifies that the content of the implementing measures 
must be clear and precise and express exactly what was meant by the directive. Generally, the 
latter criterion is not easy to fulfill, since the meaning of a translated concept often differs 
from the original one. Unfortunately, this problem cannot always be prevented by verbatim 
transposition, because this harbors the risk of parachuting a foreign concept into a national 
legal system. In addition, correspondence in text does not necessarily mean correspondence 
in spirit of the directive; the text must be interpreted in light of the purport and purpose of 
the directive (Veltkamp, 1998, 43-44). Especially if the directive is meant to grant rights or 
duties to individuals, these principles should be taken very seriously (Prechal, 1995, 91). 
The second content-related step is the inspection of existing national law. As stated 
before, member states have to ensure that existing law is brought in line with the directive. 
Two situations can be distinguished. First, existing legislation may literally conflict with 
the directive. Provisions of national law may directly go against the directive, or they may 
do so in a more indirect way. In both cases, the conflicting provisions need to be adapted. 
Second, existing law may be worded too generally in light of the directive, and require 
specification (Veltkamp, 1998, 44-45).
Form and methods
Correspondence between existing national law and a directive does not guarantee correct 
transposition; the choice of ‘form and methods’14 forms a second aspect of correctness, 
as member states enjoy only limited discretion in this respect. First, many directives 
prescribe particular form and methods for the national measures. An example is directive 
92/56/EC, which prescribes the conclusion of collective labor agreements (Heukels, 
1993, 60-62). Second, the member states’ choice of forms and methods is restricted by 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
14   Neither the literature, nor the ECJ’s case law make entirely clear what the concepts ‘form and methods’ mean (Prechal, 
1995, 88). In light of the present discussion, the exact delineation of the two concepts is not of too much interest.
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The main legal principle curtailing the choice of form and methods is that of legal 
certainty, which means that individuals must be able to ascertain their rights and 
obligations that arise from a particular directive.  As a consequence, member states are 
generally obliged to enact legally binding provisions of internal law (Heukels, 1993, 62; 
Bekkers et al, 1993a, 103). A general legal context is allowed only if it ensures the full 
application of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner and if it is legally 
binding for the administration and third parties (Heukels, 1993, 64). Consequently, 
the possibilities of transposition through non-binding instruments such as circulars, 
official instructions and administrative practices are limited (Kapteyn and VerLoren van 
Themaat, 1998, 330). The ECJ objects to ‘whimsical administrative practices’ (Craig 
and De Búrca, 2003, 421) because these can be changed as pleased by the administration 
(Prechal, 1995, 97). The obligation to enact binding provisions of internal law is especially 
strict for directives that grant individuals rights or obligations (Veltkamp, 1998, 22).
The need to adopt binding legislation also arises from the principles of effective judicial 
protection and parallel norms. The former implies the need to provide individuals affected 
by the directive with information about their legal position. Furthermore, judicial 
protection is rendered more effective by opting for binding legislation. The latter refers to 
the principle that transposing measures must have the same legal force as those measures 
initially regulating the subject matter. Otherwise, it would be possible to amend higher 
national regulations through lower ones, which would entail a breach of the principle of 
legal certainty (Veltkamp, 1998, 46-47). 
Last but not least, the member states are required to fully and permanently ensure 
the useful effect of the directive15 (Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, 1998, 330). 
This principle not only concerns the factual situation; member states also have to 
secure full transposition, which again implies the requirement to enact legally binding 
measures. Administrative practices can easily be changed by the administration, and 
hence cannot guarantee the continued application of the directive (Prechal, 1995, 97). 
A second consequence of the principle of useful effect is that member states have the 
final responsibility for implementation in their countries, and that the possibilities for 
decentralized transposition are limited (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000, 270). 
Measures for application and enforcement
The last element of correctness concerns the measures for effective application and 
enforcement. This element comprises four conditions. To begin with, the member states 
must provide for legally grounded mechanisms for monitoring and verification. In the 
15   Case 48/75 Royer [1976] ECR 479. This conclusion was reinforced by the Court’s statement in Case 102/79 
Commission v. Belgium [1980] ECR 1473.
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second place, they need to appoint national agencies responsible for the application of 
the directive and assign them a clearly and specifically described task. Obligations and 
competences of the agency are to be described in detail, so as to secure the realization of 
the result as contained in the directive (Veltkamp, 1998, 49-50). Third, the member states 
must enact measures for enforcement, so as to guarantee compliance with the directive. 
According to Prechal (1995, 101) this duty comes down to designing an appropriate 
system of sanctions, ‘since otherwise effective enforcement will be unrealistic’. Even if 
the directive does not mention sanctions at all, member states are required to take action 
in this respect. In doing so, they have discretion in the kind of sanctions, i.e. based in 
criminal, civil or administrative law (Ibid, 103). Yet discretion in the specific form and 
kind of sanctions is limited in three ways. First, national authorities need to enforce EC 
law to the same extent as national law. As a consequence, violations must be punished 
under the same material and formal conditions as similar violations under national 
law (principle of assimilation). In addition, national law must provide for effective, 
proportionate, and deterring sanctions (Veltkamp, 1998, 51). 
The last aspect of the ‘complementing measures’ requirement concerns judicial 
protection. When the directive grants rights to individuals, citizens must be able to invoke 
those rights in court. The following requirements for judicial protection may be derived 
from the ECJ’s case law (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000, 291). First, subjective rights of 
EC origin require comparable protection as those originating in national law. Second, 
national impediments to the enforcement of subjective EC rights need to be removed. 
Usually, existing provisions for judicial protection already fulfill these requirements; 
specific measures rarely need to be taken (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000, 291).
2.7 Summary
The directive is a legal instrument unparalleled in national law: it leaves member states the 
choice of form and methods to realize a particular result. Consequently, member states 
have a duty to implement directives. The implementation process can be divided into 
three stages: transposition, application, and enforcement. All three stages are subject to 
the conditions of timeliness and correctness. Timeliness implies that member states must 
guarantee full implementation before the deadline specified by the directive. Correctness 
is more complex to ascertain and comprises three conditions. First, the contents of the 
directive must be properly converted into national law. Second, the form and measures 
chosen must be in line with the principles of legal certainty, effective judicial protection, 
parallel norms, and useful effect. Third, effective application and enforcement must be 
provided for. To what extent does the Netherlands live up to these twin conditions?
Chapter 2 Explaining dlelays: the benign view
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3  Explaining delays: the benign view1
Traditionally, the Dutch self-image has been one of a commitment to compliance (Baas, 
1996, 1200). ‘We find ourselves respectable, meticulous, and possibly too loyal to the 
EU’ (Voermans, 2004, 91). As a civil servant at the Ministry of Economic Affairs assured 
me, ‘The quality of transposition is always central. Delays occur because we want to do 
it too well.’ This view is in line with the view of the Dutch as having a good ‘culture of 
compliance’ (Tallberg, 2002, 618). Just like the Danes (Biering, 2000, 959), the Dutch 
are said to have a great respect for international law. As stated by Beyers, Kerremans, 
and Bursens (2000, 77), ‘It would be unbearable for Dutch officials not to transpose 
European law (…).’
In reality, the Dutch culture of compliance is not upheld by the facts. Transposition, 
application and enforcement of directives are often far from smooth. On numerous 
occasions, this has led the European Commission and the ECJ to wage infringement 
procedures against the Netherlands. Some notorious cases concern equal pay and equal 
treatment of men and women, and the protection of birds and animal habitats.2 How 
can we explain these instances of less-than-perfect compliance?
Since the late 1970s, the issue of transposition reached the political agenda several 
times. The ensuing governmental discourse on transposition has not questioned the 
Dutch self-image of perfectionist compliance. Instead, the emphasis has been on rather 
benign causes of transposition problems, mostly legal and administrative in nature. This 
conceptualization developed in connection with the first wave of transposition research, 
which occurred from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s. Scholars of this first wave, among 
whom many Dutch students of law and public administration, viewed transposition as 
an apolitical process that is at times hampered by legal-administrative problems.3 This 
chapter introduces the Dutch governmental discourse, and the conceptually similar 
first wave of transposition research. This results in various hypotheses on transposition 
timeliness, which will be used for the statistical analysis in the next chapter.
1 Parts of this chapter have been adapted from Mastenbroek (2005a).
2  Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the member states 
relating to the  application of the principle of equal pay for men and women; Council Directive 76/207/EEC 
of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions;  Council Directive 92/43/
EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora; Council Directive 
79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds.
3  It needs to be said that some of the early authors singled out variables of a more political nature, such as the 
resistance of domestic actors (Puchala, 1975, 496; Collins and Earnshaw, 1992; Richardson, 1996). These 
variables, however, were marginal to the literature at this stage, not gaining ground until the late 1990s.
Chapter 2 Explaining dlelays: the benign view
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Chapter 3 Explaining delays: the benign view
3.1 The Dutch governmental discourse on transposition
Blind spot (1978-1988)
In 1978, the Dutch lawyers Maas and Bentvelsen arranged to conduct a study of 
transposition. They asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an overview of all directives 
in force, plus corresponding transposing measures. To their surprise, neither the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, nor the Ministry of Justice could produce such an overview. Maas 
and Bentvelsen decided to gather their own data, and analyzed all directives from 1973 
through 1975. Of these 94 directives, a mere 36% had been transposed on time.
The critical finding by Maas and Bentvelsen soon made it onto the political agenda. 
MP Brinkhorst questioned the government on the poor Dutch record. He requested an 
overview of all directives and their transposing measures in the Netherlands, as well as 
a study of the causes of untimely transposition. The Dutch government denied the first 
request, but promised to look into the causes of the problem (Del Grosso, 2000, 224). 
A year later, after being reminded by Brinkhorst, the government finally delivered its 
conclusions. Minister of Foreign Affairs Van der Klauw stated that the ministries often 
simply started the transposition process too late, that the deadlines were too tight, that 
too often additional national concerns were included into transposing measures, and that 
consultation of the advisory boards delayed the process (Maas and Van Haersolte, 1994, 
705; Del Grosso, 2000, 225). Yet no measures were taken to improve the situation.
The silence on the issue was shortly broken in 1983, again as a result of a critical 
publication. The Dutch Asser Institute in that year published an overview of all 
applicable EC directives, and the corresponding national measures (Del Grosso, 2000, 
225). It turned out that the transposition score had further deteriorated: only 70% of 
the directives applicable had been transposed (Maas and Van Haersolte, 1994, 705). 
Again, two MPs asked the government for clarity about the causes of this poor record. 
Junior minister of European affairs Van Eekelen answered that delays are caused by 
the complexity of the issue and by the perfectionist attitude of the Dutch (Maas and 
Van Haersolte, 1994, 705). As a first step towards solving the problem he promised to 
include yearly overviews of transposition into the existing annual reports on the effects 
of the EEC Treaties on the Dutch legal order (Del Grosso, 2000, 226). This decision 
materialized in 1984, some six years after the problem was first revealed.
Increased awareness (1988-1992)
In 1990 transposition assumed a firmer position on the political agenda (Bekkers et 
al, 1993a, 2), when the Commission published alarming reports about the poor state 
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of transposition of internal market directives in the member states. With a view to the 
upcoming Dutch presidency in 1991, the issue got the attention of Parliament and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who feared that the transposition deficit would negatively 
affect the Dutch image in Europe (Dommers, 1991, 42). Several measures were taken to 
battle and prevent late transposition (Bekkers et al, 1995, 397; Harmsen, 1999, 101).
Especially Parliament played an active role in seeking to reduce the backlog. First of 
all it requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide quarterly overviews of non-
transposed directives (Del Grosso, 2000, 226). The government granted this request, 
and in July 1989  installed the inter-ministerial Working Group Assessment New 
Commission Proposals (Werkgroep Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen or BNC; De 
Zwaan, 1993, 51). This committee, composed of representatives from all ministries, was 
to provide the quarterly overviews, which it did for the first time in October 1989. Also, 
it was assigned the task of discussing all new Commission proposals so as to prevent 
future transposition problems. As was decided, the BNC assigns the ministry responsible 
for transposition, which is to complete a so-called ‘fiche’ on the Commission proposal, 
listing the expected consequences for the Dutch legal order.
Parliament continued to critically monitor the ministers involved, regularly asking 
questions about transposition problems (Maas and Van Haersolte, 1994, 707). In May 
1990 it organized a hearing on the causes of slow transposition (Bekkers et al, 1993a, 2). 
The main findings were that the ministries started working on directives too late, that 
many directives did not fit the Dutch legal order very well, that the legislative process was 
too time-consuming, due to the obligation to consult several advisory boards, and that 
transposition often necessitated complicated revisions of existing law.
The Dutch government decided that more action was needed. It asked the 
Commission for the Assessment of Legislative Projects (Commission voor de Toetsing van 
Wetgevingsprojecten or CTW) to report on ways to simplify and speed up the transposition 
process (Baas, 1996, 1200). The resulting report, which was presented to the government 
in 1990, did answer this question, but in a slightly desultory way (Maas and Van Haersolte, 
1994, 709). It mainly paid attention to the EU level, singling out technical causes such 
as the short deadlines, the increase in the number of directives and the low quality of EC 
legislation. Rather haphazardly, it listed some national factors, such as the slow legislative 
process, ministerial fragmentation, and the absence of centralized monitoring. The CTW 
had fallen short of providing systematic research into the causes of late and incorrect 
transposition (Maas and Van Haersolte, 1994, 709). It did not address the cultural, 
political, and administrative causes of transposition problems, which led various observers 
to view the report as a disappointment (Baas, 1996, 1201).
The government, in contrast, was rather pleased with the CTW report. It was especially 
partial to the recommendations on accelerating the legislative process (Bekkers et al, 
1993a, 2). It set out to simplify the legislative process for transposition, and to expand the 
possibilities of using delegated legislation (Maas en Van Haersolte, 1994, 719). Awoken 
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by the ECJ’s 1992 Frankovich judgment, which established the financial liability of a 
member state for late or incorrect transposition (Baas, 1996, 1202), it hastily took steps 
to realize this goal. First, it developed Instructions for Legislation (Aanwijzingen voor 
de Regelgeving) to be used by civil servants when drafting legislation, in order to speed 
up the transposition process. Second, it made important changes to the main statutes 
governing the legislative process, namely the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene 
Wet Bestuursrecht) and the Publication Act (Bekendmakingswet). Chiefly, the obligation 
to consult advisory boards was abolished for transposition, with the exception of the 
Council of State (Raad van State), which evaluates the legal quality of bills. Also, the 
existing constraints regarding publication were abolished (Maas en Van Haersolte 722).
The Securitel crisis (1996-2002)
Having installed the BNC and having streamlined the legislative process, the government no 
longer considered transposition a problem. And indeed, the large backlog of untransposed 
directives slowly vanished. Yet, the Dutch compliance record was still far from perfect, as 
turned out on 30 April 1996. At that day, the ECJ delivered its judgment in the Securitel 
case, which concerned the non-application of directive 83/189/EC laying down a procedure 
for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations. This 
‘notification’ directive obliged member states to communicate technical standards and 
regulations to the European Commission, in order to prevent the creation of trade barriers 
(Drijber, 2001, 25). The Netherlands had transposed the directive, but had not applied it: 
some 250 technical measures had been enacted without notification (Parliamentary Papers 
II 1996/97, 25389, nr. 2, p. 4). The ECJ concluded that this could render the standards 
non-applicable, when so decided by national court (De Zwaan, 1998, 362).
The Securitel judgment caused great unrest in the Dutch government. With the 
Council presidency coming up in the first half of 1997, the Netherlands was highly 
embarrassed. Apparently Dutch ministries still had a blind spot for the European aspects 
of national policies. They had completely ignored crucial EC parameters to the seemingly 
national measures they had enacted (Van der Voet, 2001, 6-8). In the summer of 1997 a 
massive catch up operation was set into motion, so as to notify the relevant standards (De 
Zwaan, 1998, 362). Also, the government made changes to the coordination structures 
for implementation, in order to prevent similar embarrassing situations in the future.
To begin with, the government established the Interdepartmental Commission for 
European Law (Interdepartementale Commissie Europees Recht or ICER) a new committee 
for the coordination of the preparation and implementation of European law. This 
committee, consisting of representatives of all ministries, was given the task of scrutinizing 
the legal consequences of proposed EC law for the Dutch legal order, and to coordinate 
transposition. Also, it was assigned the task of coordinating these two activities, so that 
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lawyers would no longer stumble upon legal problems in the Netherlands. The ICER is co-
chaired by the ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs, in order to ensure the consistency 
between legal and policy-related aspects of European policies (Parliamentary Papers II 
1997/98, 25389, nr. 32, p. 1-2). 
Second, a special Interdepartmental Working Group on Notification (Interdepartementale 
Werkgroep Notificatie or IWN) was established. This group, which forms part of ICER, 
was to coordinate all EC notification obligations (De Zwaan, 1998, 363). To this end, all 
ministries assigned special notification coordinators, whom the IWN was to coordinate. 
Finally, the tasks of the existing committee BNC were expanded. So far, the committee 
had played a predominantly procedural role. Now, though, they were assigned a more 
substantive role, making sure that the important consequences of Commission proposals 
and possible transposition problems were assessed thoroughly (Parliamentary Papers II 
1997/98, 25389, nr. 27, p. 6).
In addition to the structural adaptations, the government provided for another 
study. It instructed the Legislative Review Commission (Visitatiecommissie Wetgeving) to 
study the legislative process at the various ministries, with the focus on the preparatory 
stage (Oosschot, 2001, 2). This commission found that the ministries had insufficient 
European legal expertise at (ibid, 3), that the European dimension of policies and 
legislation was not always recognized, that the cooperation between policy staff and legal 
staff was often insufficient, and that the ministerial lawyers often were involved too late 
(Visitatiecommissie wetgeving, 2000, 22-36). It recommended that a European Knowledge 
Center be established, and that Human Resource Management aim at attracting and 
keeping specialists in EC law (Visitatiecommissie wetgeving, 2000, 38-46). 
The government, in its 2000 response to the report, acknowledged that European 
legal expertise was not always sufficiently embedded in the ministries. However, it 
claimed that after Securitel important steps had already been taken to solve this problem, 
such as the establishment of ICER. It was of the opinion that knowledge of EC law 
should be integrated in all the ministries, and that a central knowledge center would not 
solve the problem. On the other points, no concrete actions were taken. Apparently, the 
momentum had faded, four years after Securitel.
Around the Dutch presidency (2003-up)
After another quiet period, the transposition deficit resurfaced on the political agenda in 
2003. The BNC’s report over the second quarter of 2003 showed that the Dutch record 
had deteriorated again (Parliamentary Papers II 2002/03, 21109, nr. 116). The deadlines 
had expired for 50 directives, as opposed to 28 in the second quarter of 2002. This led the 
Standing Committee for European Affairs to question the government on the matter. On 
October 28 junior minister of European affairs Nicolaï repeated the well-known, almost 
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ritual response, namely: ministries start too late, monitoring is ineffective, the terms for 
transposition are too short, ministries lack capacity, and the formal legislative procedure is 
too time-consuming. Nicolaï proposed to change the ‘fiche’ procedure so that they were 
no longer only submitted to Parliament by the minister of Foreign Affairs, but also by the 
policy ministers. Thus it was expected that the sectoral parliamentary committees would 
assume a more active role in monitoring transposition. In addition, he proposed that the 
Dutch strive for longer transposition terms in Brussels and that the possibilities to use 
delegated legislation be enlarged (Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 21109, nr. 117, p. 1).
On 27 November 2003 Parliament debated Nicolaï’s plans. The debate revolved around 
the role of Parliament, as the Christian Democrats (CDA) claimed that often delays occur 
because Parliament receives transposing bills just before the deadline. Also, Parliament 
criticized the allegedly prevalent practice of ‘gold-plating’, or adding purely national 
elements to the bills. The Christian Democrats proposed that government improved 
the quality of the information provided to Parliament, requesting a new document per 
directive, listing additional elements such as the date of submission to Parliament, and 
the existing legislative framework (Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 21 109, nr. 118). 
Yet both the social democrats (Partij van de Arbeid or PvdA) and the liberals (Volkspartij 
voor Vrijheid en Democratie or VVD) disagreed with this analysis, arguing that Parliament 
should critically assess its own role first. According to VVD spokesman Van Baalen, the 
Lower House first had to prove that it takes its transposition duty seriously. Nicolaï was 
very critical of the CDA’s request as well, as most of the information it requested was 
already available in the quarterly reports (Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 21109, nr. 
119). Finally, the CDA tabled a motion requesting extra information in the quarterly 
overviews, on the date of submission of a bill to Parliament, and on the prevalence of 
gold-plating (Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 21109, nr. 118).
Second, the discussion touched upon the possibility to increase the use of delegated legislation 
for transposition. In 1999 the government published its position on this issue (Parliamentary 
Papers II 1998/99, 26200 VI, nr. 65). It proposed that, with a view to timely transposition, 
it should become possible to implement using delegated legislation, even if statutes should be 
used formally. This proposal was rejected by the Upper House. It adopted a motion proposed 
by senator Jurgens, holding that EC transposition had to take place through the regular 
legislative process (Parliamentary Papers I 2000/01, 26200 VI, nr. 65 and nr. 37b).
Recently the government waged a second attempt to enlarge the possibilities of 
using delegated legislation, as the minister of Economic Affairs submitted a bill for the 
accelerated transposition of EC directives (Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29474, nr. 
2). This bill provides for enlarging the basis for delegation in the areas of energy, postal 
services, and telecommunication (Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29474, nr. 3, p. 
12; also see Voermans, 2004, 100). At the same time it proposes to shift parliamentary 
scrutiny from transposition to the decision-making stage, so as to safeguard the primacy 
of politics. Nevertheless, the Standing Committee for Economic Affairs received the bill 
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rather critically (Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29474, nr. 5). The CDA was not very 
pleased with it, and the bill filled the Socialist Party ‘with dismay’. The CDA argued that 
it is rather striking that the government proposed to increase delegation in these areas 
where it has a great financial interest. 
Overall, the parties in the Lower House feared that the bill would deteriorate the position 
of Parliament vis-à-vis the government. Besides, they felt that the bill offered a rather crude 
remedy for a problem that in their view had not been analyzed sufficiently. For these 
reasons, the VVD proposed to only bolster parliamentary scrutiny in the decision-making 
stage, and see if this remedies the problem, before opting for such a far-reaching solution. 
MP Van Dijk (CDA) was the rapporteur for the topic, a construction that was a veritable 
novum in the Dutch legislative procedure. He came with an alternative solution, namely 
for Parliament to only relinquish its power for directives that do not offer any discretion 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2004/05, 29474, nr. 7). Minister Brinkhorst, who as an MP first 
put the transposition problem on the agenda, accepted this amendment begrudgingly, even 
though it drastically watered down the ambitions of the bill. He realized this compromise 
was the highest attainable, in view of the continued negative stance of the Upper House on 
transposition through delegated legislation (Steunenberg and Voermans, 2005, 164).
Table 7 The transposition deficit: analysis and solutions over time
1968-1988 1988-1996 1996-2003 2003-heden
occasion -  study by Maas en 
Bentvelsen (1978)
- Sutherland report
-  parliamentary ques-
tions
- presidency 1991
- Securitel crisis
- presidency 1997
-  quarterly overviews 
2003
-  parliamentary ques-
tions
- presidency 2004
reports - government study -  parliamentary 
hearing
- study CTW
-  study Legislative 
Review Commission
- government study
diagnosis 
government
- late starts
- short deadlines
- gold-plating
-  length of legislative 
procedure
- complexity
- Dutch perfectionism
- late starts
- short deadlines
-  bad fit Dutch legal 
order
-  length of legislative 
procedure
-  increased number of 
directives
-  low quality of direc-
tives
-  ministerial fragmen-
tation
- bad monitoring
-  shortage of EU legal 
expertise
-  bad coordination 
between negotia-
tors and lawyers 
- late starts 
- bad monitoring
- lack in capacity
-  length of legislative 
procedure
measures -  yearly reports to 
be produced by 
Foreign Affairs
- installment of BNC
- quarterly overviews
-  acceleration of 
legislative process
- installment of ICER
- bolstering of BNC
-  more extensive 
quarterly overviews
-  change in fiche 
procedure
-  more delegated 
legislation?
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3.2 The academic debate: the first wave
Dutch governments and parliaments over time have portrayed transposition as a largely 
apolitical process, which at times goes wrong due to legal-administrative problems. As table 
7 depicts, the main causes singled out by the Dutch government are the short deadlines and 
late starts, the lengthy legislative procedure, and coordination problems at the ministries. 
This benign problem analysis resonates rather well with the first wave of academic research 
on the transposition deficit, which ran from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s. Just as 
the governmental discourse, most of this original literature portrays compliance as an 
apolitical process, which at times grinds to a halt due to legal or administrative reasons. 
In the following, the explanations offered by this first generation of research are listed and 
translated into hypotheses that will guide the subsequent statistical analysis.
Tight deadlines
A first legal-administrative explanation relates to the time allotted for transposition, on the 
basis of the deadline specified by the directive. The Dutch government on many occasions 
complained that the transposition terms are too short (Van Kreveld, 1993, 167; Maas 
en Van Haersolte, 1994, 715; Bekkers et al, 1993a, 151). According to the Council of 
State, though, this argument is outdated, because the terms usually should suffice (Raad 
van State, 2001, 109). Furthermore, it can be argued that the member states themselves 
have a say in setting the deadlines. Yet, it can be hypothesized that the amount of time 
granted for transposition has an effect on the amount of time used for transposition (also 
see Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2006, 13). Delays are more likely for directives with tight 
deadlines than for those allowing several years for transposition. Complying earlier than 
required by the deadline is usually not an attractive option for member states, as this 
implies imposing stricter demands on their businesses or inhabitants than other member 
states. Member states are likely to take at least the time provided by the directive.
Hypothesis 1: The more time is granted for transposition, the longer national governments are 
likely to take for transposition.
Quality
A second legal-administrative explanation of delayed transposition concerns the poor 
quality of EC directives (Krislov, Ehlermann, and Weiler, 1986, 82-83; Weiler, 1988, 354; 
Collins and Earnshaw, 1992, 225; Gaskin, 1993, 336; Bekkers et al, 1995, 417; Barnes 
and Barnes, 1999, 105; Jordan, 1999, 78; Ciavarini Azzi, 2000, 56; Dimitrakopoulos 
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   34 05-03-2007   15:52:50
Chapter 3 Explaining delays: the benign view

and Richardson, 2001; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001b, 446; Voermans et al, 2001; Falkner et 
al, 2005, 288). Many directives are vaguely worded, or highly complex in nature. Many 
directives are internally inconsistent or at odds with other directives. Besides, they often 
contain unnecessary abbreviations, unintelligible Community jargon, imprecise references 
to other texts, and political statements with unclear legal status (Xanthaki, 2001, 654).
The Dutch government frequently invoked the quality argument to justify its 
problems with timely transposition. Under their 1997 Council presidency, the Dutch 
actively sought to devise measures to increase the quality of directives. Due to the limited 
interest among other member states, the result of this activity was a meager declaration 
annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam (Ciavarini Azzi, 2000, 56). In this declaration, the 
European Council calls upon the EU institutions to develop guidelines for legislative 
drafting (Declaration No. 39 to the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam).
A low quality of directives is likely to delay transposition. The lawyers will have to 
scrutinize the unclear provisions of a directive, study its internal and external consistency, 
and reach consensus on the best interpretation. In addition, the European Commission is 
not known for its fast responses to questions of interpretation posed by the member states. 
Feedback is transferred rather slowly, and is often vague and unreliable (Bekkers et al, 1995, 
417). Finally, in some cases transposition is postponed in anticipation of complementary 
or improved legislation (Maas en Van Haersolte, 1994, 717). In brief, the quality of a 
directive seems to be an important predictor of the time needed for transposition.
Hypothesis 2: The lower the quality of a directive, the more time is needed for
transposition.
Legal instrument
A third legal-administrative explanation of delays relates to a member state’s constitutional 
provisions concerning legislative decision-making. The time needed for transposition 
depends very much on the legal instrument used for transposition (Krislov, Ehlermann 
and Weiler, 1986). This argument seems highly relevant to the Dutch case, as various 
governments have argued that formal legislative procedure is too cumbersome and 
lengthy for transposition.In the Netherlands, four different instruments can be used 
for transposition: statutes, administrative orders, ministerial decrees, and acts of 
agencies4. Statutes, to begin with, are highest in the legal hierarchy. They are enacted by 
government and Parliament together and require the advice of the Dutch Council of 
4 Local acts are excluded from the present discussion, because they do not constitute an adequate instrument 
for transposition. The same holds for circulars, policy rules, collective labor agreements (cao’s) and voluntary 
agreements between government and third parties. Also, existing legislation, case law, and dynamic referral are 
excluded from this study, because they do not constitute actual transposition.
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State. A less time-consuming instrument is the administrative order (Algemene Maatregel 
van Bestuur), which is prepared by one or more ministries and countersigned by the 
Crown (art. 89 Constitution). A third instrument is the ministerial decree (ministeriële 
regeling), which is prepared and adopted by one or more ministries. The competence to 
issue administrative orders or ministerial decrees either arises from the Constitution or 
from statutes. Finally, we can distinguish a residual category of binding acts adopted by 
agencies, such as the product boards (productschappen), industry boards (bedrijfschappen), 
and the Dutch Central Bank.
What are the expected differences in duration between these instruments? It is likely 
that a statute requires most time, because of the involvement of the Council of State and 
Parliament. Furthermore, the formal legislative process is characterized by a wish to reach 
consensus with stakeholders such as interest groups, which renders it very time-consuming 
(Bekkers et al, 1995, 410). It is probably less-time consuming to adopt an administrative 
order, because Parliament is not involved here, even though the Council of State must be 
heard. Ministerial decrees are probably faster than the other two instruments (Bekkers 
et al, 1995, 404), because neither the Council of State nor Parliament nor the cabinet 
needs to be consulted. Acts of agencies are probably comparable to ministerial decrees, 
because they are adopted rather autonomously, without involvement of the Council of 
State or Parliament.
Hypothesis 3: Transposition into a statute takes more time than transposition into an administrative 
order, which takes more time than transposition into a ministerial decree or an act of an agency.
Complexity
A fourth legal-administrative explanation concerns the complexity of the transposition 
process. Transposition is likely to take longer if the transposition process is complex. 
The complexity of the transposition process has three aspects. First, the speed is likely 
to depend on whether or not a directive can be incorporated into existing legislation, or 
whether new measures are needed. Drawing up new measures is likely to take more time 
than amending an existing one.
Hypothesis 4: Transposition by amending an existing national measure is faster than transposition 
into a new measure.
Second, there might be a difference between directives amending already existing 
directives and new directives, introducing an entirely new topic of regulation. Amending 
directives usually are rather technical in nature, adapting legislation to ‘technical progress’, 
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or gradually deepening the requirements to be met. It can be expected that amending 
directives are less complex than new ones, which set the scope for regulation of an entirely 
new policy area. Transposition in the former case will come down to incorporating the 
stricter requirements into the national legislation that is already in line with the overall 
structure of the mother directive. The lawyers then already are familiar to the structure 
of the directive, as well as its key concepts and provisions. Amending directives are hence 
expected to require less time than entirely new ones.
Hypothesis 5: Amending directives are transposed faster than new directives.
Third, the complexity of the transposition process depends on the number of measures 
that must be changed or introduced to transpose the directive (Barnes and Barnes, 1999, 
106). Many directives enter into highly regulated policy spaces. In such a situation, many 
new pieces of legislation or amendments are required for transposition. Hence the range 
and complexity of existing national legislation (Collins and Earnshaw, 1992, 217) has an 
effect on the time needed. The more measures to be adopted or changed, the more work 
for legal officers, who have to draft and streamline these measures.
Hypothesis 6: The more national measures that have to be adopted or changed, the more time is 
needed for transposition.
In addition, various observers argue that transposition delays might result from gold-
plating (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001b, 449; European Economic and Social Committee, 
2005, 2). Gold-plating occurs when concepts, obligations, mechanisms and procedures are 
used that do not follow from the directive (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001b, 449). As Glachant 
(2001, 179) concludes in his research on the implementation of two directives in four 
member states, this occurs frequently. However, the gold-plating argument is faulted. 
It is unclear from the literature and from the Dutch discourse how gold-plating, in the 
sense of adopting stricter standards than prescribed, affects the speed of transposition. 
Only when transposition is done in too perfectionist a way, i.e. by harmonizing each 
existing piece of national law that has a bearing on the directive, transposition is likely 
to be delayed. This is more likely when transposed directives necessitate modifications in 
adjacent laws, to absorb the new concepts and standards contained by the directive. Such 
cascade effects, however, are not an independent argument, in that they are related to the 
number of measures that need to be adopted. In my view, the gold-plating argument is 
captured by the previous hypothesis and will not be tested individually.
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Chinese Walls
A fifth explanation of delays is administrative in nature. As Jacobson and Weiss (1995, 130) 
argue for the general case of IR compliance, the more involved a country’s officials are in 
the preparation of an international agreement, the more likely smooth compliance. This 
general argument is highly relevant for transposition, as the link between the preparation 
and transposition stage is claimed to often be weak (Bekkers et al, 1993b, 195; From and 
Stava, 1993, 65; Ciavarini Azzi, 1988; Ciavarini Azzi, 2000; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001b, 
447). Negotiations in Brussels are often conducted by policy experts, while lawyers5 are 
not involved (Van Kreveld, 1993, 167). For that reason, the latter are entirely dependent 
on the willingness of negotiators to share information in an early stage. This makes it hard 
to notice transposition problems in an early stage, let alone to try to amend the proposed 
directive accordingly.6 Problems of interpretation of directives and synchronization 
with existing national laws are then postponed, which renders transposition more time-
consuming. Moreover, such ‘Chinese walls’ between preparation and transposition may 
lead to planning problems for the legal department, as a result of which transposition 
may start relatively late. For these reasons, the existence of Chinese walls can be highly 
detrimental to timely transposition.
An example of the effects of Chinese walls is offered by the transposition of directive 
90/313/EC on environmental information in the Netherlands.7 Whereas the directive 
had the ardent support of the government, it was transposed more than five years late. 
The reason was that the directive was not in line with the ideas incorporated in the already 
existing Government Information Act (Wet Openbaarheid Bestuur or WOB), which made 
transposition extremely cumbersome. Better coordination between negotiators and 
lawyers might have prevented this problem (Van der Voet, 2001, 7).
In the Netherlands, Chinese Walls between negotiators and legal officials has been 
one of the main problems identified by the various committees that studied the causes 
of transposition problems over time (Visitatiecommissie Wetgeving, 2000, 22-36). This 
variable concerns the level of ministries: some ministries have a clear structural division 
between the preparation for EU negotiations and the implementation of the outcomes of 
these negotiations, whereas at other ministries, the distinction is less pronounced. 
Hypothesis 7: The less intensive coordination between negotiators and lawyers at a particular 
ministry, the more time is needed for transposition.
5   The Dutch bureaucratic system is characterized by a strong distinction between policy experts, responsible for 
the substantive aspects of policies, and lawyers, who are responsible for legislative drafting, .
6   A similar argument can be made for the actual application of transposing measures: often problems arise 
because sub-national governments were not involved in the transposition process.
7  Council Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the environment.
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Inter-ministerial coordination
A sixth problem is administrative in nature as well, and concerns inter-ministerial 
coordination problems (Krislov, Ehlermann, and Weiler, 1986, 79; Bekkers et al, 1993b, 
197; Dimitrakopoulos, 2001a, 616; Oosschot, 2001, 4; Drijber, 2001, 8; Falkner et al, 
2005, 298). Directives often touch upon the jurisdiction of several ministries, which are 
required to work together. This may cause problems of communication and even conflicts 
of competence or interest, which might protract the transposition process. According to 
Dimitrakopoulos (2001a, 616), coordination is a major problem in Greece, where the 
ministries work according to different sectoral logics. In other words, the more ministries, 
the more clearance points and possibilities for delays (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). 
Furthermore, negative conflicts of competence may occur when none of the ministries 
assume responsibility (Van Kreveld, 1993, 168).
In the Netherlands, this problem is likely to be particularly pressing. The Dutch civil 
service is known for its fragmentation, and has been described as the ‘Republic of the 
Thirteen Disunited Departments’ (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005, 159). The ministries 
are highly autonomous, and have there own policy styles (Bekkers, 1993b, 197-
8). The Ministry of Agriculture, for instance, has a penchant for decentralized rule-
making, whereas the Ministry of Health favors statutes. Such differences in view and 
tradition may transform the transposition process into a struggle between ministries 
(Dimitrakopoulos, 2001a, 616). Respondents state that ministries often dispute the 
responsibility for a particular directive. By the same token, sometimes no ministry wants 
to assume responsibility for a particular piece of EC law. Such bureaupolitical struggles 
are likely to slow down the transposition process. 
Hypothesis 8 : The less intensive coordination between ministries, the more time needed for 
transposition.
Administrative capacity
A final explanation is administrative capacity: it is often argued that delays in 
transposition, and problems with EU compliance more broadly, result from capacity 
problems (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001b, 448; Tallberg, 2002, 613; Falkner et al, 2005, 20). 
The Dutch government has voiced this explanation several times. As most ministries 
have downsized their legal divisions over the last decades, so as to increase their efficiency, 
personnel resources are rather tight. The civil servants at these divisions usually are 
responsible for both drafting national legislation, and transposing EC law. Under time 
constraints, transposition is likely to suffer, because priority is usually given to national 
legislation, which has the attention of Parliament and the media and is hence more 
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important for the survival of ministers. Furthermore, transposition is highly sensitive to 
personnel overturn, as it is often a highly specialist task, which the lawyers learn on the 
job over time. Directives are highly technical and often barely intelligible for generalists. 
Personnel overturn hence negatively affects the speed of transposition, as it is not a task 
that is easily taken up by others in the section.
Various authors have tested the capacity hypothesis. However, most have used it to 
explain cross-country differences in compliance. For instance, Mbaye (2001, 262) uses 
bureaucratic efficiency and corruption indices to explain variance in the number of 
infringement procedures opened against member states.8 Others argue that this variable 
operates at the level of ministries. As Devuyst (1993, 43) has argued for Belgium, the 
most important problem is understaffing at individual ministries. For the Dutch case, 
neither of the two perspectives is relevant, as problems with staffing are neither constant 
between ministries, nor over time. The staffing problem is most likely to exist at the legal 
units within the ministries, who do most of the transposition job. Here, capacity very 
much fluctuates over time, depending on the number of directives and national legislative 
initiatives on the agenda. The corresponding hypothesis is that a staffing problem at a 
particular ministry increases the time needed for transposition.
Hypothesis 9: The more staff available for transposition at a particular ministry, the less time 
needed to transpose a directive.
3.3 Summary
The Dutch discourse on transposition is grounded in a self-image of perfectionism. 
Since the 1970s, when the transposition deficit first reached the political agenda, Dutch 
governments have regarded as an apolitical process that at times grinds to a halt because 
of legal-administrative problems. This view was echoed by the first wave of transposition 
scholarship, which rather eclectically identified a host of legal and administrative 
explanations for delayed and incorrect transposition. In the next chapter, these rather 
benign explanations will be put to the test. The question is to what extent this apolitical 
view suffices to explain the time needed for transposition.
8   Mbaye (2001, 262) also uses the number of veto points as an indicator for administrative incapacity. This 
operationalization is in line with Tallberg’s (2002, 613) comment that political resistance by domestic actors is 
just another capacity limitation. However, I treat this variable later, under the heading of  ‘domestic politics’.
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4  Diagnosing and explaining timeliness1
How adequate is the ‘benign’ problem analysis, as developed by consecutive Dutch 
governments and underpinned by the first wave of transposition research? This chapter 
presents a statistical analysis that assesses the size of the Dutch transposition deficit and 
evaluates the explanatory strength of the ‘benign’ view of transposition delays.
4.1 Research design
The first question relating to the size of the Dutch transposition deficit will be answered using 
descriptive statistics. The second question is explanatory and requires statistical modeling. 
The effect of several legal-administrative variables will be assessed through the technique of 
survival analysis.2 This is a statistical method for studying duration, or time until an event, 
which is a qualitative change that occurs at a certain point in time (Allison, 1984, 9). Even 
though very common in medicine, sociology and economics, the method rarely is used by 
political scientists (for an overview see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). In the field of 
EU studies the technique has been used even more seldom, the notable exceptions being 
studies on enlargement (Schimmelfennig, 2002) and EU decision-making speed (Golub, 
1999; Schulz and König, 2000; Golub, in press, König, in press; Drüner et al, 2006). 
Survival analysis: core concepts
In a survival analysis, duration until an event is not modeled directly, as one would do when 
using regression analysis. The dependent variable in survival analysis is the so-called hazard 
rate, a latent variable containing information on both the occurrence and the duration of 
an event (see figure 1). The hazard rate is the instantaneous probability that the event will 
occur at a certain point in time, provided that it has not yet occurred (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones, 1997, 1419). The goal of survival analysis is to estimate the effect of covariates 
on the hazard rate. These covariates can be either constant over time, or change in value. 
The effect of the covariates on the hazard rate is separated from the so-called base-line 
hazard rate, which is solely attributable to the passage of time, and is common to all units 
studied.
1  This chapter has been adapted from Mastenbroek (2003).
2   The technique of survival analysis was originally developed in the field of medicine with the purpose of study-
ing the effect of medicine on the prospects of survival in cancer patients- hence the gloomy name. It is also 
known as event history analysis, lifetime analysis, failure time analysis, and reliability analysis.
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Figure 1 Constructing the hazard rate: duration and event
(T) 
t0 t1 
adoption transposition
eventduration
Why survival analysis?
In the present case, using survival analysis is preferable to a multivariate regression analysis 
on the time needed for transposition.3 Such an analysis would not be suited for the present 
case because it would misrepresent the influence of the deadline. The deadline probably has 
a time-dependent effect on the probability of transposition. The conditional probability 
of adoption is expected to rise, as the deadline looms closer. This result is in line with the 
hypothesis offered in the previous chapter that member states will transpose a directive as 
close to the deadline as possible. In other words, the effect of the deadline is expected to 
increase over time. Such a time-varying covariate (Allison, 1982, 65) cannot be incorporated 
into  regression OLS.4 A second reason for preferring survival analysis to multiple regression 
analysis is that the durations and the residuals are not distributed normally, which makes 
regression analysis unsuitable.5 A final common reason for using survival analysis is the 
problem of right-censoring, or the situation that some processes have an unknown duration at 
the time of observation (see Yamaguchi, 1991, 3-9). Right-censoring is not a serious problem 
for this study because only 1% of the directives studied have an unknown duration.
A discrete-time specification
Survival analysis offers two options for specifying time: continuous or discrete (Allison, 
1984, 14). A discrete-time specification is recommended either when the exact timing of 
events is unknown, or when the events do not occur on a continuous basis. In the present 
3 Another alternative would be to use a binary dependent regression model such as logit regression. The down-
side of such a strategy is that it would discard information on when the unit experienced the event.
4 It is not an attractive alternative to directly include the time allotted for transposition, because high correlati-
ons between the period of trime granted and the time used for transposition may also result from systematic 
but large differences between those two quantities. For instance, if a member state always takes twice as long 
as the deadline to transpose a directive, there will still be perfect correlation between the allotted time and the 
duration.
5 OLS regression is not per definition ill-suited to analyze transposition duration, as has been demonstrated by 
Steunenberg and Rhinard (2006).
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study the latter is the case. Even though the dates of transposition are known, these are more 
accurately conceptualized in terms of weeks than days. Transposition typically takes place 
on weekdays, and is likely to take place at more or less regular points in time, depending 
on the responsible ministry. Additional advantages of discrete-time models are that they 
allow for a more flexible specification of time-dependence (Jenkins, 1995, 129) and can 
better deal with ties in the data than continuous-time analyses (Yamaguchi, 1991, 16). 
Finally, I find discrete-time models more appealing because they can be estimated using 
logit analysis (Allison, 1982), a technique that many political scientists are already familiar 
with. Therefore, this paper presents a discrete-time logit model of transposition.
4.2 Sample and sources
Between 1958 and 2002, 1.568 directives had been issued to the Netherlands (European 
Commission, 2002)6. It would have been uneconomical to study all of these. Additionally, 
studying transposition of this large group of directives would probably violate the assumption 
of causal homogeneity (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, 91; Collier, Seawright, and Munck, 
2004, 29); the explanatory strength of various explanations is likely to vary over time. In 
addition, the transposition speed may have changed considerably over time. Even though it 
would be interesting to study the changes in duration over time, this is infeasible for three 
reasons. First, to introduce the year as an independent variable would possibly introduce 
selection bias, because the incidence of right-censoring is likely to be higher for older directives 
than for newer ones. Censoring would then no longer be the result of a random process, a 
problem that cannot easily be accounted for (Blossfeld and Rohwer, 1995, 36). Second, such 
a design would probably violate the assumption of independence of observations, because 
the cases are likely to be clustered within certain sub-periods between 1958 and the present. 
Finally, before the mid-1990s information on the transposition of directives was gathered 
less systematically and reliably than in later years. Including these years would unnecessarily 
protract the data gathering process. Also, it is very hard to retrospectively assign scores on 
some of the explanatory variables, such as the number of ministries involved. 
For these reasons, I have drawn a sample of directives that are fairly recent. The lower 
limit of the sample was set at 1995, which is the first year covered by the on-line legal 
database Opmaat, which was used to construct the database. Concerning the upper limit 
of the sample, the following arguments were important. Chiefly, the probability of right-
censoring had to be minimized. Even though survival analysis can handle right-censoring, 
the outcomes become less instructive when less information is available. Taken that the 
average deadline amounts to 15 months and that information on transposition does not 
always become instantly available, a nice cutoff point would have been 1999. However, 
6  The database was constructed early 2002.
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there are two problems with the 1999 directives: information on their transposition in the 
databases I used was not complete at the time, and the deadlines had not passed for many 
1999 directives. Therefore I chose 1998 as the upper limit of the sample. To conclude, all 
directives from 1995 through 1998 will be studied. To gain at least some understanding of 
the development in transposition timeliness over time, the outcome of the statistical study 
will be compared with the situation in the late 1970s, a period in which the problem was 
studied for the first time (see Maas and Bentvelsen, 1978). 
Of the 344 directives enacted from 1995 through 1998, 229 directives were included 
in the final sample. There are five reasons for excluding particular directives (see table 
8). First, 56 directives in the original sample did not require transposition, because the 
Netherlands deemed existing legislation sufficient or because dynamic referral was used, 
as a result of which directives automatically take legal effect upon their adoption. From 
a theoretical perspective, these directives are uninteresting, because they do not require 
actual transposition (but see Kaeding, 2006, 238). Another 46 directives in the original 
sample did not require transposition according to the Commission. This may be the case 
when a directive involves mere codification of earlier decisions, or only requires factual 
behavior (Eijlander and Voermans, 2000, 261-262). In these cases transposition is not 
called for, which is why they were excluded from the sample. Third, two directives were 
transposed before they were officially enacted. In both cases, the civil servants took the risk 
of transposing a directive that had not been adopted yet, confident as they were that the 
Council would adopt the draft text. Such cases with a negative duration fortunately are very 
seldom, so that there is no risk of misrepresenting the state space. Fifth, two directives in all 
probability were transposed, but the transposition measures were never officially published. 
Finally, eleven directives had to be excluded because they were transposed by ministries that 
seldom transpose directives.7 Including these directives into the analysis would have resulted 
in too small an N for these ministries, which would have produced unreliable estimates.
Table 8 Composition of the sample
include reason frequency percentage
yes 229 67
no existing legislation suffices 56 16
no transposition not required 46 13
no negative survival time 2 1
no transposition without official publication 2 1
no not enough observations on ministry 11 3
total 344 100
To construct the sample and score the variables, the following data sources were used. 
First, the European Commission was kind enough to provide a list of all directives adopted 
7   These are the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
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from 1995 through 1998, and all legislative measures notified by the Netherlands as 
transposing these directives. Celex and Eurlex8, the Commission’s main databases on EC 
law, were used to extract key information on the directives. To construct the national-level 
variables, I used three national data sources. Highly useful proved a database compiled by 
the T.M.C. Asser Institute that contains information on all transposing measures adopted 
by the Netherlands. Unfortunately, the information was not complete for recent years, 
due to personnel problems. I complemented the information thus obtained using the 
BNC’s quarterly state of plays of transposition10, as well as the legal database Opmaat.11 
The latter contains information on all statutes, administrative orders, and ministerial 
decrees passed; hence it allowed me to double-check all transposing measures found. 
Finally, in the case of missing information the relevant civil servants were contacted.
4.3 Operationalization and measurement
The dependent variable in survival analysis is the hazard rate. In order to construct this 
variable, information is needed on the occurrence and timing of the events for all cases in 
the sample. This information takes the form of a so-called censoring indicator and a time 
variable. The former is a dummy variable that can take on the values 1 (transposed) or 0 (not 
transposed yet). The time variable refers to the duration for those directives that have been 
transposed, and to the minimal duration for those that have not yet experienced the event, 
as is illustrated in figure 2. The duration equals the difference between the starting point and 
the moment of transposition, measured in weeks.
The starting point, i.e. the date from which the directive is ‘at risk’ of being transposed, 
is the date the directive is signed at the EU-level. The endpoint, transposition, is the date a 
transposing measure is adopted at the national level. This operationalization is not strictly in 
line with the legal definition of the implementation duty, which specifies that the measure 
must not only be adopted, but also enter into force before the deadline. In reality, there 
often is quite a lag between signing the measure, its publication, and its entry into force, as 
regulated by the Bekendmakingswet (Publication Law). To focus on the date of entry would 
mean that the legally required ‘waiting time’ between publication and entry into force would 
be included into the analysis. This would misrepresent the underlying survival process and 
produce unreliable parameter estimates. 
8   For Celex see http://europa.eu.int/celex/ and for Eurlex see: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/index.htm. At 
the time of the study, Eurlex was freely accessible but restricted in scope. Celex contained more information, 
but access was subscription-based. Therefore I had to combine both resources. Since 1 January 2005, the two 
databases have been merged into Eurlex.
9   For information on the Asser Institute or the Institute for Private and Public International Law, International 
Commercial Arbitration and European Law, see http://www.asser.nl.
10   See Parliamentary Papers, series 21109.
11  See http://www.opmaat.sdu.nl.
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Figure 2 Key dates in the transposition process
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Because the dependent variable in survival analysis is the hazard rate, instead of the actual 
duration, the hypotheses as formulated in the theoretical chapter must be slightly rephrased. 
The dependent variable is the conditional probability of transposition, or the probability 
of transposition at a certain point in time, provided that the directive has not yet been 
transposed. The transposition process is assumed to start after the directive is adopted in 
Brussels12, when the Dutch Permanent Representation communicates the directive to 
the national government (Dommers, 1991, 44). The national government then will start 
transposing the directive; the process ends when the first measure is adopted. What are the 
hypothesized effects of the explanatory variables suggested in chapter four and how are they 
operationalized (see table 9 for an overview)?
Table 9 Variables, operationalization, and hypotheses
variable operationalization dummies hypotheses
allotted time time until deadline - HR ≠ 1
quality decision- making procedure
(Council directive as reference group)
Commission directive HR > 1
Council & EP directive HR = 1
legal measure legal measure (ministerial decree as 
reference group)
act of agency HR = 1
administrative order HR < 1
statute HR < 1
complexity a) modification modification HR > 1
b) existing legislation existing legislation HR > 1
c) number of national measures - HR < 1
Chinese walls lead ministry (Ministry of Transport as 
reference group)
Agriculture HR = 1
Economic Affairs HR = 1
Environment HR = 1
Health HR > 1
Social Affairs HR > 1
Finance HR > 1
Interdepartmental 
coordination
number of ministries (one ministry as 
reference group)
two ministries HR < 1
three or more ministries HR < 1
time ln(t) - HR > 1
12   Even though at times civil servants start the transposition process before the directive has been adopted at the 
EU level, most of the times they wait until that moment, as various interviewees assured me.
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To begin with, the allotted time is thought to play a role, the hypothesis being that the 
conditional probability of transposition peaks around the deadline, after which it is expected 
to drop again. This continuous variable is constructed on the basis of the deadline set by the 
directive. Per directive the time remaining until the deadline is calculated for every week the 
directive has not yet been transposed. The hypothesized functional form will be checked 
using a linear spline function (see Marsh and Cormier, 2002; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 
2004, 90). This means that the time until the deadline is partitioned into various parts, in 
which the functional form can take on a different shape. As the hazard rate is expected to 
increase before the deadline, and then decline, the knots, or boundaries of the partitions 
are put at ten weeks before the deadline and exactly at the deadline. Information on this 
variable was drawn from Celex and the directive texts.
Second, the quality of the directive has been suggested as a determinant of transposition 
speed. The hypothesis is that the higher the quality, the lower the conditional probability 
of transposition. Unfortunately, this variable is rather complex in nature, since it involves 
many dimensions, such as ambiguity, consistency with other directives, intelligibility, and 
the use of political statements. In addition, it is hard for a layperson to score directives 
on these dimensions. Therefore, a proxy will be resorted to, namely the EU decision-
making procedure. As is argued in the literature, the problem with quality is not so much 
with Commission proposals, which are usually of good quality, but with the complicated 
negotiation process, which necessitates woolly compromises between and within the 
institutions (Bekkers et al, 1993b, 194; Macrory and Purdy, 1997, 46). EU decision-making 
is characterized by a search for consensus, even in those areas were qualified majority voting 
is used (Mattila and Lane, 2001). Accordingly, ‘scientific credibility and precision are likely 
to be sacrificed in order to achieve consensus’ (Collins and Earnshaw, 1992, 225). For this 
reason, directives adopted by the European Commission alone are likely to be of a higher 
quality than directives adopted by the Council, either acting alone or together with the EP. 
Furthermore, Commission directives are known to be more technical in nature, and hence 
less politicized. This indicator variable is rather straightforward. It is ordinal and requires 
two dummies, with Council directives as the reference group. Information on this variable 
is drawn from Celex. The validity of this measurement will be assessed in the case studies.
The third variable is the legal measure used. The hypothesis is that the hazard of 
transposition is lowest for statutes, followed by administrative orders, ministerial decrees 
and acts of agencies respectively. Moreover, I expect an interaction effect with time. Initially 
I expect the difference in conditional probability for ministerial decrees and administrative 
orders to decrease over time. Ministerial decrees can be enacted swifter, but they lose this 
advantage after a certain period, when administrative orders and statutes will start becoming 
transposed. This variable is relatively easy to measure. Information is drawn from the quarterly 
overviews of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the list of measures notified to the Commission, 
the list of the Asser Institute, and Opmaat. Information on the acts of functional agencies is 
gathered from different sources, depending on the type. It is an ordinal variable with four 
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categories: statutes, administrative orders, ministerial decrees and acts of functional agencies. 
Three dummies are constructed, with ministerial decrees as the reference group.
Fourth, transposition duration is likely to be influenced by the complexity of the 
transposition process. This complexity is measured by three indicators. First, the complexity 
depends on the novelty of a directive, which comes down to the difference between ‘mother’ 
directives and later amendments. This variable is binary in nature, with new directives as 
the reference point. Information on this variable is extracted from the titles and texts of the 
directives. The corresponding hypothesis is that, all other things equal, amending directives face 
a higher conditional probability of transposition than new directives. Second, transposition 
into a completely new national measure is less complex than transposition into an existing 
measure. Information on this categorical variable is gathered by studying the texts of the 
relevant transposing measures, which usually indicate whether this concerns modification of 
an existing measure. If in doubt, I studied the text of the relevant measure. In order to account 
for possible time-dependent effects, I also interacted the variable with time. A final proxy 
for complexity is the number of measures required for transposition. This variable is relatively 
straightforward, involving a simple count of the measures used so far. Information on this 
continuous variable is collected from the various Dutch sources mentioned above.13
The fifth independent variable concerns the Chinese Walls between negotiators and 
lawyers. This variable does not so much pertain to the level of individual transposition 
processes, but to the ministries that process them. It is reported that in smaller ministries, 
coordination between the two groups is often better (interview, 2001). Strong Chinese 
walls are more likely to be present in large ministries with a large, professional international 
division that is responsible for negotiation and a separate legal division responsible for 
transposition. Such a distinction is present at the ministries of Transport, Agriculture, 
Economic Affairs and Environment. A second group of ministries (Health, Social Affairs 
and Finance) do not have such clear division of responsibilities and are hence expected to 
have fewer problems with timely transposition (Staatsalmanak, 2003).14
This variable is operationalized as the ministry formally in charge of the transposition 
of a particular directive. This is a nominal variable, requiring the construction of six 
dummies. The reference group for the comparison is the Ministry of Transport, which 
descriptive analysis identified as the slowest implementer. I also accounted for possible 
clustering between cases that were adopted in Brussels at the same time and were 
transposed by the same ministry. Often, such directives are very similar to each other 
13   A problem with this variable is that the definitive number of measures may not be known, for the process of 
transposition may not yet have come to a close. In my opinion this problem is not too important. Having 
regularly checked the changes in this variable, the picture seems to be almost complete, in that the number of 
measures per directive has stabilized to a great extent.
14   The full names of these ministries are respectively: Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Manage-
ment; Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality; Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment; Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport; Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment; and the Ministry of Finance.
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and are transposed as a group, often even into one and the same legal measure. Regarding 
these as stand-alone cases would violate the assumption of independence of observations. 
Information on this variable is obtained from the quarterly overviews of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which lists the responsible ministry for each directive.
The sixth benign variable, inter-ministerial coordination, is hard to quantify, because 
this would involve detailed knowledge of all the cases. Therefore, the number of ministries 
involved in the transposition process is used as a proxy, the argument being that coordination 
problems are more likely to occur, when more ministries are involved. Information on this 
variable is drawn from the original texts of the transposing measures, the quarterly overviews 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Asser Institute’s overview. The number of ministries 
ranges from one through seven. Since transposition by more than three ministries is rather rare 
(9 cases or 4%), a dummy variable was constructed for those cases processed by three or more 
ministries, and another dummy for two ministries. The reference group is one ministry.
Finally, survival analysis requires the construction of an additional variable, namely time.15 
That is, the hazard is partly explained by the mere passage of time. Specifically, I expect the 
conditional probability of transposition to increase with time. That is, right after the directive 
is adopted the probability of transposition is still low. The Permanent Representation must 
communicate the directive to the responsible ministry, which is bound to take some time 
designating the responsible civil servants. These persons might first have to finish some other 
work before the actual process is started. They then will have to consult stakeholders and draft 
transposing measures, after which decision-making can take place. The conditional probability 
of transposition, controlling for the influence of the other independent variables, is hence 
expected to rise over time. Time is measured in weeks after adoption of the directive. The 
form of the time dependence is verified using spline-smoothing of the distribution function 
of time, using five linear splines with the knots at the quartiles (see Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones, 2004, 90; Marsh and Cormier, 2002). In these time segments, the functional form 
of the hazard rate can vary freely, thus allowing for empirical assessment of the form of the 
baseline hazard, rather than assuming one by using a parametric model.
4.4 Assessing the Dutch transposition deficit
Only 3 of the 229 directives in the database have not yet been transposed. The 
transposition rate for the sample is thus 99%. Hence the Netherlands does not seem to 
suffer from a serious transposition deficit. On the other hand, a more precise picture can 
be sketched using the information on the actual time needed for transposition.
15   The seventh benign variable identified in the previous chapter was administrative capacity. Unfortunately, 
this variable could not be included into the statistical analysis, as there are no reliable data on the personnel 
capacity for transposition at the various ministries (interview, Ministry of Transport). Instead, this variable will 
be studied in the qualitative part of this study.
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In operationalizing timeliness it makes sense to look at the difference between the 
deadline specified in the directive, and the date the transposing measure enters into force. 
Since the distribution of durations is rather skewed, the median instead of the mean should 
be reported: this lies at 0 weeks. The cumulative distribution of the cases shown in figure 3 
further substantiates this good score. Some 30% of the directives were transposed early, and, 
very strikingly, 28% were transposed precisely on time. Apparently, the Dutch government 
often postpones the entry into force of transposing measures until the prescribed date. 
However, this rather positive picture is put into perspective by the fact that 42% of the 
directives were transposed late. The median for this group lies at some 7 months, which is 
equivalent to 1.6 times the period allotted for transposition. Moreover, several cases were 
transposed years after the deadline, which indicates a problem with timely transposition.
Figure 3 The cumulative percentage of transposed directives as a function of delay 
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The figures hence hint at a structural transposition deficit, even though eventually most 
directives are transposed. The situation is even more serious when we look beyond the first 
transposing measure. Often more than one measure is used for transposition, something we 
should control for, since the implementation duty implies that all transposing measures be 
adopted in time. The data reveal that 43% of the directives were transposed into more than 
one measure. Focusing on the first measure only thus implies a serious underestimate of 
the transposition deficit. If an analysis is made of the latest instrument enacted, the Dutch 
transposition record indeed worsens. It then turns out that 58 instead of 42% of the directives 
were transposed late. The median delay becomes 53 instead of 30 weeks. Finally, it must be 
noted that the actual extent of the deficit cannot be measured properly, because we never know 
whether transposition has been complete. Even though the database contains information on 
the latest instrument reported, we cannot be sure this is the last instrument to complete 
transposition. The actual deficit is hence likely to be larger than the 58% mentioned above. 
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In interpreting these data, an important question is whether the problem with timeliness 
is structural. According to Börzel (2001, 814) this is not the case because the transposition 
rates actually show an upward trend over time. However, this seems to be an artifact of the 
Commission’s data.16 Little progress has been made since the situation in the late 1970s, the 
first time the problem was studied in the Netherlands. Maas and Bentvelsen (1978, 446) 
then found that 64% of all directives enacted from 1973 through 1975 were transposed 
late, with a median of 15 weeks. In this respect, the current score of 58% is no considerable 
improvement, and the median delay has even increased.17 Hence there seems to exist a 
serious problem with timely transposition in the Netherlands. 
4.5 Explanatory analysis
The first step in the survival analysis is to establish the functional form of the baseline hazard rate. 
In order to check the hypothesized time-dependence, I first estimate a full model containing 
all variables, and the five splines. As figure 4 shows, this yields a monotonically rising baseline 
hazard, which implies a log-transformation of time. As a double-check I verified whether 
including the natural log of time in the analysis affects the parameter estimates or decreases the 
Log Likelihood of the model significantly. Since this is not the case, the log-function can be 
viewed as an appropriate approximation of the baseline hazard. As expected, the conditional 
probability of transposition rises monotonically over time, all other things equal.
Figure 4 The baseline hazard of transposition
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16   As said, the Commission data refer to all directives enacted so far. The transposition rate is thus bound to in-
crease over time, simply because of the increasing proportion of old directives, which have a higher probability 
of having been transposed.
17   Alternatively, this difference in findings might be an artifact of the data, as the study period for the present 
research is longer than that of Maas and Bentvelsen. For this reason, the 15 weeks median they report might 
be an underestimate.
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Having established the functional form of the baseline hazard, I now proceed to the other 
variables. Table 10 presents the estimated hazard ratios.18 To begin with, the functional 
form for the influence of the deadline needs to be assessed. As indicated earlier, the 
hazard is expected to increase the closer the deadline looms, and to drop after it has run 
out. This hypothesis needs not be rejected: as illustrated in figure 5, the hazard ratio rises 
fast until the date of the deadline, after which it drops. This functional form does not 
allow for easy parameterization, which is why I leave the three splines or time segments 
in the model.
Table 10 The estimated hazard ratios of transposition
variable operationalization hypothesis hazard ratio (robust standard errors 
in parentheses)
time until deadline spline for the period running to ten 
weeks before the deadline
HR ≠ 1 1.04*** 
(0.01)
spline for the period from ten weeks 
before until the deadline
HR ≠ 1 1.10*** 
(0.03)
spline for the period after the deadline HR ≠ 1 0.99*** 
(0.00)
quality Commission directive HR > 1 2.19*** 
(0.42)
Council & EP directive HR = 1 1.48* 
(0.33)
national legislative 
instrument
act of agency HR = 1 2.50** 
(1.14)
act of agency * t HR ≠ 1 0.99* 
(0.01)
administrative order HR < 1 0.11*** 
(0.04)
administrative order * t HR ≠ 1 1.02*** 
(0.00)
statute HR < 1 0.11*** 
(0.05)
statute * t HR ≠ 1 1.02*** 
(0.00)
complexity (a) modification HR > 1 1.21 
(0.25)
complexity (b) existing legislation HR > 1 2.98*** 
(1.07)
existing legislation * t HR ≠ 1 0.99*** 
(0.00)
complexity (c) number of measures HR < 1 1.45*** 
(0.09)
18   ‘HR’ refers to ‘hazard ratio’. A hazard ratio of 1 means that a particular variable has no effect. A hazard ratio 
greater than 1 means that a one-unit change in the independent variable increases the conditional probability 
of transposition, keeping all other variables constant, whereas a hazard ratio smaller than 1 implies a lower 
conditional probability, thus implying that the process takes longer as compared to the base category.
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Table 10 continued
variable operationalization hypothesis hazard ratio (robust standard errors 
in parentheses)
Chinese walls Agriculture HR = 1 1.36 
(0.75)
Agriculture * t HR ≠ 1 1.01 
(0.01)
Economic Affairs HR = 1 12.64*** 
(7.15)
Economic Affairs  * t HR ≠ 1 0.98*** 
(0.01)
Environment HR = 1 2.95** 
(1.63)
Environment * t HR > 1 0.99 
(0.01)
Health HR > 1 3.46*** 
(1.43)
Health * t HR ≠  1 0.99 
(0.00)
Social Affairs HR >  1 10.31*** 
(7.57)
Social Affairs * t HR ≠  1 0.99* 
(0.01)
Finance HR >  1 1.15 
(0.75)
Finance * t HR ≠  1 1.01** 
(0.01)
inter-ministerial 
coordination
two ministries HR < 1 0.97 
(0.18)
three or more ministries HR < 1 0.50** 
(0.16)
time ln (t) HR > 1 1.77*** 
(0.26)
observations 14711
Wald  Chi2(N) 313 
log likelihood -1022
prob>chi2 0.00
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (all two-sided)
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Figure 5 Hazard as a function of time until deadline
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The second variable is the quality of the directive, as operationalized by contrasting the 
different EU decision-making procedures. As it turns out, the hazard of Commission 
directives is more than twice that of Council directives, which is in line with the hypothesis. 
As expected, there is no significant difference with Council and EP directives. Admittedly, 
though, this variable is rather crude, and there is still a lot of variance within the three 
groups. Hopefully, the qualitative analysis will shed more light on this variable.
How about complexity? First, there is no significant effect of modification, contrary 
to the expectation. The effect of this variable is to some extent usurped by the ‘existing 
legislation’ variable, because there is a correlation between the two (phi= .35). This 
makes sense theoretically, because the ‘mother directives’ will often already have been 
transposed into national legislation, so that subsequent modifications usually do not 
require new legislation. This second operationalization of complexity does have the 
expected sign and is significant. Also, the difference in the hazard for existing versus new 
legislation decreases over time as expected. After about two years, the hazard ratio setting 
off the two kinds even becomes smaller than one, which indicates a higher hazard for 
new measures. 
Moreover, the number of measures does not show the expected sign. The hazard ratio 
for this variable is 1.45, which means that one extra measure increases the hazard by 
45%. This is counterintuitive, as the hypothesized effect was that transposition is slower 
if more measures need to be changed or introduced. This finding might result from 
sampling bias. The problem is that the number of measures known might be correlated 
with the ease of the transposition process, so that those directives requiring more measures 
might actually be easier to transpose than the ones requiring only one measure. The 
number of measures may not have been fully known at the moment of data gathering, 
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for some transposition processes were not concluded yet. Therefore, this latter variable 
will be investigated further in the qualitative analysis.
When it comes to the third variable, the legal measure used, the evidence is in line with 
the hypothesis. Statutes as well as administrative orders face an initial hazard rate that is 
only 11% that of ministerial decrees, which is the reference group. Yet the effects of these 
two types are not proportional over time. As is shown in figure 6, both administrative 
orders and statutes lose their backlog over time, the initial hazard ratio increasing by 
2% per week. The case studies can be used to shed more light on these time-varying 
covariates. Contrary to the expectation, though, acts of agencies turn out to be faster 
than ministerial decrees, facing a hazard that is 2.5 times higher than ministerial decrees. 
This might be related to the highly technical character of such transposing measures.
Figure 6 Hazard ratios over time as a function of the legal instrument used
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The differences between the ministries, in order to capture the effects of Chinese walls, 
are less straightforward, because of the combination of time-constant and time-varying 
effects, the latter of which are significant for the ministries of Economic Affairs and 
Finance. Starting with the other ministries, however, the estimates are largely in line 
with the hypothesized dichotomy based on the presence of Chinese Walls. The Ministry 
of Transport faces the lowest hazard of all, but as hypothesized its hazard does not differ 
significantly from the Ministry of Agriculture’s. On the other side of the dichotomy, the 
ministries of Environment, Health and Social Affairs do not differ significantly from each 
other. The position of the Ministry of Environment is different than hypothesized, as its 
hazard differs significantly from that of Transport. On the other hand, the difference is 
barely significant (p=0.49) and not significant when compared with that of Agriculture 
(p=0.20). 
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When it comes to the position of Economic Affairs and Finance, time-varying effects 
must be taken into account. The Ministry of Economic Affairs has an initial hazard 12 
times that of the Ministry of Transport, but loses its lead after some two years. This may 
be due to the fact that for those ministries, the real difficult directives remain after that 
date, whereas the Ministry of Transport then starts catching up, because the coordination 
problems are solved by then. The opposite holds for the Ministry of Finance, which 
improves its position relative to that of the Ministry of Transport over time. The initial 
problems for Finance may be due to the fact that this ministry does not deal with many 
directives (6% of the total number) and hence has even worse problems early on in the 
transposition process. As was illustrated by a telephonic interview with a civil servant, 
transposition is not a core business at the Ministry of Finance. Roles and tasks are often 
not immediately clear to the civil servants involved, which is why transposition may get 
off to a bad start. 
All in all, it can be concluded that the existence of Chinese Walls makes some difference 
for transposition speed. Yet we need to realize that measurement of this variable is rather 
crude, as it is based on the formal organizational structure of the ministries. The issue of 
Chinese walls will therefore be analyzed in more detail in the qualitative analysis.
The results are mixed for the ‘benign’ variable of coordination problems, as indicated 
by the number of ministries involved in transposition. There is no difference in hazard 
between directives dealt with by one versus two ministries, but the involvement of three 
or more ministries halves the hazard. However, the effect is not strictly in line with the 
hypothesis, which says that the hazard should increase with the number of ministries. 
Possibly, coordination problems only play a role when many ministries are involved. 
On the other hand, the operationalization may again not be good enough to yield 
conclusions about this variable. The number of ministries is a rather crude indicator, and 
the apparent problems when three or more ministries are involved may be more due to 
the fact that these directives are probably highly complicated, calling for various changes 
to be made in national legislation.
4.6 Outlier analysis
The statistical model performs pretty well in the sense that most hypotheses need not be 
rejected. Yet this does not say anything about the overall model fit, which can be assessed 
graphically by means of residual analysis. I have used the estimated hazards to calculate 
the predicted survival times for each case, so as to inspect this fit. As is shown by figure 
7, the model performs rather nicely in that the model explains the majority of the cases 
well (94% of the cases lies within two standard deviations), except for those transposition 
processes that were extremely delayed. The model seems to be poor at predicting these 
cases, which indicates an omitted variable bias. That is, for a well-fitting model we would 
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expect a minimum of 95% to lie within two standard deviations; the outliers therefore 
hint at a systematic problem. As has been argued, problems of measurement validity may 
play a role for the quality of the directive, the complexity of the transposition process, 
Chinese walls, and coordination problems. Alternatively, the limited fit might stem from 
omitted variable bias. Apart from administrative capacity, which could not be included in 
the present analysis, these concern institutionalist and ‘political’ explanations, which were 
suggested in the second and third wave of theorizing on transposition. The next chapters 
will develop and present a qualitative study that identifies the causes of the outliers.
Figure 7 Standardized residuals as a function of delay (bands at three times the standard deviation)
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4.7 Summary
This chapter has evaluated the claim that there is a transposition deficit in the Netherlands. 
Whereas the European Commission’s reports suggest that the Dutch transposition score 
is rather good, the data presented in this chapter suggest otherwise. Almost 60% of the 
directives are transposed late, and the delays can amount to several years. The problem 
with timeliness is structural, in that the Dutch record has not improved considerably since 
the late 1970s. Hence the Netherlands seems to suffer from a transposition deficit.
Several variables combine to explain transposition duration. Key variables are the 
time until the deadline and the legal instrument used. Also, the quality of directives, as 
measured by the different EU decision-making procedures, is an important explanatory 
variable, as well as the difference between transposition into new versus existing national 
legislation. In addition, there are important differences between the ministries, due to 
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the existence of Chinese walls between negotiators and lawyers. Especially the Ministry 
of Transport has problems with timely transposition, whereas the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs is among the fastest. Finally, the mere passage of time substantively increases the 
conditional probability of transposition.
Yet, residual analysis indicates that the model only tells part of the story. The model 
cannot explain a significant number of directives, especially those with serious delays. 
The reason for this limited fit could be the crude operationalization for some of the 
variables, such as quality, complexity, or Chinese walls. Alternatively, the bad fit could be 
a result of omitted variable bias. The next chapters will shed light on this issue.
Chapter 4  Explaining delays: on misfit and politics
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5  Explaining delays: on misfit and politics1
The objective of the remainder of this study is to explain the outliers of the survival analysis, 
and to further underpin the statistical results found. As to the former question, there are 
two possible answers: the outliers may either be systematic or unsystematic in nature 
(King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, 56). Starting with the latter, an outlier may be due to 
noise, either as a result of measurement error or the presence of non-systematic factors. 
For instance, unexpected delays may be due to mundane problems, such as the temporary 
absence of the expert civil servant working on the dossier. Such problems are not particularly 
interesting from a theoretical perspective. Alternatively, unexpectedly long durations may 
be the consequence of omitted variable bias: systematic factors then explain the bad fit of a 
statistical model (King, Kehoane, and Verba, 1994, 168). 
For the present study, it is likely that the outliers were caused by systematic factors. So far, 
I have only dealt with legal-administrative causes of delays, which have been put forward 
by the Dutch government and the first wave of transposition research. Other important 
explanations, notably the goodniss of fit or domestic politics, have not been incorporated 
into the analysis. In addition, some of the legal-administrative variables were operationalized 
less than optimally, which might explain the outliers.
In testing the strength of these omitted and poorly operationalized variables, a complexity 
is that the study on outliers is very much y-centered (Gerring, 2007). That is, the cases have 
been selected on the dependent variable, rather than on the independent variables that have 
not yet been tested. Furthermore, the situation is probably one of equifinality, or the fact 
that different causal patterns can produce similar outcomes (George and Bennett, 2005, 
161). Consequently, there is no guaranteed way of obtaining results for each hypothesis. 
Instead, by identifying a host of institutional and political variables, I seek to increase the 
chances that theoretical sense can be made of the outliers. In the following, these second 
and third wave variables are introduced.
5.1 The goodness of fit
As I have argued, the first wave of research on transposition was rather eclectic, listing 
various legal and administrative explanations for transposition problems. This changed 
in the late 1990s, when the first wave gave way to a second, more theoretical research 
agenda, inspired by historical institutionalism (see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Mahoney, 2000; 
Pierson, 2000). The central claim of this approach is that history is causally critical (Pierson 
and Skocpol, 2002, 699): in order to understand policy choices one must first construct 
1  Parts of this chapter have been adapted from Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2006).
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policy histories (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Inspired by structural institutionalism, historical 
institutionalists claim that the state, or rather the institutions that compose it, plays a role 
in determining the outcomes of politics.
Historical institutionalism moves beyond structural institutionalism, though, and adds 
the time dimension of institutional influences on political outcomes (Pierson and Skocpol, 
2002, 698). It stresses that institutions tend to be highly persistent, and that they have 
long-term effects on political choices (Peters, 1998, 210; Hall and Taylor, 1996, 941). The 
crucial term in explaining this long-term influence is path dependency. Institutions create a 
path along which future policy and institutional choices will be taken. The reason is that 
the costs of exiting a certain path and switching to an alternative one rise over time, due to 
positive feedback effects (Pierson, 2000, 252; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, 701). If we apply 
the core insights of historical institutionalism to EU compliance, the assumption becomes 
that directives present an exogenous shock to national institutions.
The historical institutionalist view of EU compliance became highly popular in the 
late 1990s, as a key element of the vibrant Europeanization agenda (see Olsen, 1996; 
Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Vink, 2003). Central to this literature was the notion 
of goodness of fit, the roots of which can be found in the work by Héritier (1995). Her 
argument was that member states try to upload their policies to the European level, with 
the aim of laying these down in binding European law. In this way member states try 
to minimize the costs of adaptation and to establish a level European playing field for 
their industry (Héritier, 1995, 278). Later, other authors extended Héritier’s notion to the 
process of EU compliance: if member states do not succeed in uploading their policies, 
they will not happily adjust to the resulting decision-making outcome, because of the high 
costs of compliance. Hence the assumption is that the ease of compliance depends on the 
goodness of fit between EU policy demands and existing national policies (Duina, 1997, 
1999; Duina and Blithe, 1999; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Knill, 2001; Green Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Börzel, 2003a).
The goodness of fit can usefully be presented as a historically institutionalist argument: 
the central claim is that existing institutional paths are ‘sticky’ and resistant to change. If 
European policy demands can be accommodated within the confines of the path already 
taken, compliance will be smooth. Conversely, if a directive requires profound changes of 
the existing institutions, EU compliance will be time-consuming and initially incorrect. In 
underpinning this relationship, two different mechanisms have been suggested, along the 
lines of both rational choice and sociological institutionalism.2 Some focus on the cost-
awareness of national actors (Duina, 1997; Börzel, 2003a; Knill and Lenschow, 1998). 
2 The literature on neo-institutionalism identifies three alternative perspectives: historical, rational-choice, and 
sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000). The mechanisms pre-
sented by historical institutionalists draw heavily on the insights of the other two paradigms, in that they need 
either the logic of appropriateness or the logic of consequence to underpin the stickiness of institutional paths.
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Others suggest normative notions, bringing the logic of appropriateness to the forefront 
(see Héritier et al, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003; Knill, 2001).
Hypothesis 10: The worse the fit between a directive on the one hand and domestic institutions 
and policies on the other hand, the more time needed for transposition.
The original hypothesis
The first author who formulated the goodness of fit argument was Duina (1997, 1999). He 
claims that the timing and extent of EU compliance depend on the fit between a directive 
and two nation-specific institutions: the organization of interest groups and national policy 
legacies. He hypothesizes that a directive that is in line with these will be implemented fast 
and well. Conversely, compliance will be poor for directives requiring major policy shifts 
and the re-organization of interest groups. The key to this relationship is with parliaments, 
which act as ‘guardians of the status quo’ (Duina, 1999, 6). Duina tests his hypothesis 
while controlling for three rival explanations: a member state’s stance towards the EU, the 
interests of key political actors, and the length of the legislative process. Duina analyzes the 
implementation of the 1975 equal pay directive in France, Italy, and the UK, and a 1980 
air pollution directive in the UK, Italy, and Spain. He concludes that the hypothesis needs 
not be rejected, because the directives’ demands on the policy legacies of a nation proved 
influential (Duina, 1999, 120).3
A second ground-breaking study on the goodness-of-fit is the one by Knill and 
Lenschow (1998). Focusing on national administrative traditions, they hypothesize that 
lawyers’ responses to EC legal requirements are institutionally framed. They put forward 
the ‘intuitive hypothesis’ that the correctness of implementation depends on the fit 
between European legislation and relevant national policies. However, after confronting 
this hypothesis with data on the implementation of four environmental directives in the 
UK and in Germany, they reach a totally different conclusion than Duina. Only three of 
the eight cases are in line with the hypothesis. For instance, two directives requiring major 
adaptations in the UK were implemented rather smoothly. At the same time, one directive 
requiring hardly any changes in Germany was implemented with a huge delay. Therefore, 
Knill and Lenschow (1998, 602) conclude that the goodness of fits by itself is insufficient 
to explain implementation performance.
Striking a more critical note, Haverland (2000) finds that the goodness of fit is not 
decisive in explaining the implementation of a directive on packaging waste. Despite facing 
a high misfit, the UK, for example, implemented the directive relatively fast and correctly. 
Germany, on the other hand, only faced moderate adaptation pressure, but implemented 
3  Whereas Duina’s results seem to be rather good, these rest on a very thin basis, as the variation on the indepen-
dent variables (consequences for policy legacy and organization of interest groups) is limited (see Duina, 1999, 
119-120).
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the directive two years late. The key to these puzzling results, according to Haverland, is 
with institutional veto points. In the UK, the bad fit did not prove consequential because 
the opposition had no effective veto point to hinder implementation. In Germany, however, 
the Bundesrat managed to oppose one directive provision on refillables, which delayed the 
whole process. Consequently, he concludes that rather than the goodness of fit, veto points 
shape the ease of implementation.
Finally, evidence against the goodness of fit as a stand-alone hypothesis has been produced 
by a recent comparative study on the implementation of six labor directives (Falkner et al, 
2005, 277-280), which reports a ‘failure of the misfit hypothesis’. Only 22% of the cases are 
in line with the hypothesis. Moreover, there is no correlation between a country’s average 
degree of misfit and transposition performance (ibid, 279). Denmark, Ireland and the UK, 
show high misfits, but on average transpose really fast. On the other side of the spectrum 
we find Germany and France, which had a hard time complying with several well-fitting 
directives. The authors argue that we must take into account the role of domestic politics 
(also see Treib, 2003), and the culture of compliance (Falkner et al, 2005) of the different 
member states.
Towards auxiliary variables
The goodness of fit hypothesis is rather intuitively appealing and parsimonious. Therefore, 
despite the disappointing empirical results, various authors have continued to use it. The 
general response by advocates of the thesis has been to identify various auxiliary variables, 
so as to bring in the dynamism needed to explain smooth compliance in the face of a 
misfit, or conversely (see table 11 for an overview). For instance, Knill and Lenschow 
(1998, 602-603) expand their original framework by adding three variables. First, they 
claim that the goodness of fit is not given, but defined by policy actors. Second, they claim 
that the possibility that actors perceive the adaptation pressure as high depends on the 
‘embeddedness’ of national regulatory patterns, i.e. the extent to which they are deeply and/
or widely institutionalized. Third, they suggest the additional hypothesis of policy context, 
defined as the degree of domestic support, policy salience, and the supra- and international 
pressure on the member state to comply. To sum up, they try to bring more dynamism into 
the framework.
Héritier et al (2001) also propose a revised goodness of fit framework. They take a two-
pronged explanatory approach: the impact of Europe depends both on the member states 
pre-existing policies, and on the dynamics of political processes (Héritier et al, 2001, 9). As 
to the first element, the authors are cautious to put too much emphasis on the goodness of 
fit argument. Yet they do not discard it completely and argue that it is a necessary condition. 
That is, if national policies differ from EU policies, there is a pressure for member states to 
adjust the former (ibid, 9). However, this pressure does not explain the differential impact of 
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Europe, which is why they introduce the national political process as a second explanatory 
element. Specifically, they claim that the adjustment to European policies depends on the 
stage of liberalization already present in a member state, the national reform capacity, and 
the dominant belief system or problem-solving approach (ibid, 257-259). These variables 
combine to sketch a more dynamic picture of compliance processes.
A similar strategy can be seen in the comparable frameworks developed by Risse et 
al (2001), and Börzel and Risse (2003). Maintaining misfit as a necessary rather than a 
sufficient condition for change, they identify several ‘mediating factors’, which explain the 
final degree of domestic change. First, they propose two structural variables: the number of 
veto points in a political system and the political and organizational culture. As to the former 
variable, they claim that the more power is dispersed in a system, the more difficult it is to 
bring about domestic change. The political and organizational culture, for their part, affect 
whether or not domestic actors can use adaptational pressures to induce structural change. 
Alongside these structural mediating factors, they identify two variables at the agency-level. 
First, they claim that the differential empowerment of actors makes a difference: structural 
changes may lead to a redistribution of power among the stakeholders, thus allowing for 
smooth compliance, even if there is a misfit. Second, they stress the effect of learning: 
Europeanization may bring about a redefinition of actors’ interests and identities. 
Finally, Börzel (2003) also views a misfit as a necessary condition for change. Her main 
argument is that a misfit can be overcome by adaptational pressure from above, such as 
infringement proceedings, or from below, in the form of domestic mobilization (ibid, 3). 
The empirical analysis of the implementation of six environmental directives in Spain and 
Germany sustains this explanatory framework. Not all ill-fitting cases led to implementation 
problems, unlike the original goodness of fit hypothesis stipulated, because domestic actors 
managed to ‘pull’ policy-makers into compliance, while mobilizing the Commission to 
‘push’ them by starting infringement procedures.
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Table 11 Synopsis of the goodness of fit literature
author definition of goodness of fit type of condition complementary variables
Duina (1997) -  organization of interest 
groups
- policy legacy
necessary n/a
Knill and Lenschow 
(1998)
- regulatory style
- regulatory structure
necessary - embeddedness
- policy context
 • degree of domestic support
 • policy salience
 •  supra- and international pressures
Green Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse 
(2001)
- policies
- institutions
necessary - structure
 • multiple veto points
 • mediating formal institutions
- agency
 •  differential empowerment of actors
 • learning
Héritier et al (2001) necessary, nor 
sufficient
- nature of EU policies
 • degree of prescription
 •  market-making v. market-correcting
 • degree of flexibility
-  variance in domestic constellations
 • reform stage
 •  dominant belief system
national reform capacity
Börzel and Risse 
(2003)
- policies
- institutions
necessary - logic of consequentialism
 • multiple veto points
 • formal institutions
- logic of appropriateness
 • norm entrepeneurs
 • informal institutions
Börzel (2003) • problem-solving approach
• policy instruments
• policy standards
necessary - domestic pressure for adaptation
- external pressure for adaptation
Bringing domestic politics back in
Why has the original goodness of fit hypothesis performed so poorly? Basically, the 
problem is that it is too deterministic, as it presupposes that national governments and 
parliaments want to maintain the status quo (e.g. Duina, 1997).4 ‘If adaptational pressures 
are very high, (…) the institutional, material, and cultural adaptations are exceedingly 
costly and national institutions will be defended at great cost’ (Risse et al, 2001, 8). Yet, 
domestic policy-makers often want to change existing policies and institutions (Treib, 
4   Alternatively, the disappointing results for the original goodness of fit hypothesis may be the result of measure-
ment problems. Whereas it is straightforward to identify ‘a misfit’, it is hard to assess the degree of this misfit. 
Furthermore, the goodness of fit is multidimensional concept. The main distinction is between institutional 
and policy misfit (Börzel and Risse 2003, 59-60; Falkner et al, 2005, 27; Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 
2001, 6-7; Héritier et al 2001, 15; Knill and Lenschow, 1998, 597). Even though the various contributions 
list examples of these types of fits, none offer a thorough operationalization, accounting for the relative effects 
of the different kinds and degrees of misfits (but see Falkner et al, 2005, 27-32).
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2003; Héritier et al, 2001; Knill and Lenschow, 1998). They may even use EU policy 
requirements as a leverage to do so, while shifting the blame to the EU-level (Smith, 
1997). For instance, the Italian government has used EMU requirements as leverage 
for realizing contentious economic reforms (Stiller, 2006). Thus the problem is that the 
goodness of fit is an essentially apolitical concept that is not geared to explaining the 
domestic politics of compliance. Hence we need to bring domestic politics back in (Mair, 
2004; Falkner et al, 2005; Mastenbroek and Van Keulen, 2006).
Hence domestic politics may overcome a misfit. The importance of domestic politics 
has been recognized by later advocates of the hypothesis, who present a misfit as a 
necessary rather than a sufficient condition, and complement it with auxiliary variables, 
so as to allow for a more dynamic account of compliance. The majority of these variables 
added are political in nature, such as the domestic pressures identified by Knill and 
Lenschow (1998) and Börzel (2003). Also, the argument by Knill and Lenschow (1998) 
that the goodness of fit is not given, but defined by domestic actors, is a clear attempt 
to escape the determinism of the hypothesis. A third example is the variable of national 
reform capacity, suggested by Héritier et al (2001), which may overcome a misfit. Finally, 
dynamism is captured by the mediating variables introduced by Risse et al (2001) and 
Börzel and Risse (2003).
Yet, these revised frameworks beg an important question. Why would we want to 
maintain the goodness of fit? If domestic preferences or beliefs may overcome a misfit, 
what is the added theoretical value of this variable? One reason for doing so would be 
that its effects cannot be captured by other explanatory variables. In my view, this is not 
the case, because the purported causal relationship between misfit and compliance is 
spurious. As is depicted in figure 8, both the status quo and the attitude towards an EU 
policy input are an outcome of the beliefs or preferences of the domestic actors involved. 
If actor constellations that gave rise to a certain policy are still in tact at the time of an 
EU impact, we can expect problems if there is a misfit. The causal effect is then in the 
misfit with underlying beliefs or preferences. Conversely, when those constellations have 
changed in the meantime, the goodness of fit does not have a direct bearing on the ease 
of compliance.
In addition, several cases have been described that unmask the misfit as a necessary 
condition for change.  Even in the face of a good fit, domestic policy makers may decide 
to either over- or under-comply with a directive. Héritier et al (2001, 288) offer a telling 
example of the first situation. In the French case of road haulage, substantial policy 
reform occurred despite a perfect fit between the directive and French policy. This leads 
the authors to reject the goodness of fit as a necessary condition, and to view European 
policies as an input into the domestic political process, which might be exploited by 
national actors in order to further their objectives. Kallestrup (2002), in turn, provides 
an example of the opposite situation, namely over-compliance in the face of a good 
policy fit. In Denmark, policy makers have used complicated directives to impose radical 
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changes in Danish competition policy, even though the directives in question did not 
call for this, the Danish status quo being perfectly in line with the EU policy demands. 
In brief, it seems that a misfit is not a necessary condition for change. 
Figure 8 Graphical depiction of the goodness of fit hypothesis5
t 0 
t 1
domestic
preferences/beliefs
spurious relationship
ease of compliancedirective
policies and institutions
(status quo)
The previous discussion also explains the good empirical results reported by Green 
Cowles et al (2001, 230) and Börzel (2003, 62) for their modified frameworks. To some 
extent, the good explanatory value stems from selection bias. If a misfit were indeed a 
necessary condition for domestic change, one would expect not to find well-fitting pieces 
of EC law that are followed by domestic change. However, the studies that report good 
results only study on cases of misfit (see  Green Cowles and Risse, 2001, 226; Börzel, 
2003, 576). On this basis, it is logically impossible to reject the goodness of fit as a 
necessary condition.
In conclusion, a misfit seems to be neither a sufficient condition for non-compliance, 
as was posited by the early advocates of the hypothesis, nor a necessary condition for 
domestic change, as had been suggested by its later proponents. I therefore propose to 
drop the variable altogether, and directly focus on the preferences and beliefs of domestic 
actors regarding a certain EU policy input. This adds to the existing literature by making 
it more parsimonious. First, it drops the fit variable. Second, by including actors’ beliefs 
or preferences directly, several of the auxiliary variables become superfluous. In doing 
so, I seek to bring the modified frameworks closer to the basics of rational choice and 
5   Goodness of fit theorists might object to this conceptualization, arguing that it misrepresents the relationship between 
domestic preferences or beliefs and the status quo. Instead of prioritizing the former, as I do in this graph, they could 
give precedence to the latter, and argue that the status quo causes preferences and beliefs of domestic policy makers. 
However, I believe that this sequence is faulted, as the various case studies discussed above have shown that the causal 
effect of existing policies and institutions is much less weaker than originally expected. Agency plays a much more 
important role than assumed by goodness of fit scholars, who prioritize structure at the expense of agency.
6   It must be noted that the two Air Pollution Directives selected by Börzel (2003, 57) display a good fit in the 
case of Germany. Yet, these are only two of the twelve cases.
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   66 05-03-2007   15:53:04
Chapter 5 Explaining delays: on misfit and politics

sociological neo-institutionalism7. In this way, I hope to overcome the lack of ‘consistent 
and systematic concepts to account for the varying patterns of institutional adjustment 
(..)’ (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002, 255) that plagues the literature on Europeanization. 
5.2 Theorizing the politics of transposition
At first sight, the plea to bring politics back in seems a recipe for trouble. There are myriad 
political science theories that we could use to explain EU compliance, or transposition 
speed more specifically. The combined insights of International Relations (IR) theory, 
neo-institutionalism, policy analysis, and comparative politics offer an impressive 
toolbox. To reduce the variety in relevant theories I propose the following classification. 
First, we can distinguish between theories that portray the state as a unitary actor, and 
theories that zoom in on the several domestic stakeholders that may be involved. The 
goodness of fit literature also alludes to this distinction. Whereas Knill and Lenschow 
(1998) and Börzel (2003a) implicitly adopt a unitary actor perspective, Green Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse (2001) as well as Börzel and Risse (2003) describe the domestic 
political processes that may occur in the face of a misfit. 
A second way of organizing the theories relevant to EU compliance is by reference 
to the fundamental schism in political science: the distinction between rationalism and 
constructivism, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. This distinction 
also characterizes the modified goodness of fit literature: some of the auxiliary variables 
suggested have a rationalist undertone, such as national reform capacity (Héritier et al, 
2001) and adaptational pressures from below and above (Börzel, 2003a). Other variables 
are constructivist in nature, such as the dominant belief system (Héritier et al, 2001) and 
political and organizational cultures (Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 2001).
Crossing the two dichotomies yields four paradigms relevant to explaining transposition 
(see table 12). Unitary actor rationalism takes the shape of strategic calculation by 
member states, whereas constructivism views transposition as norm diffusion through 
socialization of national governments. Taking a multiple actor view, the main difference 
becomes that between the aggregative and the deliberative conceptions of democracy. 
Whereas the former paradigm focuses on the aggregation of individual preferences into 
a collective choice, the latter concerns the deliberation about these preferences and their 
normative underpinnings, with the aim of arriving at a shared judgment.
7   Surprisingly, none of the models revolving around the goodness of fit directly contain preferences or beliefs 
directly. For instance, preferences only play a very indirect role in the approach developed by Green Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse (2001) and Börzel and Risse (2003). Primary importance is given to multiple veto points, 
which I believe not to be in line with rational choice institutionalism, which has preferences at central stage. 
Even though they are right to point out the importance of formal institutions, they miss the focus on preferen-
ces. As is argued by Steunenberg (2005, 2006), the number of veto points itself is inconsequential, the ease of 
transposition depending not on the number of actors, but on their substantive positions.
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Table 12 A classification of ‘political’ theories of transposition
unitary actor perspective multiple actor perspective
rationalism IR rationalism:
transposition as strategic calculation
rational choice institutionalism:
transposition as preference aggregation
-  degree of domestic support (Knill and 
 Lenschow, 1998)
- policy salience (Knill and Lenschow, 1998)
-  supra- and international pressures (Knill and 
Lenschow, 1998)
-  adaptational pressures from below and above 
(Börzel, 2003a)
-  national reform capacity (Héritier et al, 2001)
-  multiple veto points (Green Cowles, Capo-
raso, and Risse, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003)
-  formal institutions (Green Cowles, Caporaso, 
and Risse, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003)
-  differential empowerment of actors (Green 
Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 2001)
construc-
tivism
IR constructivism:
transposition as norm diffusion
deliberative democracy:
transposition as deliberation
- embeddedness (Knill and Lenschow, 1998)
- stage of liberalization (Héritier et al, 2001)
- dominant belief system (Héritier et al, 2001)
-  political and organizational cultures (Green 
Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 2001)
-  learning (Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 
2001)
- norm entrepreneurs (Börzel and Risse, 2003)
- informal institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2003) 
We can conceive of various specific theories within each of the paradigms. In the following, 
I discuss the main contributions that so far have been suggested in the literature, so as 
to compare their explanatory strength in the qualitative analysis. I would argue that 
this strategy is preferable to assessing the explanatory strength of the paradigms as such, 
which currently is a popular research strategy. The problem is that it is exceedingly hard 
to draw a clear empirical line between true deliberation and strategic action (Bächtiger 
and Steiner, 2005, 162; Johnson, 1998, 171). The main problem is that we never know 
whether the preferences revealed by actors are real or authentic. Even worse, not all 
parties to a conflict may have the same view of the character of a discussion (Goodin, 
2005, 186). As Holzinger (2004, 198) rightly points out, ‘Pure bargaining can scarcely 
ever be found in the way it is described in the economic model.’ Under the rationalist 
model, preferences do not need justification, but they may be justified (Gutmann 
and Thompson, 2004, 15). Often, ‘lofty rhetoric will coexist with mean bargaining’ 
(Gambetta, 1998, 35). Therefore, instead of testing the ontological accuracy of ‘the’ 
rationalist versus ‘the’ constructivist view, I formulate particular theories under these two 
headings that might explain the observed variation in transposition delays.
5.3 Compliance as strategic calculation
Compliance has been a central topic in international relations theory since the early 1980s. 
Following the upsurge of regime theory (Krasner, 1982; Keohane, 1984), a much-debated 
question became to what extent international institutions matter (Young, 1992, 164), 
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i.e. whether and how they affect state behavior. The two main perspectives are offered by 
the enforcement and the managerial school (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996; Chayes 
and Chayes, 1993; Jönsson and Tallberg, 1998; Tallberg, 2002). Whereas the latter has 
close parallels to the first wave of transposition research, the former holds that non-
compliance with international rules is a state’s choice, based upon strategic calculation.8 
Non-compliance, in this view, results from a member state’s conscious decision to defect: 
‘Compliance, adherence, and cooperation all turn on the political calculation of member 
countries that it is best to comply’ (Gourevitch, 1996, 363-364).
The enforcement school originates in the rationalist approach to international relations. 
Central to this approach is the view of national states as rational utility maximizers, 
which enter into international agreements to further their own good (Keohane, 1988, 
386). A key assumption of this approach is that member states can be treated as unitary 
actors. International institutions are thought to mirror state interests, especially those 
of strong states. Accordingly, compliance is always spurious, in the sense that both the 
international rules and national behavior reflect those interests (Mitchell, 1994, 428). 
Good compliance records are likely to be caused by the fact that member states avoid deep 
cooperation, i.e. treaties that require states to depart significantly from what they would 
have done in the absence of the treaty (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996, 383).
The tendency of states to negotiate treaties that are in their interest does not automatically 
result in compliance: the signatories will decide strategically whether or not to observe a 
treaty after its adoption. Defection is notorious, and results from a national government’s 
choice not to comply. Institutions may at most induce compliance by performing 
functions that are valued by the member states (Keohane, 1984, 107).9 They may alter the 
cost calculation of member states, because they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs 
(Keohane, 1984), while institutionalizing reciprocity (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985, 250). 
International institutions do not affect member states’ preferences, which are treated as 
fixed, but they do increase the likelihood of compliance because of the long-term value of 
cooperation, even if it is not in member states’ short-term interest to comply.
Several students of European integration advocate the IR rationalist view of non-
compliance. Börzel (2003b) argues that we must link the ‘shaping’ to the ‘taking’ of EU 
policies. Falkner et al (2005, 278) find that ‘opposition through the backdoor’ is one of 
the reasons for non-compliance with the labor law directives they study. The view assumes 
‘rational action by member states who wish to reap the benefits of appearing to be good 
Europeans yet knowing all about the possibilities for policy erosion away from the high 
8   A third alternative would be the pure realist view that the degree of compliance depends not so much on particu-
lar state interests concerning an international rule, but on the power of a member state. However, this perspective 
is rather irrelevant to the present study as it cannot explain intra-country variance in a particular period.
9   IR rationalists are internally divided about the relationship between international institutions and state inte-
rests. Whereas neo-liberals argue that international institutions may alter state interests, neo-realists maintain 
that international institutions only mirror them. 
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politic venues’ (Richardson 1996, 287). At the same time, the question arises how willful 
non-compliance may occur in the face of the principles of direct effect, supremacy, and 
Community loyalty. The argument is that the member states can erode these principles 
relatively easily, because even though the EU is a supranational legal order when it comes 
to the adoption of EU policies, the implementation system is basically intergovernmental 
(Jordan, Ward, and Buller, 1998, 1405; From and Stava, 1993, 60). The Commission has to 
rely almost completely on the member states for implementation (Peters, 1997, 187-188): it 
has neither the authority, nor the capacity to carry out its own policies on the ground. When 
it comes to its function as guardian of the treaties, the Commission is far less powerful than 
most European governments when enforcing national law. In many policy areas, such as the 
environment, the Commission is not even allowed to gather information on implementation 
on the ground (Macrory and Purdy, 1997, 37-38; Collins and Earnshaw, 1992, 231). In 
addition, in the areas where the Commission does have extensive enforcement powers, it 
is faced with limited resources. Moreover, due to the high political sensitivity of instances 
of non-compliances it has to go about its task very carefully, dealing and wheeling with the 
member states, trying to talk them into compliance. EU enforcement can be characterized 
as compliance bargaining between the Commission and the member states, who are aiming 
to reach reaching amicable solutions for compliance problems (Jönsson and Tallberg, 1998, 
372). It is highly diplomatic in nature, also because member states generally are not very 
willing to openly address each other’s deficiencies in implementation. 
To sum up, there is a strong tension between supranational decision-making and state-
dominated implementation. Viewed in this way, the transposition deficit is a consequence 
of member states’ quest for control over EU activities (From and Stava, 1993, 56). Non-
compliance then becomes the logical response to unwanted policy decisions, especially 
those taken by a qualified majority. Besides, even if the EU comprised a more supranational 
system of policy implementation, political calculation by the member states probably would 
not be extinct. To repeat the famous phrase by Bardach (1977, 85), ‘implementation is the 
continuation of politics by other means’.
Hypothesis 11: A member state will not transpose a directive that it objected to.
5.4 Compliance as preference aggregation
Another way of viewing transposition is to open the black box of the state. As Puchala 
(1975, 510) notes, non-compliance with EC law is often a result of domestic political 
dilemmas instead of malevolence. He sketches a picture of basically benevolent governments, 
who ‘balk at complying’ (ibid, 498) when they are forced to do so by powerful domestic 
actors. Ministries in charge of transposing directives are often confronted with other 
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stakeholders, such as other ministries, Parliament, advisory bodies, businesses, and interest 
groups. Alternatively, ministries may be internally divided over how a directive should be 
implemented. Depending on their substantive preferences, role, and power, these stakeholders 
may exert influence on the process and outcome of transposition. For instance, Parliament 
may refuse to enact transposing legislation, or a powerful interest group may manage to 
block the transposition process. In the words of Snyder (1995, 57), it is a ‘well-known truth 
that the implementation and enforcement of (Community) law are often highly political, in 
the sense that they require the exercise of power and a choice between competing values’.
Keeping with rationalism, while allowing for multiple actors, we could view 
transposition processes as a form of social choice, or the aggregation of preferences 
held by domestic actors (cf. Elster, 1986). The central feature of social choice theory is 
the strategic interaction of individuals within a well-defined context (Weingast, 1996, 
169). The notion of strategic interaction central is based on two main assumptions: 
methodological individualism and rationality. Methodological individualism implies that 
analytical individuals are viewed as the basic unit of analysis. Rationality means nothing 
more than that these actors are assumed to have a fixed set of complete and transitive 
preferences they seek to maximize, by selecting the courses for action that yield most 
utility. Furthermore, in calculating the expected utility of each behavioral alternative, 
they incorporate the actions of other actors engaged in the interaction. 
Hence the main ingredients of a rational choice model are the actors and their 
strategies, as derived from their preferences and their expectations about the behavior 
of other actors. Rational choice institutionalists add institutions to this equation. As to 
the definition of these institutions, the common denominator seems to be formed by 
‘rules’ (Riker, 1980, 432). These can be defined as ‘prescriptions commonly known and 
used by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent relationships’ (Ostrom, 
1986, 5). They determine ‘(…) the ways the tastes and values are brought forward for 
consideration, eliminated, and finally selected’ (Riker, 1980, 443).
Institutional veto points
How to link rational choice to transposition? The earlier attempts to use rational choice 
institutionalism to underpin the goodness of fit hypothesis are not very helpful. The goodness 
of fit can be viewed as a rationalist argument, but one that makes very strong assumptions 
about the substance of national actors’ preferences, namely to maintain the status quo. It is 
exactly this presupposition that has produced the disappointing empirical results described 
above. So as to increase empirical leverage, it is better not to fill in the preferences ex ante. 
This allows us to better account for the fact that sometimes transposition is fast and correct 
despite a misfit, or protracted and incorrect in the face of a good fit. Such an account 
would hence prioritize domestic actors over the status quo in a certain policy area.
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A first attempt to develop a rationalist multiple actor theory of EU compliance was 
offered by Haverland (2000). According to him, the key is with institutional veto points.10 
Stakeholders may overcome a misfit or a good fit, depending on their preferences, when 
they have institutional veto power. This view is in line with the expectation of Héritier 
et al (2001, 10) that the national reform capacity, defined as the number of veto players, 
is a key determinant of Europeanization in the face of a misfit (also see Green Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003). The general hypothesis derived from 
this work is that transposition becomes more time-consuming, the more institutional 
veto players are involved.
The veto player argument has been tested by Mbaye (2001), Giuliani (2003), and 
Falkner et al (2005). They all investigate the effect of the number of veto players on 
countries’ compliance performance, using Tsebelis’ (1995, 2002) veto player index. This 
index measures the number of veto players in a particular year, defined as both the parties 
making up the executive, and the institutional players whose consent is required to pass a 
legislative measure, such as Parliament. The empirical results are not conclusive, however. 
Mbaye (2001, 271) finds that the number of veto players does not have a significant effect 
on the number of infringement procedures brought before the ECJ against a member 
state in a particular year. Giuliani (2003, 150), on the other hand, finds a negative effect 
of the number of veto players on the adaptation rate, which is a standardized index of 
national adaptation based upon the rate of transposition of directives, the number of 
letters of formal notice, reasoned opinions, and references to the ECJ.11
The reason for Mbaye’s disappointing results could be that the number of infringements 
is not a valid measure for her dependent variable, non-implementation of EC law. That 
is, infringement procedures only form the tip of the iceberg of actual non-compliance 
(Börzel, 2001, 808; Falkner et al, 2005, 218), as the Commission does not discover 
all instances of non-compliance, nor has the resources to pursue every single breach of 
Community Law (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2001). Therefore, the effects of the veto 
player variable may be underestimated. Second, the Tsebelis’ veto player index is relatively 
crude in that only includes the veto players relevant for legislative decision-making. As 
such, it does not apply to cases of transposition through lower-level instruments, which 
constitute the majority of transposition processes. 
Steunenberg and Rhinard (2006, 23) have constructed a procedural veto player index 
that does capture the differences between these instruments for various countries. They 
find that indeed, the more players are involved, the more time is needed for transposition. 
This index is only partly relevant for this study, though, as it is primarily geared to explain 
10   It needs to be noted that this point was also recognized by some goodness of fit scholars, like Green Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse (2001). However, they present veto points as a variable that is additional to the goodness 
of fit.
11   This finding may be an artifact of the data, as Giuliani’s statistical setup probably suffers from severe pooling 
effects. Also, it must be doubted whether the different kinds of non-compliance can be simply added up.
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   72 05-03-2007   15:53:06
Chapter 5 Explaining delays: on misfit and politics

differences between member states. For transposition into statutes, the autonomy of the 
prime minister is used as an indicator, which is constant across all cases in my database. 
The same holds for transposition into statutes, for which Steunenberg and Rhinard use 
Tsebelis’ index, which is again not relevant for analyzing intra-country variance. For 
ministerial decrees, the authors focus on the number of ministries involved, which is 
similar to the ‘coordination’ variable in the present study.
Thus existing veto player indices cannot serve well to explain differences between 
directives transposed within one country. For instance, Tsebelis’ veto player index is 
relatively constant over time, depending on the constellation of institutional and partisan 
veto players, and cannot serve to explain differences among transposition processes 
within that period. For this reason, the present study will not investigate the effects 
of institutional veto players, but test a so-called policy specific approach (Steunenberg, 
2005; 2006) that treats interest groups and corporatist bodies as veto players, whereas 
Tsebelis (2002, 307) excludes these for being ‘idiosyncratic’.
From veto points to rational choice models
The downside of the veto player hypothesis is that it focuses not so much on the contents 
of government preferences, but on the institutional layout of the member state. Treib 
(2003) criticizes this approach and proposes to focus on actual governments’ substantive 
preferences. Rejecting the argument that national governments always defend the status 
quo, he proposes an actor-centered perspective, stressing the importance of domestic 
politics. He claims that the key to the variation in implementation performance is 
with the political preferences of national governments. Instead of guarding the status 
quo, governments’ reactions are to a great extent determined by their party political 
preferences (ibid, 24). Political opposition may occur even if the goodness of fit is high, 
and a misfit may be inconsequential when a national government is willing to change 
existing policies. Even though interesting, this approach is limited as well, in that it 
neglects other veto players, such as Parliament, and that it assumes rather than measures 
the substance of governmental preferences. We need a more general rational choice 
model, which includes all possible actors and their preferences, to explain problems with 
transposition.
Such a more general rational choice model would also have advantages over the 
modified goodness of fit frameworks. If we define the national policy status quo as the 
‘congealed tastes of their creators’ (Riker, 1980), we can assume that preferences underpin 
both the status quo and the wish to maintain it in the face of a directive. An additional 
advantage of focusing on the fit with domestic preferences rather than existing policies 
is that it renders a more parsimonious framework than those generated by goodness of 
fit theorists. The majority of the auxiliary variables introduced to salvage the central 
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hypothesis logically drop out if we directly include preferences. This applies to the 
national reform capacity (Héritier, 2002), multiple veto points and formal institutions 
(Caporaso, Cowles, and Risse, 2000; Börzel and Risse, 2003), and the differential 
empowerment of actors (Caporaso, Cowles, and Risse, 2000).
Bargaining under a deadline
We can conceive of various general rational choice applications to the particular problem 
structure of transposition. For instance, some work has been done on principal-agent 
models (see Bergman, 2000 for an overview), but none of these contributions allow for 
the fact that there are multiple agents at the national level, which makes these models 
unsuitable for studying transposition. More promising are bargaining models, as these 
explicitly model the interactions between the various domestic stakeholders. In addition, 
they are highly relevant for analyzing transposition, as they explicitly model the passage 
of time; besides information, this is a central ingredient of bargaining models (Cramton, 
1992, 225). Bargaining is assumed to take place in separate time periods, in which the 
participants make offers. Generally, the payoffs of reaching agreement are assumed to 
shrink according to some discount factor (Ghosh, 1996, 312). We can identify three 
specific research agendas relating to the role of time in bargaining that may be interesting 
from the perspective of transposition speed.
To begin with, several bargaining theorists focus on the causes of delays in bargaining 
processes, or the phenomenon that parties at times postpone making an offer or 
counteroffer. Whereas some authors view these delays as strategic actions, for instance 
intended to signal the strength of their bargaining position (Cramton, 1992, 207) or to 
increase the chances of reaching a favorable agreement as explained above, others stress 
the non-strategic causes of delays, such as transactional time, which is the time needed 
before an offer can be technically communicated to the other party (Ghosh, 1996). 
Even though delays in this sense could be a reason for late transposition, the literature 
concerned is not helpful in making this link explicit, as it tries to explain the origin of 
such delaying tactics, instead of its effects on bargaining duration.
Second, there is a highly promising sub-literature on the so-called deadline 
effect. Many bargaining processes operate under deadlines, either internally agreed 
or externally imposed (Ma and Manove, 1993, 1313). Examples of deadlines are 
threatened strikes in wage bargaining, or potential third-party intervention in mediation 
processes (Stuhlmacher, Gillespie and Champagne, 1988, 97). Roth, Murnighan, and 
Schoumaker (1988) showed that a striking concentration of bargains is struck just before 
these deadlines. Various theorists have subsequently sought to explain this prevalence 
of ‘eleventh hour agreements’ (Gneezy et al, 2003, 348), using both complete and 
incomplete information models. For instance, players may delay their move until the 
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latest moment and make an ultimatum offer, thus increasing the chances of reaching a 
more favorable outcome (Ma and Manove, 1993, 1316-1317; Fershtman and Seidmann, 
1993; Gneezy et al, 2003).
Unfortunately, most of the literature on the deadline effect is ill-suited to explain 
late transposition, as it studies the question why agreements are reached just before 
the deadline, rather than much earlier. Moreover, in these models deadlines are usually 
of a ‘stop-the-clock’ nature (Fershtman and Seidmann, 1993, 308), after which 
agreement is no longer possible.12 In transposition processes, in contrast, the ‘clock’ is 
not stopped when the deadline expires, which makes for an altogether different dynamic 
of bargaining. A third line of research, though, seems to capture this dynamic. Two 
articles by Stuhlmacher and others (Stuhlmacher, Gillespie, and Champagne, 1988; 
Stuhlmacher and Champagne, 2000) explicitly model the effects of time pressure on 
bargaining processes and outcomes. They do so without assuming a ‘stop-the-clock’ 
deadline. Rather, they investigate the effects of increasing time pressure, resulting 
from an impending deadline. Even though in the qualitative analysis on transposition 
duration the deadlines are comparable in length, this literature is still promising as it 
claims that the effects of time pressure are moderated by other variables. Hence it could 
serve to explain why, in the face of similar deadlines, transposition duration may vary 
considerably between directives.
Stuhlmacher, Gillespie and Champagne (1988) and Stuhlmacher and Champagne 
(2000) posit that time pressure, as resulting from an approaching deadline, has an effect 
on the outcomes of bargaining. They view bargaining as a process of increasing action, 
the closer the deadline looms (Stuhlmacher, Gillespie and Champagne, 1988, 99). 
Crucially, time pressure is thought to lead to a less ambitious target agreement, quicker 
and larger concessions, and faster responses, which increases the chances of reaching 
agreement (Stuhlmacher and Champagne, 2000, 472-473). However, Stuhlmacher, 
Gillespie, and Champagne (1988) argue that the effect of time pressure is moderated 
by two other variables.13 A first moderator is the opponent’s strategy. The more flexible 
a player, the lower his aspirations, the more reasonable his initial offers and concessions, 
and the faster his response rate (ibidem, 99). A looming deadline is not expected to 
cause speedy agreement if a player is inflexible. That is, the other player may perceive 
the opponent’s inflexible behavior as a threat and retaliate by becoming less flexible as 
well. This may lead to deadlock, even in the face of an approaching deadline (ibidem, 
12   The deadline is then conceptualized as a point beyond which there is no longer a surplus to be divided 
(Fershtman and Seidmann, 1993, 307). This does not capture the nature of deadlines in transposition proces-
ses. Only in the rare case that national courts or the ECJ have imposed penalties upon a non-complying 
member state, might there be a surplus lower than the costs incurred by non-transposition. However, and this 
is another point where the comparison falls short, not by the other parties to the bargaining process, such as 
Parliament or interest groups. 
13   Stuhlmacher, Gillespie, and Champagne (1998) suggest another moderating variable: the presence of 
monetary rewards in experimental settings. This variable is not relevant to the present study, which is of a non-
experimental nature.
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101). Second, the effect of time pressure is said to be moderated by the complexity of 
the bargaining problem, as indicated by the number of issues in the decision-making 
process. Time pressure is expected to only speed up bargaining in simple negotiations, 
revolving around few issues, because the effects of time pressure are offset by the high 
cognitive demands on the players, which do not allow for the speedy reaching of an 
agreement, even when a deadline looms large. From this discussion, the following two 
hypotheses can be distilled:
Hypothesis 12: The less flexible an opponent’s strategy, the weaker the effect of time pressure on 
in bringing about agreement, and hence the more time is needed for transposition.
Hypothesis 13: The more issues, the weaker the effect of time pressure in bringing about agree-
ment, and hence the more time is needed for transposition.
A voting model
Second, we may use voting models to analyze transposition speed. The suitability of this 
class of models is less intuitive, because the passing of time does not explicitly play a role 
in these models. For this reason, voting models are primarily appropriate for analyzing the 
substantive outcome of transposition processes. For instance, taking an earlier paper as 
his starting point (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000), Steunenberg (2005) has modeled 
the correctness of transposition using a combination of the spatial analysis of voting 
and the theory of sequential games. This paper does not offer any leads for analyzing 
timeliness, as transposition is considered as a more or less instantaneous outcome of 
decision-making, reflecting the constellation of domestic actor preferences in a particular 
institutional setting (cf. Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2001). More relevant in this regard 
is a third paper in which Steunenberg (2006) incorporates coordination by higher-level 
actors as an additional parameter. In the following, I will discuss this latter model, which 
has a bearing on both correctness and timeliness.
The approach developed by Steunenberg (2006) departs from the veto player theory 
as discussed above. It views transposition as a decision-making process in which different 
national actors need to cooperate; each actor can block the transposition process or 
refuse to implement the directive when the directive is not in its interest. Instead of 
formal veto positions, the emphasis is hence on policy-specific veto players (ibid, 6). This 
conceptualization does justice to Tsebelis’ (1995, 307) observation that ‘the number of 
veto players varies by issue’, something his index cannot capture. Also, it generalizes the 
intuitive rationalist notion of several goodness of fit theorists that the effect of a misfit can 
be overcome by domestic support (Knill and Lenschow, 1998), or adaptational pressures 
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from below and above (Börzel, 2003a).14 It also formalizes the insight of Treib (2003) 
that we should look at the opinions of political parties in Parliament, but casts its net 
much wider, extending to all possible legislative and regulatory  procedures and the actors 
that play a role in adopting these. In addition, it leaves the substance of the preferences 
flexible, instead of imputing preferences for instance based on political parties’ left-right 
status, as proposed by Treib (2003).
Steunenberg (2006) views transposition as a process in which various political and 
administrative actors need to approve of the transposition of a directive. All actors are 
supposed to have their own ideas of how a directive should be transposed (ibid, 295). 
Central to transforming their preferences into an outcome is the policy coordination 
mechanism, which depends on the instrument used for transposition. Transposition is 
modeled as a two-level game: first, actors at the lower level, such as divisions within a 
ministry, try to transpose a directive, after which one or more higher-level players, such 
as the responsible minister or Cabinet, take their turn.
The different actors are assumed to have complete and perfect information (ibid, 299). 
They are thought to hold single-peaked preferences concerning each issue contained in 
the directive (d). Each veto player i has an ideal point concerning the issue, labeled Li for 
a lower-level player, and Hi for a higher-level player. Furthermore, at each level one of 
the actors is assumed to be the agenda setter, which may be either accepted or adopted by 
the other player  (ibid, 298-299). Another ingredient of the model is the Commission’s 
enforcement costs. The Commission, whose ideal point is assumed to equal the content 
of the directive, will take action against a national government when the difference 
between the national legislation and the contents of the directive exceeds those costs of 
enforcement. It is assumed that the various players want to avoid being prosecuted by the 
Commission, and thus that they will ensure that its transposition proposal falls within 
the set of sustainable proposals, i.e. the range of proposals that will not be challenged by 
the Commission (ibid, 299).
How are the actors’ preferences transformed into an outcome? First, the lower-level 
agenda-setter will propose a transposition measure, which the other players then either 
accept or reject. If they all agree, the proposal is accepted, and approved by the higher-
level coordinator. If they disagree, the matter is taken to the higher level. There, the 
coordinating player or players have to agree on a transposing measure. If there are more 
players at this level, as is for instance the case when two departments are involved in 
transposition, the higher-level agenda-setter makes a proposal, which is then either 
accepted or rejected by the other player(s) at that level.
14   Two other auxiliary variables suggested in the goodness of fit literature are not part of the models discussed 
here, but could in principle be incorporated into them: the differential empowerment of domestic actors 
(Green Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 2001) and the saliency of the preferences held by them (Knill and Len-
schow, 1998).
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   77 05-03-2007   15:53:08

Chapter 5 Explaining delays: on misfit and politics
In Steunenberg’s framework, delays may occur in situations with multiplayer coordination. 
The presence of multiple veto players at the higher level may result in deadlock. More 
specifically, delays will occur if the higher-level players do not agree on the transposition of 
a certain directive. As is illustrated in figure 9, one higher-level player may want to move 
to the right of the directive, whereas the other may want to move to the left. They hence 
cannot agree on a deviation from the directive. This is hypothesized to lead to delayed 
transposition. Players may try to postpone their decision, or try to resolve the conflict in 
various ways. In the end, though, the directive will be transposed literally (ibid, 304).
Figure 9 A preference configuration for delayed transposition15
L 1 
dmin
L 2 
d dmax H1 H2 h1(d) h2(d)
Hypothesis 14: If higher-level players are divided about the transposition of a directive, the pro-
cess will be delayed.
5.5 Compliance as norm diffusion
In the late 1980s, the rationalist paradigm that had dominated international relations 
since the 1970s was increasingly under fire (Haas, 1989, Ruggie, 1998). Various IR 
theorists argued that rationalism was blind to the transformative effects of international 
institutions on member states’ preferences, interests, beliefs, and identities (Haas, 1989, 
380; Ruggie, 1998, 864; Finnemore, 1996, 5; Wendt, 1992, 394). The core assumption of 
IR constructivism, which then began to make inroads into the field, is that international 
institutions assume a power of their own by socializing members into compliance.
IR constructivism is closely linked to sociological institutionalism.16 The core notion 
of this branch of neo-institutionalist theory is that life is organized by relatively stable sets 
15   The sustainable set is the segment between d
min
 and d
max
. The sets of policies the two higher-level players prefer 
to the directive are the segments running from the directive (d) to their indifference points (hi(d)). The set of 
feasible policies is empty, as the two sets of preferred policies will not overlap. Any proposal approved by the 
lower-level players, except for the directive, will be rejected by one of the higher-level players.
16   The two approaches are essentially the same; that is, if we concentrate on the modernist version of constructi-
vism (Checkel, 1999, 554). The main difference is that one is applied to international relations, and the other 
to comparative politics (Risse, 2000). First, both approaches subscribe to the logic of appropriateness as the 
mechanism underlying human behavior. A mutual constitution of structure and agency, of norms and actors. 
Moreover, it must be noted that both approaches usually bracket institutions (see Checkel, 1998 and Sending, 
2002; for a more reflexive approach, see Wiener, 2004). Finally, both approaches stress collectivism instead 
of the methodological individualism promoted by rationalist theories. The link between the two literatures is 
made explicit by March and Olsen (1998).
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of shared meanings and practices (March and Olsen, 1996, 249). Human interaction is 
thought to be shaped by widely shared ideational factors that construct actors’ interests 
and identities (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, 393). These ideational factors combine to 
form an institution, which may be defined as ‘a relatively stable collection of practices 
and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations’ 
(March and Olsen, 1998, 948). The focus is on patterns of behavior, which explains why 
institutions are also defined as standard operating procedures and practices (March and 
Olsen, 1984, 738).
Crucial to sociological institutionalism is the interaction between institutions and 
behavior. The central mechanism linking the two is the logic of appropriateness. It 
supposes that actors’ behavior is not so much led by rational choice, but by duties and 
obligations (March and Olsen, 1984, 741). Institutions provide standards of obligation, 
which help actors to assess which course of action is expected from them in a certain 
situation. ‘Individuals face choices all the time, but in doing so they seek guidance from 
the experiences of others in comparable situations and by reference to standards of 
obligation’ (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991, 10). 
IR constructivism, just like rationalism, started out from a unitary actor perspective 
(Keohane, 1988, 392).17 Most IR constructivists are statists, even though few of them 
make this claim as explicitly as Wendt, who yields that ‘the state-centrism of (his) agenda 
may strike some (…) as depressingly familiar’ (1992, 424; italics added).18 For instance, 
Risse (2000, 29), in a study on socialization into human rights norms, distinguishes 
between governments or target states, transnational organizations, and domestic 
opposition located in civil society. This implicit unitary actor view is in line with the 
conceptualization of the logic of appropriateness as a collective, rather than an individual 
property: norms are defined by the political and social system (March and Olsen, 
1984, 741). The core assumption of this literature is that member states’ responses to 
integrative challenges are determined by their values, beliefs, and identities (Aspinwall 
and Schneider, 2000, 21). This is also clear in the work by Héritier et al (2001), who 
identify a state’s dominant belief system as the key determinant of compliance.
There are two ways in which we can use the logic of appropriateness to explain EU 
compliance. First, we can apply it to the meta-level, asking the question to what extent 
member states find it appropriate to comply with the rules of a particular international 
17   At the same time, it must be said that the term ‘unitary actor’ could be seen as misleading when used to refer 
to IR constructivism, because the focus in this theoretical school is not so much on individual actors and their 
agency, but on the norms held by these actors. This conceptualization differs greatly from the rationalist one, 
for which actors and their strategies are the cornerstone of analysis. Yet, for reasons of classification I propose 
to employ the unitary actor label also for IR constructivism, since most theories in this school do adopt a weak 
notion of agency, namely focusing on national governments or states acting in a certain way, even if norms 
and beliefs are portrayed as causally prior to this behavior.
18   It must be noted that not many constructivists are clear about this assumption. For instance, Acharya (2004) 
speaks of ‘local agents’ and ‘norm-takers’, without stipulating whether she means member states, as represented 
by top officials, or actors within the state.
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institution. Compliance then takes on a holistic character (Hurd, 1999, 381). Law is then 
seen as generating a felt sense of obligation, which leads to behavior change (Finnemore 
and Toope, 2001, 749), something that is not captured by rationalist theories (Reus-
Smit, 2003, 592). However, this perspective is not useful for the purpose of the present 
study, as it cannot explain intra-country variance in the ease of transposition.
To explain the different fates of directives within one member state, it is most fruitful to 
view compliance on a rule-by-rule basis, with standards of appropriateness being applied 
to individual directives (Hurd, 1999, 398). Legitimacy then derives from the substance 
of these norms, and compliance is conceptualized as a piece-by-piece assessment of these 
directives in the face of pre-existing domestic norms.19 If a directive fits a member state’s 
norms, that state will deem the directive appropriate and speedily comply with it. If 
the member state finds the directive inappropriate, because it runs counter to national 
norms, compliance will be more time-consuming, dependent on a process whereby 
the norm is diffused into the domestic system, with internalization of the rule as the 
endpoint (Sending, 2002, 456). In other words, the hypothesis that follows from the 
norm diffusion perspective is that transposition will be delayed when a directive does not 
fit the norms held by a member state.
According to Dimitrova and Rhinard (2005)20, the above conceptualization is too 
crude. Inspired by Knill and Lenschow (1998), who focus on the embeddedness of 
national norms, they argue that we should distinguish between norms at three levels 
(ibid, 5-6). First-order norms are sectoral and technical in nature and are held by a specific 
group of actors. Second-order norms concern more political questions and are held by a 
wider group of actors. They are relevant to various policy areas, stipulating the general 
approaches to policy-making in those areas, the types of regulatory approaches to be 
used, as well as appropriate policy instruments. Third-order norms are broadly rooted in 
a society, spanning the political system, and referring to deeply held value questions. Not 
all directives will challenge norms at all levels though: some only challenge higher-level 
norms, while leaving third-order norms intact. 
Based on this distinction between levels of norms, Dimitrova and Rhinard formulate the 
following hypotheses. First, they expect transposition to be timely and correct if European 
norms fit the norms at all three levels. Second, they expect content change when a European 
norm conflicts with a first-order norm, but is consistent with second order norms. Third, 
19   Most constructivist studies take a top-down orientation, starting with the EU input, and ending with the 
policy result. Some authors, however, claim that we should work the other way around, stressing the agency of 
domestic actors, who use international norms actively and selectively (e.g. Gurowitch, 1999; Acharya, 2004).
20   Dimitrova and Rhinard (2005) hover between a unitary and a multiple actor perspective. On the one hand, 
they assume that domestic norms are uniform. Even though they argue that first order norms are held by a 
sector-specific community, their conceptualization differs from a veritable multiple actor approach, which 
would allow for the possibility that different groups hold different norms. At the same time, they do break 
open the black box of government, by assuming that civil servants who participate in Council working groups 
may be socialized into new norms, which they then are likely to defend back home.
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they argue that delay will occur when the norm fits contrasts with both the first and second 
order norm. Finally, they argue that serious delay will occur when the directive does not fit 
the broad, third-order norms held by a community. In brief, the duration of transposition 
is thought to depend on the depth of the norm that is challenged by the directive. A scope 
condition for this theory to be applicable is that the directive is not purely technical.
Hypothesis 15: The ‘deeper’ the domestic norm that is challenged by the directive, the more time 
is needed for transposition.
5.6 Compliance as deliberation
Deliberation may simply waste precious time
(Gambetta, 1998, 21)
Hence if a directive does not fit domestic norms that are deeply and broadly held, 
constructivists expect transposition to become delayed. How can we explain, though, 
that despite this normative misfit most directives are transposed eventually? Here, 
constructivism has a problem: it has a hard time explaining change, as it has an 
underdeveloped theory of agency (Checkel, 1998, 325). Because the focus is on the 
structural components that drive behavior, it is ‘curiously bloodless’ (Hall and Taylor, 
1996). As standards of appropriateness are collective understandings, individual agency 
does not play an independent role in many constructivist theories. Individuals are more 
or less ‘programmed’ by the institutions in which they are located (Sending, 2002, 452). 
They are ‘the mindless plaything of social forces or the passive executor of inherited 
standards’ (Elster, 1989, 97). This holism produces an important problem: the logic of 
appropriateness cannot explain how changes in ideational structures get off the ground, 
as in order for norm change to occur, norm advocates need to behave inappropriately 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 897).
Various constructivists have struggled with this problem of explaining change. Many 
have concluded that change must come from outside the system (Lieberman, 2002, 
698). Typically, constructivists have emphasized that member states can be induced 
into compliance by other states, international organizations, or advocacy coalitions. To 
begin with, some authors focus on the interaction between the international system 
and individual states. Compliance and enforcement are then viewed as a hierarchical 
process, in that international organizations can teach states to value certain goals (Adler, 
1998, 133; Checkel, 1998, 331; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, 396-397). By the 
same token, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 902-903) argue that the international state 
system shapes the identity and behavior of individual states. If many states accept a 
new norm, other states will start to view the new norm as appropriate, and adopt it as 
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well. Underlying the effects of this peer pressure mechanism is the importance states 
attach to legitimation, conformity, and esteem. States want to conform to standards of 
appropriateness held by their peers, and be esteemed by them. This is in line with the 
hypothesis by Jacobson and Weiss (1995, 129) that the greater the number of countries 
that have complied with an international treaty, the greater the chances of compliance 
by any individual signatory.
Other constructivists stress the transformative effects of societal mobilization 
(Checkel, 1999, 552). If not portraying the state as unitary, they assume a unitary 
government. Here, the typical account is rather unidirectional in nature, sketching 
how a ‘good’ international norm21 is opposed by a ‘bad’ government, which is then 
persuaded to comply by an epistemic community or domestic advocacy coalition. 
For instance, Gurowitz (1999) analyzes how human rights activists have mobilized 
their domestic governments to incorporate international human rights norms. Here, 
domestic governments are usually viewed as unitary actors. This is very clear in the 
literature on epistemic communities, networks of experts with an authoritative claim 
to knowledge and a normative agenda (Haas, 1992). These are claimed to try to exert 
influence on member states’ interests, inducing learning on the part of the latter (Haas, 
1992, Haas, 1998, 32; Ruggie, 1998, 868). In line with this agenda, several authors 
have stressed the role of advocacy coalitions (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2000; Risse 
and Sikkink, 1999). These coalitions, which may be either domestic of transnational in 
nature, may force norm-violating governments into dialogue and thus socialize them 
into compliance. 
Summing up, even in the face of initial norm conflict, states may still comply with 
international rules, because they are pressurized into compliance by advocacy coalitions 
or international organizations. Alternatively, we may locate the source of change within 
the governmental machinery. Checkel (2001), for instance, assumes that government 
officials or elites are sensitive to socialization processes. This is a great improvement 
over much of the earlier constructivist literature, which works from a unitary actor 
assumption. At the same time, this view still starts from a unitary actor assumption, as it 
assumes that government officials initially think and behave in line with the prevailing 
‘national’ standards of appropriateness. It thus closes its eyes to the fact that many 
compliance processes unleash contestation within governments, e.g. between Parliament 
and Government, within Parliament, or within or among administrative actors involved. 
Compliance, and transposition more specifically, is often a purely domestic political 
process taking place within domestic bureaucratic and political arenas, a phenomenon 
that the constructivist literature on compliance has neglected so far.
21  As Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, 403) remark, constructivist research in international relations has almost 
exclusively been concerned with what are considered ‘good’ norms, such as human rights, environmental 
protection, and democracy.
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I thus take the conceptualization of Checkel (2001) one step further and depart from 
the overly communitarianist focus of IR constructivism (Sending, 2002). As follows 
from the empirical literature on the goodness of fit, are often internally divided about 
the standards of appropriateness to be followed. Whereas some norms are shared by all 
of society, others are very much group-specific (Elster, 1989, 99). They may pertain to a 
social category (Johnston, 2001, 495), rather than to all of society. Accordingly, we often 
see ‘ongoing contestation over institutional outcomes’ (Thelen, 2003, 213). This ongoing 
contestation may be sparked by international rules and norms, which often become 
incorporated in domestic debates (Cortell and Davis, 1996, 452). Such a disaggregated 
view would be in line with the recent finding of Zürn and Checkel (2005, 29) that we 
should theorize the role of domestic politics in EU socialization. Also, it echoes the 
more general call made in IR theory to bring domestic politics back in (Haggard and 
Simmons, 1987, 513; Keohane, 1988, 392; Milner, 1998, 767; Checkel, 2005).
I hence propose to break open the black box of the state. Rather than studying the 
interaction between international norm-setters and member states as norm recipients, 
I investigate the role of different governmental and societal actors, which may hold 
conflicting norms concerning the topic matter of the directive. Such a view would 
formalize some of the modified goodness of fit frameworks, which focus on learning, the 
role of norm entrepreneurs, and informal institutions that facilitate consensus-building 
among actors who disagree about a directive (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Green Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse, 2001).
In order to build a more realistic constructivist model of domestic compliance 
politics we need to specify the mechanisms explaining political outcomes. These may 
be borrowed from standard IR constructivism. So far, the literature has been greatly 
divided about these (see table 13). To begin with, Wiener (2004, 196), in her summary 
of the constructivist literature on compliance, distinguishes between elite learning, 
internalization, socialization, and persuasion. Checkel (2001), for his part, draws 
a line between social protest/mobilization and social learning/persuasion, arguing 
that the former is consistent with ‘thin rationalism’ (ibid, 558), and the latter with 
constructivism. Risse (2000), claims that there are three pathways to socialization, 
based on the logics of consequence, appropriateness, and arguing- the latter of which 
comprises argumentation, deliberation, and arguing. Sending (2002, 456), stipulates that 
learning, persuasion, and socialization are all ways leading to internalization of a norm. 
Dimitrova and Rhinard (2005) distinguish between norm entrepreneurs and persuasion 
as pathways to socialization.  Zürn and Checkel (2005) propose normative suasion as 
the constructivist pathway to socialization, as opposed to the rationalist mechanisms of 
strategic calculation and role-playing. Finally, Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, 400-403) 
list the following mechanisms of social construction: norm entrepreneurs, international 
organizations, epistemic communities, speech, argument, persuasion, and structural 
configuration.
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Table 13 Constructivist micro-mechanisms
author dependent variable mechanisms
Wiener (2004) compliance - elite learning
- internalization
- socialization
- persuasion
Checkel (2001) compliance - social learning/persuasion
Risse (2000) socialization - logic of appropriateness 
- logic of arguing
Sending (2002, 456) internalization of a norm - learning
- persuasion
- socialization
Dimitrova and Rhinard (2005) socialization - norm entrepreneurs
- persuasion
Zürn and Checkel (2005) socialization - normative suasion
Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, 
400-403)
social construction - norm entrepreneurs
- international organizations
- epistemic communities
- speech, argument, and persuasion
- structural configuration
Notwithstanding this great variety in mechanisms, persuasion is the common denominator 
of IR constructivism (cf. Johnston, 2001, 495). According to Checkel (2001, 562), 
argumentative persuasion is ‘a social process of interaction that involves changing attitudes 
(…)’. This is highly similar to the Habermasian logic of communicative action adopted 
by Risse (2000), which holds that not everybody agrees on what is appropriate, but that 
actors try to reach a reasoned consensus about this. As Schmidt and Radaelli (2004, 
188, 192) observe, compliance with EU inputs often takes the form of deliberation, 
which causes decision makers to change their perceptions and preferences. Persuasion 
hence is the main constructivist micro-mechanism. In order to develop more specific 
hypotheses on this count, I will follow the example of two key constructivist compliance 
studies (Checkel, 2001; Risse, 2000) and resort to the booming literature on ‘deliberative 
democracy’ (Elster, 1986, 1991, 1998; Page, 1996; Habermas, 1984; Steenbergen et al, 
2003; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004),22 which has persuasion at its center (Holzinger, 
2004, 198). 
Democratic deliberation can be defined as a cooperative search for agreement in 
which the participants aim for a reasoned consensus (Bächtiger and Steiner, 2005, 687). 
Deliberative theory attaches primacy to multilateral arguing, based on justifications, for 
the purpose of changing the beliefs of opponents (Elster, 1991, 2; Holzinger, 2004, 197). 
22  An interesting question concerns the relationship between deliberative theory and constructiv-
ism. Risse (2000) claims that the logic of arguing is a third logic next to those of consequence and 
appropriateness. However, I believe that this logic is subsumed by the latter, because it still very 
much concerns the discovery of what is appropriate. Risse (2000, 6) himself also seems to adopt 
this view, as he argues that social constructivism ‘encompasses not only the logic of appropriateness 
but also what we could call a logic of truth seeking or arguing’.
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   84 05-03-2007   15:53:11
Chapter 5 Explaining delays: on misfit and politics

Rather than the aggregation of preferences, which is central to social choice, argumentation 
aims at changing the position of opponents (Elster, 1986, 112). Depending on the 
question ‘how enlightenment and consensus operate in the (particular) deliberative 
context’ (Barabas, 2004, 688), we could use theories on deliberative democracy to explain 
both the timeliness and correctness of transposition.
Whereas deliberative democracy for a long time was primarily normative in nature, 
we can currently observe a boom in empirical research on the topic. In recent years, 
theorists in this field have made a concerted attempt towards operationalization of the 
concept of deliberative democracy, leading to remarkable consensus on its key empirical 
determinants. Habermas (2005, 385) himself recently advanced the argument that his 
theory not only has normative, but also empirical relevance, stressing that the ideal 
discourse conditions are an intrinsic dimension of the practice of communicative action. 
Furthermore, numerous hypotheses have been generated concerning the factors that 
induce opinion updating by participants to deliberative processes. Before these issues 
are discussed, though, it makes sense to sketch what transposition-as-deliberation would 
look like.
To begin with, transposition-as-deliberation assumes that domestic actors hold 
different norms, which lead to conflicting views of the desirability of a directive. This is in 
line with the general conceptualization of deliberation as involving a search for consensus 
in the face of conflict (Shapiro, 2003, 122; Miller, 2003, 183). If all actors agree that the 
directive is welcome, we should not expect any problems with transposition. If all actors 
are united in their resistance to the directive, the unitary actor perspective sketched above 
is expected to hold. More interesting, though, is the situation of normative conflict. 
Domestic actors in favor of a certain norm contained by the directive will try to persuade 
opponents of this norm, and vice versa. Alternatively, the directive may entail open 
provisions. This also opens the possibility for norm conflict, as domestic actors will have 
to reach a consensus on which norms to apply. This will be done through a process of 
deliberation.
When, in the deliberative framework, do we expect transposition to be delayed? On 
the one hand, deliberation seems to be time-consuming per se (Elster, 1998, 7; Gambetta, 
1998, 21). In the words of Shapiro (2003, 121), ‘Deliberation can amount to collective 
fiddling while Rome burns.’ Deliberation tends not to be speedy, due to its ‘leisurely 
style of philosophical argument’ (Elster, 1986, 128). Yet, not all deliberative processes 
are equally leisurely. One of the advantages of deliberation is that it increases input 
legitimacy: participants are willing to accept outcomes they initially would not have, 
because they find that the process was just. However, for the process to be considered 
just by the participants, certain criteria of discourse quality must be fulfilled, such as free 
participation and justification of assertions. 
We can expect that a high discourse quality is conducive to speedy transposition. When 
people believe that they have been heard and treated correctly by the other parties to the 
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conflict, they may accept results they otherwise would not, even when no preferences are 
changed by the deliberation (Shapiro, 2003, 123; Fearon, 1998b, 56). Conversely, low 
discourse quality, for instance in the form of manipulation or threats (Neblo, 2005, 175), is 
not conducive to the speedy resolution of a normative conflict in the face of a directive, as it 
may destroy the goodwill of participants to open up to the views of others, thus diminishing 
possibilities for compromise. Serious breaches of the maxims of deliberation may cause 
inter-group hostility in deliberative processes, bringing differences to the surface (Shapiro, 
2003, 123). Such breaches may destroy the ‘good faith’ (Johnson, 1998, 174) of other 
participants and hence cause the conflict to escalate. When the deliberators do not perceive 
other participants as friendly, but as a rival ‘outgroup’ (Sunstein, 2003), the members of the 
former group will be less open to the arguments of the other party. In consequence, the two 
groups will polarize, and shift towards a more extreme point than held in the beginning 
(ibidem, 81). Deliberation under these conditions will result in stalemate, with the various 
groups fiercely opposing each other, which has an adverse effect on duration.
Hypothesis 16: The lower the discourse quality, the more time is needed for transposition.
A related hypothesis concerning timeliness concerns the setting in which deliberation 
takes place. Bächtiger and Steiner (2005) claim that deliberation is done easier behind 
doors (also see Elster, 1991, 46-47; Checkel, 2001, 563; Shapiro, 2003, 123). When 
taking place in public, deliberators are less prone to persuasion, as they are concerned 
that the public views changes of mind as a weakness. Chances are higher that the 
participants are driven into extreme positions and can no longer reach consensus. In 
that case, transposition may lead to a stalemate that is likely to be won by those with the 
resources to ‘shout loudest and longest’ (Shapiro, 2003, 123).
Hypothesis 17: The less insulated the deliberative process, the more time is needed for transposition.
5.7 Summary
This chapter has identified the main theoretical paradigms that may be used to explain 
the outliers to the statistical model. They are united by their explicit political character, 
which is in line with the current consensus among researchers on Europeanization 
that instead of the goodness of fit, we should bring politics center stage. The various 
‘political’ theories have been organized along two dimensions. First, some theories adopt 
a unitary actor perspective, whereas others break open the black box of the state and 
look at the multitude of actors involved in transposition. Second, we can specify either 
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   86 05-03-2007   15:53:11
Chapter 5 Explaining delays: on misfit and politics

a rationalist or a constructivist micro-mechanism. Crossing the dimensions yields four 
approaches to compliance and transposition more specifically. IR rationalism views 
transposition problems as the result of strategic calculation by rational states. Rational 
choice institutionalism theorizes the strategic interaction of policy-specific veto players, 
viewing transposition as preference aggregation. Like IR rationalism, IR constructivism 
views the state as a unitary actor. Non-compliance in this view results from normative 
misfit. Deliberative theory, to conclude, proceeds from the assumption of normative 
diversity at the domestic level, and analyzes the processes of deliberation that take place 
at the domestic level. The next chapter sets out the methodological framework for testing 
the hypotheses that have been developed under these broad headings.
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6 Case study design
This chapter develops the framework for the second empirical part of this study: the 
focused comparisons of the outliers to the survival analysis with well-predicted cases. 
The question is which, if any, of the ‘political’ theories offered in the previous chapter are 
helpful in explaining the different outliers. In addition, the case studies may serve as an 
instrument for measurement validation, double-checking the validity of the indicators 
used in the statistical analysis. In this chapter I design the case study analysis. First, I 
discuss the objectives of the case studies, case selection, and data gathering techniques. 
Next, I operationalize the hypotheses that guide the case studies.
6.1 Objectives
The primary objective of the case studies is to explain the outliers to the statistical study 
by identifying those independent variables that differ between the cases. More specifically, 
I will carry out two focused comparisons of outliers with ‘on-the-line’ cases directives: 
whose duration was predicted well by the statistical model (cf. Lieberman, 2005). More 
specifically, two couples of cases will be chosen that are as similar as possible with regards 
to the independent variables that were in the quantitative study, but as dissimilar as 
possible in the dependent variable. In other words, the case studies will take the form of 
a similar system design, also called Mill’s method of difference (Lijphart, 1971, 687). 
The qualitative studies are partly deductive, partly inductive in nature. First, the 
explanatory value of the suggested ‘political’ hypotheses will be assessed, as well as the 
value of the legal-administrative variables for which the large-N operationalization was 
unsatisfactory. Second, the case studies might bring other, unexpected omitted variables 
to the surface. Third, the variables included in the statistical analysis will be double-
checked, as some of these may not be valid operationalizations (Creswell, 2003, 221). 
This holds particularly for the quality and complexity of directives, two variables that 
proved hard to operationalize for a large N. Thus the case studies will serve as a way of 
measurement validation (Adcock and Collier, 2001, 533).
Fourth, the case studies might be useful in underpinning the quantitative results. They 
might provide information on the causal processes linking certain independent variables 
with particular outcomes (George and Bennett, 2005, 206). As such, the case studies 
might aid in interpreting the parameter estimates by providing ‘chains of evidence’ (Yin, 
2003, 105; George and Bennett, 2005, 215). As Pierson (2004, 174) rightly remarks, 
theories have more implications than the suggested correlation only. Even though we 
may not be able to observe causal mechanisms directly, we often can observe the traces 
left behind, engaging in detective-like work.
Chapter 5 Case study design
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Fifth, the qualitative analysis will serve to test the hypotheses on correctness, something 
that could not be done quantitatively. It would have been too time-consuming to assess 
the correctness of transposition for a large number of directives, especially since assessing 
correctness requires detailed knowledge of the legal requirements of each directive and 
the corresponding national legislation. Therefore, in-depth analysis is the only way to 
investigate on correctness. 
As a final objective of nested analysis, Lieberman (2005) recommends to use the 
outcomes of the case studies to rerun the statistical analysis. Unfortunately, this objective 
is often unrealistic, as the case studies may identify interesting omitted variables that are 
yet not quantifiable. In many occasions, in the face of messy variables and restricted time 
available to the researcher, all one can do is hypothesize about the collinearity between 
the omitted variables and the variables that were included in the quantitative model. 
Also, there is a question of incidence: if there are reasons to believe that the incidence of 
the causes of the outliers is low, the model can be hypothesized to be reasonably good. 
Such considerations will serve to provide feedback into the quantitative analysis, making 
the research at least somewhat cyclical.
6.2 Case selection
The first important principle underpinning case selection was that of literal replication 
(Yin, 2003). The problem is that the theories presented are not universal, but 
probabilistic. For this reason, more than one outlier was studied. This strategy of literal 
replication (Yin, 2003) increases the chances that interesting conclusions can be drawn. 
A second principle guiding case selection was that of theoretical generalization. As said, 
the outliers were matched with ‘on-the-line’ outcomes. For each outlier, a case with 
similar characteristics that was explained well by the statistical model was selected. If the 
case studies identify a particular explanation, we need to verify whether this explanation 
does not hold for the ‘on-the-line’ cases.
With a view to case selection, I first generated a list with the ten worst outliers, which 
are listed in table 14. I decided to only include cases from 1997 and 1998, with a view to 
the availability of interviewees. Then I inspected which of the outliers could be matched 
with a good control case. Taken together, these selection criteria reduced the pool of 
interesting outliers to four directives. Directive 95/60/EC on the fiscal marking of gas 
oils and kerosene was excluded because it was too old, just like directives 96/87/EC and 
96/86/EC on the transport of dangerous goods by road. Four other directives, notably 
98/61/EC on operator number portability, 98/71/EC on the legal protection of designs, 
98/24/EC on chemical agents at work, and 97/69/EC on dangerous substances had 
to be excluded for the lack of a good control case. This left three interesting outliers, 
namely directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, 
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directive 97/27/EC on motor vehicles, and directive 98/81/EC on genetically modified 
organisms. Unfortunately, the ministry responsible for the latter case was not willing to 
cooperate, which left only two outliers to be studied.
Table 14 The ten cases with the largest residuals
nr. topic std residual transposed delay (weeks) status
95/60 fiscal marking of gas oils and kerosene 7.00 yes 325 too old
98/61 operator number portability 4.11 yes 130 no control case
98/71 legal protection of designs 4.01 no 47 no control case
98/44 legal protection of biotechn. inventions 3.13 no 112 included
98/24 chemical agents at work 2.68 yes 47 no control case
96/87 transport of dangerous goods by rail 2.54 yes 205 too old
96/86 transport of dangerous goods by road 2.54 yes 205 too old
98/81 genetically modified micro-organisms 2.34 no 120 no interviews
97/27 motor vehicles 2.26 yes 95 included
97/69 dangerous substances 2.23 yes 121 no control case
As for the two selected outliers, similar well-explained cases were selected. In doing so, 
not all variables were kept constant, but only those that were significant in the statistical 
study, so as to ease the selection of control cases. The directive on biotechnological 
inventions, to begin with, was transposed by Economic Affairs. It was an entirely new 
directive, which was transposed into a statute that modified two existing statutes. No 
other ministries played a role in the process.1 It was adopted in 1998, with about two years 
being allotted for transposition. As it turned out, there was one directive in the sample 
that proved nice material for comparison: directive 98/30/EC on the liberalization of the 
gas market. As table 15 shows, its characteristics are highly similar to that of the biotech 
directive2, but it was transposed nicely on time. 
It was more difficult to find a suitable control case for the second outlier, the 
directive on motor vehicles. Even though there was a large pool of cases transposed by 
the Ministry of Transport, none of them was perfectly similar. One directive, though, 
was similar enough to justify a focused comparison: directive 1998/76/EC on access 
to the profession of road transport operator. The two directives were transposed by the 
Ministry of Transport through modification of an administrative order. Even though for 
directive 98/76/EC the ministry cooperated with another ministry, this cannot explain 
the difference in outcome, as the statistical analysis turned out no significant difference 
between one and two ministries. Another difference is that one directive required three 
1   Initially, it seemed that the Ministry of Agriculture played a role, but in the interviews its role turned out to be 
negligible.
2   The only problem is that 98/44 was transposed through modification, and 98/30 into a new law. However, 
since modification is supposedly faster than adoption of a new law, this variable cannot explain the observed 
difference in duration.
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national measures, and the other just one. However, this could be seen as an advantage 
for directive 97/27/EC, and it cannot explain the difference in duration. The same holds 
for the time allotted, which is actually higher for the late directive than for the timely 
one. Finally, as there is no statistical difference between directives adopted by codecision 
versus consultation, this variable is not crucial either. All things considered, the cases are 
similar with regards to the key legal-administrative variables.
Table 15 Selected cases
comparison 1 comparison 2
directive outlier : control case: outlier : control case:
98/44/EC  
(biotech inventions)
98/30/EC  
(gas)
97/27/EC (masses  
and dimensions)
98/76/EC (access to 
the profession)
allotted time 108 weeks 111 weeks 104 weeks 52 weeks
decision-making proc. codecision codecision codecision consultation
legal measure statute statute administrative order administrative order
number of measures 1 1 3 1
lead ministry Economic Affairs Economic Affairs Transport Transport
number of ministries 2 1 1 2
novelty new new modification modification
existing legislation yes no yes yes
transposition no yes yes yes
delay >112 weeks -7 weeks 95 weeks -8 weeks
6.3 Data gathering techniques
Data were gathered through a combination of qualitative interviews and document 
analysis. To begin with, semi-structured interviews were held about each directive. In 
selecting the interviewees, a stratified sample was taken, representative of the main 
actors involved in the process. In doing so, I tried to minimize the problems with 
reliability that plague interview techniques by using multiple sources (Berry, 2002, 679). 
When applicable, I made sure to ‘average out’ the various opinions, by focusing on 
their common denominator rather than on the completely contradictory opinions by 
particular interviewees. 
For each directive, I consulted a member of the European Commission, national civil 
servants, and members of the relevant interest groups. Also, I interviewed prospective 
enforcers of the transposed directive, as these are usually aware of problems with 
correctness, as well as relevant policy experts, so as to allow for inter-subjectivity of the 
findings. For the two cases that were transposed into a statute, I also spoke with the MPs 
who played a key role in the transposition process. For each directive, I made sure to hear 
a maximum variety of views. Even though initially, the non-response to my interview 
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requests was fairly high, I ‘politely persisted’ (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002, 673), and 
eventually most persons agreed to cooperate.3
The interviews held were semi-structured in nature, so as to do justice to both the 
deductive and the inductive character of this study. I used a standard interview schedule 
(see Appendix I) listing the topics required to answer the main research questions. At the 
same time, I kept the questions open and the conversation flexible, which allowed for 
unexpected turns and insights. As to the order of the questions, I moved from the non-
threatening to the threatening (Leech, 2002, 666): I started out with the background 
and character of the directive and its relationship to national legislation, and ended with 
the transposition process, including its correctness. The interviews were not recorded, 
so as not to inhibit the interviewees. I felt this was important, as the interviewees often 
revealed rather sensitive information. For this reason, I agreed with all interviewees 
not to use the information for direct attribution, but only append a list of interviewed 
institutions (see Appendix II). For each directive, I sent a factual summary to some key 
interviewees, to verify the factual quality of the reports.
A second data gathering technique was document analysis. This served to further 
substantiate the views of the interviewees. Especially where the several renditions 
contrasted with each other, be it because of bad memory or simple exaggeration (Berry, 
2002, 681), I cross-checked the information as much as possible using written materials, 
or by getting back to the interviewees. In other words, I triangulated between sources 
and techniques. Here, a distinction needs to be made between the internal market and 
transport cases. As the former were transposed through statutes, I could make use of the 
parliamentary documents, which offered an extensive and reliable source of background 
information. As for the transport cases, the Ministry of Transport allowed me to consult 
and copy relevant documents contained in the archives. Unfortunately, the cases were 
covered to a very different extent4, which made the comparison a bit uneven. Therefore, 
for the transport directives I rely to a relatively great extent on interview information. 
Finally, for the internal market directives a formidable secondary literature exists, which 
I used to sort out the technical details of the cases, as these were rather complex.
3   Five persons explicitly declined the request to cooperate. For most, replacements could be found. Another 7 
persons did not react to initial emails, after which I pursued other interviewees. In total, I held 33 interviews. 
Unfortunately, it proved relatively hard to trace down people who where knowledgeable about the transpo-
sition of directive 97/27, which is why this directive is covered less extensively than its control case 98/76. 
Unfortunately, it proved impossible to get a hold of a Commission member willing to talk about directive 
97/27.
4   Due to personal conflicts between civil servants in the case of 97/27, no dossier was kept until 2001, so that 
the most interesting period of the transposition process is not covered.
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6.4 Data and operationalization
Before operationalizing the key variables, let me discuss what preliminary information was 
needed to analyze each case (cf. Holzinger, 2004, 205). First, information on the contents 
of the directive was needed, as well as the main actors involved and their positions, a 
broad outline of the steps in the decision-making process, and the final outcome. These 
elements formed the raw material for analyzing the transposition processes. In addition, 
the following specific variables were studied.
Legal-administrative variables
As was made clear in chapter five, not all legal-administrative variables lent themselves to 
large-N operationalization. A first ‘benign’ variable that could not be operationalized for 
the larger sample concerns administrative capacity, defined as the number of staff devoted 
to the transposition of a particular directive. As a process observation, I will reconstruct 
the timeline for each transposition process and compare the temporal sequence of events. 
In case capacity problems have an effect on duration, we would for instance expect 
that bureaucratic preparation and response to requests of MPs takes more time. To this 
end, information will be drawn from parliamentary documents for the internal market 
directives and available archives for the transport directives.
A second legal-administrative variable that requires further scrutiny is quality, as the 
large-N operationalization was rather crude. This variable has three aspects. First, the 
directive can be said to be ambiguous when its provisions and/or parts of the preamble 
contradict each other. Second, a directive may contain provisions that are imprecise. 
Third, provisions of a directive may have a certain legal connotation in a member state 
that was not foreseen during the drafting process. An example is the Dutch term besluit 
(decision), which is the cornerstone of Dutch administrative law. A directive that contains 
the term ‘decision’ may be hard to implement for this reason. For a layman, the quality 
of a directive is hard to assess, as it requires in depth legal knowledge of the policy field 
concerned. Furthermore, the quality of a directive is hard to assess objectively, as it is 
dependent on the judgment of the norm recipients in charge of transposition. Therefore, 
rather than providing an explicit yardstick for measuring this variable, I will ask the 
interviewees how they judged the quality of the directive. Finally, if quality is indeed the 
cause for delay, we would expect this to have an effect primarily in the early stages of 
transposition.
A third legal-administrative variable that could not be measured well quantitatively is 
the complexity of the transposition process, which waas operationalized by the number 
of measures that had to be brought into line with the directive. This variable could not 
be measured well, as it was not always clear how many measures were still pending. In 
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   94 05-03-2007   15:53:14
Chapter 6 Case study design

addition, it sometimes was unclear whether or not all national measures containing a 
reference to a particular directive were ‘real’ transposition measures. The complexity can 
be assessed more validly in a qualitative fashion, by studying the secondary documents, 
such as transposition plans and parliamentary documents, complemented with interview 
information. In addition, I will ask the lawyers to what extent the linkages between 
various measures made transposition complex. Again, this variable is likely to primarily 
slow down the drafting stage of transposition, as civil servants then have to sort out the 
relationships between the various instruments. 
Finally, the case studies will specifically look at the effects of Chinese walls, or the 
organization divisions between negotiators and implementers at the departments studied. 
First, the interviews will be used to assess to what extent the negotiators and legal officers 
communicated throughout the process. Was information exchanged between the two 
during the decision-making process, for instance through the establishment of project 
groups? If not, when did the legal officers first find out about the directive? Was this 
before or after the directive was adopted? Third, did the legal officers consult policy 
experts during the transposition process? How was the mutual relationship between the 
two parties?
Goodness of fit
The goodness of fit is a particularly fuzzy variable, as it comprises various dimensions. 
Therefore, it can be expected that the validity of the quantitative measure used, 
modification versus adoption of an entirely new legal instrument, is not particularly 
high. In combination with the widespread skepticism on this hypothesis, based on 
various empirical studies, it is probably wise to re-investigate this hypothesis in the 
qualitative analysis. In conceptualizing the goodness of fit, we must make a distinction 
between institutional and policy misfit (Börzel and Risse 2003, 59-60, Green Cowles, 
Caporaso, and Risse, 2001, 6-7; Héritier et al 2001, 15, Haverland et al, 2005, 27). The 
policy dimension relates to the content of the policies. The difference can be qualitative 
in kind, relating to either the problem-solving approach or the policy instruments, or 
quantitative, which implies a gradual difference between national and European policy 
standards. The institutional dimension relates to the regulatory style or structure of a 
particular policy sector (Knill and Lenschow, 1998, 597). For instance, a directive may 
affect the organization of interest groups (Duina, 1997).
A second dimension of the goodness of fit concerns the practical significance of a misfit 
(Falkner et al, 2005, 28,). That is, a policy or institutional misfit may seem very high on 
the basis of the law books, while being irrelevant in practice. For instance, the scope of 
application may be highly curtailed, or the EC legal provision may already be in place in 
practice, as in the case of collective labor agreements. In addition, I would like to stress 
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that the converse may also hold: a seemingly good legal fit may be accompanied by a big 
practical misfit, for instance when the national legal provisions are not enforced in reality.
How do the two dimensions of goodness of fit combine, so that they can be used to 
assess the degree of goodness of fit? I think it is impossible to specify ex ante whether a 
policy or institutional misfit is harder to overcome. Therefore, I see both types of misfit 
as sufficient components, subject to the condition that they are practically significant. 
Furthermore, I doubt whether there is an intrinsic difference in importance between 
a qualitative and a quantitative misfit. Therefore, I suggest that both can be viewed 
as individually sufficient components of a misfit. Information on this variable will be 
gathered from interviews and relevant legal and official documents.
IR rationalism
When it comes to IR rationalism, the key variable is a member state’s negotiating position, 
as compared to the contents of the directive as adopted. The negotiating position is 
defined as the substantive position of the Netherlands on the issues comprised by a 
Commission proposal. This position can be deduced from preparatory documents, such 
as negotiating instructions, minutes of Council meetings, complemented with interview 
information. Additionally, as a process observation, this position is supposed to be 
constant throughout the transposition process. We can expect a strong link between 
a member state’s negotiating position and its stance during the transposition process. 
I will try to assess whether the position of the government was the same during the 
transposition process and the negotiations. Finally, since compliance is conceived as a 
process of strategic calculation, interviewees are expected to be concerned about the 
odds of being found out by the Commission. This information will be drawn from the 
interviews.
Rational choice institutionalism
The following information is required to test the two bargaining hypotheses. First, the 
flexibility of the players must be assessed. This variable can be imagined as a continuum 
ranging from a cooperative to a competitive approach to negotiation. Unfortunately, 
this variable is rather hard to operationalize. Earlier studies are not very helpful, as they 
manipulate this variable through experiments, assigning conditions that are thought 
to capture the negotiator’s strategy (Druckman, 1994, 528). However, one useful 
argument is made by Carnevale and Lawler (1987) who distinguish between players 
with an individualistic orientation, aiming for maximum profit to them, and those 
with a cooperative orientation, aiming for a mutually beneficial agreement. Using this 
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distinction, I will try to roughly and relatively assess the orientation of the players in the 
two rounds. To do so, the respondents will be asked to what extent they were willing to 
compromise. Second, the number of issues will be measured by asking the respondents 
which issues they remember as being discussed during the transposition process. Only 
those that were listed by a majority of the respondents will be included.
In order to test the two-stage coordination game model suggested by Steunenberg 
(2006), the following information is needed. First, we need to know which actors can be 
labeled veto players. A problem here is that these are policy-specific. Thus it is impossible 
to identify them beforehand: they may be the national government, political parties or 
fractions, parliamentary committees, interest groups and regional and local governments 
(Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000, 215). Nonetheless, it is clear that the actors with a 
formal role in the legislative process must be included. In addition, interest groups may 
dispose of an informal veto (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000, 215), for instance when 
they are thought able to hinder actual application of the directive, or in case of a strong neo-
corporatist tradition in the policy area concerned. Furthermore, different governmental 
ministries may be involved and dispose of a veto, or even different ministerial units that 
oppose each other. Here, interviews will prove the main source of information. As the 
interviewees may indicate different issues, depending on perceptions and memory, I will 
only include those issues that were stated by a majority of the interviewees. The next step 
will be to ask the interviewees for their and others’ positions on the issues. If needed, and 
insofar possible, these statements will be verified or complemented by information from 
secondary sources, such as parliamentary documents. Finally, I will study legal texts and 
expert accounts to derive information on the outcome of the transposition process.
Sociological institutionalism
For sociological institutionalism, the key variable is the fit between European norms and 
domestic norms. A norm may be defined as ‘a standard of appropriate behavior for actors 
with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 891, Dimitrova and Rhinard, 
2005, 5). Elster (1989, 99) provides two characteristics necessary for identifying social 
norms, namely that they must be shared by other people, and that they have a strong 
emotive grip on the minds of people, in that people display strong negative emotions 
when considering the prospect of the norm being violated. 
In addition, it is essential to differentiate the levels at which domestically-held norms 
may be affected by a directive. Using the distinction between first, second and third 
order norms discussed above, the degree of normative misfit will be analyzed. First order 
norms are likely to be voiced by technical specialists interviewed about the transposition 
processes, and underpinned by written documents. They specifically relate to the issue 
regulated by the directive. Second order norms are expected to be held and voiced by 
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political actors, such as MPs interviewed. They are more general in character, and thus 
refer to more issues than the ones at stake in the transposition process. Third order norms 
are much broader, and referring to deep value questions. They are likely to play a central 
role in the discourse on the transposition process, evidenced by parliamentary documents 
and interviews. They arouse deep involvement by the respondents. As a causal process 
observation, this variable requires a great degree of correspondence between the various 
interviewees on this point, as the key to norms is their intersubjective character. Variation 
in answers points out that the unitary actor perspective is not appropriate.
Deliberative theory
The first deliberative variable is discourse quality. As an operationalization, I will first 
consider the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by Steenbergen et al (2003). 
Basing themselves on Habermas, the authors argue that a good discourse should fulfill 
the following criteria (Steenbergen et al, 2003, 25-26). First, there should be open 
participation: every stakeholder should have access to the deliberations. Second, the 
participants should justify their assertions. Third, the participants should consider the 
common good, in the sense that the participants consider the position and well-being of 
others. Fourth, the participants should treat each other respectfully. They should show 
respect for other groups, demands, and counterarguments. Fifth, the participants should 
aim at reaching a consensus, a criterion Steenbergen et al (2003, 26) label constructive 
politics. The unit of analysis of the DQI is a speech, an element of the debate voiced by 
a participant. An individual may hold various speeches. For coding purposes, only the 
speeches containing a demand are included, i.e. a proposal about the decision to be made 
(ibidem, 27).
However useful, the DQI also suffers from several important disadvantages. First, 
the index can only be applied to the cases that have been transposed through a statute, 
and not to the cases for which delegated legislation was used, as there are no written 
transcripts of the deliberation process available. Second, the index is rather narrow in 
scope, due to its focus on parliamentary debate. It runs the risk of neglecting aspects 
of the broader decision-making process of which the debate forms a part. The actual 
parliamentary debate may be conducted when the decision has already been made. This 
harbors the risk of several biases. For instance, the DQI operationalizes the requirement 
of open access by counting the number of times a speaker is interrupted. However, it 
seems more interesting to see which actors are allowed to participate in the broader 
process of decision-making, of which the parliamentary debate is but one stage. 
In addition, deliberation is not necessarily a face-to face activity; it may also take 
the shape of textual exchange between institutions (Tulis, 2003, 200-201), and possibly 
also take place in rather informal settings. Therefore, analyzing the parliamentary debate 
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will only reveal a subset of the actual process. Third, we can doubt whether the various 
speeches that serve as the units of analysis can be viewed as independent. It can be expected 
that disrespect towards one player in a speech act will lead to ‘tit-for-tat’ disrespect by 
that player in a subsequent speech. Fourth, the discourse quality index is not suited for 
the present study because it requires multiple coders, in view of reliability. Therefore, I 
suggest using a less sophisticated but better feasible and more valid operationalization. 
Instead of quoting all speeches, I will look for flagrant violations of these criteria, as 
indicated by the participants to the process. Whereas this will give a less reliable absolute 
score, it will be sufficient to compare the two cases. 
The second hypothesis stemming from deliberative theory concerns the degree of 
insulation of the deliberative process. This will be measured by analyzing the extent of 
media coverage (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004, 206). Using Lexis-Nexis Academic, an 
on-line database containing articles from the main Dutch newspapers5, I will identify 
the extent of media coverage. In establishing this, I will use the directive’s identification 
number and the main key words of the directive as search terms. In addition, I will use the 
Internet search engine Google6, to find out how much has been published on the Internet 
about the four directives. Finally, I will find out to what extent interest groups observed 
the transposition process, as this is another indicator of the degree of insulation.
6.5 Correctness
The last variable that needs to be operationalized is the correctness of transposition, 
which is one of the dependent variables. As explained in chapter 2, correctness has three 
dimensions, namely the content of the national implementing measures, the nature of 
those measures, and their provisions for effective application and enforcement (Prechal, 
1995, 35). When it comes to the contents, the implementing measures must incorporate 
all legal rules7, whether they contain prohibitions or obligations, and whether they are 
of a procedural or a substantive character. Second, those measures must take the form of 
binding provisions of internal law. Regarding the third criterion, member states provide 
legally grounded mechanisms for monitoring and verification, appoint national agencies 
responsible for the application of the directive and assign them a clearly and specifically 
described task, as well as enact sanctions and provide for judicial protection. The degree 
of correctness is rather difficult to determine for a layman, as it requires highly specialist 
legal knowledge. Therefore, I will to a great extent rely on the judgment on this issue by 
independent experts, the European Commission, and national stakeholders.
5  These are NRC Handelsblad, Trouw, Algemeen Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad, de Volkskrant and Het Parool.
6  See http://www.google.com.
7  Factual obligations are excluded here, as they are extremely rare.
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6.6 Summary
This chapter has developed a framework for conducting the case studies that are 
embedded within the findings of the survival analysis. The chief objective of the focused 
comparisons is to identify the causes of the outliers. In addition, the case studies may 
serve to underpin the statistical findings by providing insights into the underlying causal 
mechanisms, and serve to test and develop hypotheses on correctness. As a second step, 
this chapter has identified the cases chosen for further analysis. In doing so, two outliers 
were selected and matched with control cases- directives that are as similar as possible on 
the statistical variables, but while having been transposed on time. Finally, this chapter 
has operationalized the main variables deduced from the various theoretical approaches 
to non-compliance, as well as the additional dependent variable of correctness.
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7 Biotech versus gas1
7.1 The biotech directive
With its proposal for a directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, 
the European Commission sought to regulate the patentability of biotechnological 
inventions, a matter that until then was regulated by national legislation and the European 
Patent Convention (EPC).2 This Convention, dating from 1973 and administered by 
the München-based European Patent Office (EPO), regulated patenting in general. 
Crucially, it excluded plant or animal varieties and essential biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals from patentability. At the same time, microbiological 
processes and the products thereof were patentable. In practice, though, it was not 
always clear what was patentable or not (Commandeur et al, 1996). For this reason, the 
Commission argued that existing legislation was out of date (Kamstra et al, 2002, 3). 
Adding to the confusion was the system of patent granting. The EPO does not grant 
European patents, but bundles of national patents. Differences in national views on which 
types of inventions are patentable may lead to discrimination, because national courts treat 
questions about infringements and annulment of patents (Bostyn et al, 2001, 120-121). 
The European Commission wanted to change this confusing situation, and make clear 
once and for all which biotechnological inventions were patentable. In 1988, it filed a 
proposal to do so.
The original Commission proposal3 was fairly technical in character, as the patenting 
of biotechnological inventions at that time was the domain of ‘a nerdy hobby club’ 
(interview). The proposal aimed to harmonize national patent law, so as to create a level 
playing field for the biotech industry.4 A key feature of the proposal was the principle 
that inventions concerning plants, animals as well as isolated human elements were to 
become patentable, provided that they are new, inventive and susceptible to industrial 
application.5 At the same time, the proposal specified several exceptions to this general 
rule, chiefly whole plant and animal varieties, and those inventions that conflict with the 
ordre public and morality.
1  Parts of this chapter have been adapted from Mastenbroek and Van Keulen (2006).
2  Currently, the member states of the EPC are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United 
Kingdom. Iceland, Norway, Lithuania, and Latvia are candidate members.
3  COM(1988) 496 final.
4  The need for harmonization as well as the legal base was contested, however, in the course of the negotiations. 
According to some experts, the Commission was mainly driven by a wish to be involved in the ‘hot’ sector of 
biotechnology, as European patent law is fully covered by the Munich-based European Patent Convention.
5  It must be stressed that the directive was not groundbreaking, in that it was based upon the existing European 
Patent Convention and the jurisprudence on the basis of this.
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At the outset, the Commission appeared to have a relatively comfortable position. A 
majority of member states was actively or passively in favor of the directive, which enjoyed 
wide support of industry and patient associations. However, from 1992 on the ethical 
dimension started to ‘disturb the debate’ (interview). Opponents of biotechnology such 
as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and Gaia, started lobbying the European Parliament 
to block the directive. In 1994 the EP tabled several amendments, such as the exclusion 
from patentability of the human body or parts of the human body as such, limits to 
processes for modifying the genetic identity of humans, and the setting of ethical limits 
on inventions on animals (Kamstra et al, 2002, 4). 
The Council and EP reached agreement about the amendments in a conciliation 
meeting.6 Consequently, the Commission felt confident that the EP would vote in favor. 
However, in January 1995 a new Parliament was installed. By this time, the issue of patents 
on biotechnological inventions had attracted the interest of a huge coalition of interest 
groups after the EPO had granted a patent on the Harvard University ‘onco-mouse’.7 
After a two-day mass protest by Greenpeace, the new EP rejected the compromise text, 
because it deemed the patenting of life forms unethical. Both Commission and Council 
were infuriated about the EP’s disloyal behavior (Paterson, 2000, 339). 
The Commission persevered, though, and eight months later presented a new 
proposal, which better took into account the ethical concerns (Kamstra et al, 2002, 6). In 
the meantime, though, the chief motive underlying the proposal, i.e. the argument that 
the EPC was outdated, had become obsolete, because the EPO had gradually expanded 
the possibilities for the patenting of biotechnological inventions. Yet the Commission 
argued that the EPC and the EPO’s jurisprudence still were insufficient, because they 
were not generally accepted, and because national differences in legislation and the 
danger of European patents being revoked by national courts hence remained (Kamstra 
et al, 2002, 6).
Negotiations on the new proposal thus started off in an extremely politicized 
environment. The European Parliament was heavily lobbied by non-profit groups 
highlighting ethical, health and environmental risks associated with exploiting scientific 
knowledge, which were translated into parliamentary amendments. Interest groups also 
obtained access to the negotiations through national governments, represented in the 
Council working group on intellectual property, where the text was discussed for two 
years. In the course of the negotiations, the delegations of the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Italy, France and Britain voiced various reservations over the patentability of human gene 
sequences, plants and animals.
6  All except for amendment 76, that proposed, among other things, that an invention could only be 
patented if the person whose material had been used, had given its consent.
7  This was a mouse that had been genetically modified in such a way that it became cancer-prone. 
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Although the position of the latter three member states changed to a more willing 
stance, the Dutch delegation voiced political reservations over a crucial element of the 
text, relating to the patentability of plants and animals. These reservations originated in 
Parliament, which in 1995 had passed a revision of the Patents Act (Rijksoctrooiwet) in 
which the patentability of plants and animals had been explicitly excluded (Parliamentary 
Papers II 1995/96, 19744, nr. 18). The MPs involved were unaware that, parallel to 
the revision of national law, the European Commission had been drafting a directive 
with precisely this controversial issue as a defining element (interview). The ‘fiche’ did 
not anticipate these problems: it stated that ‘no special problems with implementation’ 
were foreseen (Parliamentary Papers II 1995/96, 22112, nr 60, p. 3). As a consequence, 
various parties in the Lower House felt betrayed by civil servants from the ministry, 
which had been negotiating on the new Commission proposal in Brussels, while in The 
Hague the bill excluding plants and animals from patentability was about to be adopted 
by the Upper House (interview). 
However, parliamentarians made it clear that there could be no question of bypassing 
national legislation through EC law. According to MP Witteveen, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs could not use a Commission proposal to justify an interpretation that 
diverged from that of Parliament (Parliamentary Papers II 1996/97, 19744, nr. 20, p. 
2). The PvdA, which together with the CDA had filed the amendment to revise the 
existing Patents Act (Parliamentary Proceedings II, 1993-1994, nr. 23), filed a motion 
forcing junior Minister of Economic Affairs Van Dok-Weele to ensure that the contested 
article of the Commission’s proposal be brought into line with the Lower House’s wish 
to exclude plants and animals from patentability. Van Dok-Weele granted the request, 
and promised to ‘promote that (Parliament’s) position is brought into the discussions 
about the European directive’ (Parliamentary proceedings II, 27 June 1996, 100-6653). 
In reality, responsible officials from the Ministry found themselves stuck between a rock 
and a hard place, as they were aware of the political pressures from the Commission and 
industry and as the minister supported the drive towards harmonization. Reluctantly, 
they took political opposition into account. Nonetheless, as the Dutch reservation 
concerned a principle element in the text, the Dutch could not be accommodated. In 
December 1997, the Dutch delegation voted against the final text, with the Belgian and 
Italian delegations abstaining (Kamstra et al, 2002, 8).
Contents
The main objective of the directive was to harmonize the member states’ laws for the 
patenting of biotechnological inventions, so as to encourage businesses to make more 
investments in the field of biotechnology (directive 98/44/EC, recital 3). It is based upon 
the general harmonization article 100a of the EC Treaty, and consists of the following 
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key elements (see table 16). First, it defines what is patentable and what not. Broadly, 
inventions that are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial 
application are patentable, even if they concern a product consisting of or containing 
biological material (directive 98/44/EC, art. 3:1). Not patentable are plant and animal 
varieties and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals, 
including crossing or selection (art. 4:1), the human body and the simple discovery 
of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene (art. 5:1). 
However, an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of 
a technical process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute 
a patentable invention (art. 5:2). Also, particular inventions the exploitation of which 
would be contrary to the ordre public or morality are not patentable. More specifically, 
these are processes for cloning human beings, processes for modifying the germ-line 
genetic identity of human beings, uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes, and processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to 
cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also 
animals resulting from such processes (art. 6). Second, the directive contains provisions 
relating to the scope of protection, and plant breeding law.
Table 16 Key elements of directive 98/44/EC
element required or optional discretion
patentability required unclear
scope of protection required no
compulsory cross-licensing required no
On the face of it, the directive seems of a high quality. It appears to be highly unambiguous, 
as it explicitly sums up the inventions that may and may not be patented. However, art. 
6:1 can be characterized as rather imprecise. Whereas several MPs and interest groups 
claimed that it did leave some jurisdiction, others held that the list of inventions that 
are not patentable was exhaustive. This article could have been formulated more clearly. 
In addition, the directive was exceptionally complicated, as was asserted by six of the 
eight interviewees, both in its legal, and its substantive aspects. Not only laymen, but 
also even experts had a hard time mastering the directive, which was claimed to ‘excel in 
obscurities’ (MP Witteveen, Parliamentary Proceedings II, 30 May 2000, 81-5219).
The goodness of fit with existing policies and institutions was large. As the majority of 
the interviewees indicated, the directive itself could in principle be easily accommodated 
within the Patents Act 1995 (also see Parliamentary Papers II 1997/98, 19744, nr. 22, 
p. 7). It did not have a major impact on the Dutch problem solving approach or the 
policy instruments. Only one policy standard (the patentability of plants and animals) 
went against existing legislation. When it comes to the institutional dimension, no major 
changes were made. The directive closely followed EPO jurisprudence, and hence ‘changed 
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   104 05-03-2007   15:53:17
Chapter 7 Biotech versus gas
0
the substantive legislation on patentability in Europe relatively little’ (Kamstra, et al, 2002, 
45). Qualifications used by the interviewees are: ‘symbolic law’ (three times), and ‘a run of 
the mill piece of legislation, which did nothing more than compiling existing legislation 
and jurisprudence’. Some interviewees even disputed the argument of harmonization, 
because of the large goodness of fit with the existing practice of patent granting.
At the same time, the directive dealt with a highly sensitive and extremely politicized 
issue, biotechnology. According to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the directive became 
a symbol of biotechnology, though it only regulated the patentability of biotechnological 
inventions, and not the admissibility of these inventions, let alone their application. 
Moreover, it impinged upon an element of existing national legislation, namely the 
exclusion from patentability of genetically modified plants and animals, an issue that 
was extremely salient to certain political parties and interest groups.
Actors
Generally, we can identify two blocks in the transposition process. On the one hand, 
there was a large group of proponents. The main actor in this block was the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, which was responsible for the transposition process, and supported 
the directive. A clear outcome of the interviews was that the minister favored the 
directive, even though in the Parliamentary Papers, it argues that it merely has as its task 
to implement EC law. Now turning to the political parties, the VVD and D66 were 
largely in favor of the directive.8 The VVD stressed that biotechnology could make an 
important contribution to agriculture and food supply, the environment, and last but 
not least the economy (Parliamentary Proceedings II, 30 May 2000, 81-5233). D66 
explicitly endorsed the directive, and thought the bill was a good piece of legislation 
(Parliamentary Proceedings II, 30 May 2000, 81-5223). Moreover, D66 stressed that 
EC law had to be complied with. In the words of D66 MP Ter Veer, the patenting 
of biotechnological inventions ‘could not be regulated à la carte by the Netherlands’ 
(Parliamentary Proceedings II, 30 May 2000, 81-5220, 5224). According to one of the 
interviewees, the proponents of biotechnology were much less visible than the opponents. 
In his words, ‘Supporters of the directive run a risk in the Netherlands, because it’s hard 
to go against the grain.’
Certain interest groups also clearly favored the directive. Most prominent was the 
NIABA, the Dutch Biotech Industry Association (Nederlandse Biotechnology Associatie). 
This organization, which represents the majority of Dutch biotechnological companies, 
8  It must be noted, though, that in 1996, both VVD and D66 supported the motion to force Van 
Dok-Van Weele to better advocate the Dutch position in Brussels (Parliamentary Proceedings II, 
1995-1996, nr. 100).
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was a clear advocate of the directive and favored fast and correct transposition. However, 
the NIABA also preferred no transposition to incorrect transposition. It is claimed to 
have a close working relationship with Economic Affairs. Other supporters were patient 
organizations, notably the Alliance of the Chronically Ill (Werkverband van Chronisch 
Zieken), the Dutch Association of Hemophilia Patients (Nederlandse Vereniging van 
Hemofilie Patiënten), and the European Platform for Patient’s Organizations, Science 
and Industry. They were, however, less active than NIABA. On the whole, the interest 
groups on this side of the divide were actively involved, but they cannot be viewed as veto 
players. This is for instance evidenced by the fact that in a later stage of the transposition 
process, the Ministry ignored NIABA’s wish not to transpose the directive incorrectly.
The adversary block was located within Parliament. A vast parliamentary majority, 
consisting of PvdA, CDA, the small Christian parties RPF, GPV, and SGP, as well as 
the Socialist Party and Green Left, staunchly opposed the transposing bill (see table 
17 for the composition of the Lower House). The PvdA and CDA did not object to 
biotechnology or the patenting of biotechnological inventions in general, but to specific 
aspects of the transposing bill, mainly the patentability of genetically modified plants 
and animals. In the words of an interviewee, the PvdA ‘did not object to Herman the 
bull, but to a patent on it’.9 The other parties took a more fundamental stance, opposing 
biotechnology in general, either for ethical or environmental reasons, or out of concerns 
for developing countries (Parliamentary Proceedings II, 30 May 2000, 81-5239). 
On this side of the divide, various interest groups played an active role. The Platform 
for Gen Technology (Platform Gentechnologie) is an open platform of individuals and 
NGOs which critically monitors developments in the field of biotechnology. From 1998 
it campaigned against ‘patents on life’, with the directive as one of its focal points. In 
May 2000 it sent a letter to Parliament, signed by 22 NGOs, requesting a fundamental 
debate about biotechnology before the implementing bill was discussed. The most 
influential NGO in this camp was the Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals 
(Dierenbescherming), which actively lobbied Parliament to stop the directive. It was 
mainly active in the early stages of the process, supplying MPs with legal ‘evidence’ that 
the directive was unlawful, and pressuring MPs to fight the directive with the ECJ. MPs 
also actively consulted the Dierenbescherming. However, as soon as its wish to exclude 
plants and animals from patentability was taken over by a parliamentary majority, it 
considered the fight over, and turned its attention to other matters. Again, the interest 
groups cannot be labeled veritable veto players; all they could do was lobby, in the hope 
that their interests would be safeguarded.
9  Herman the Bull, created in 1990 by the Dutch biotech company Pharming, was the first transge-
netic bull in the world.
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Table 17 Composition of the Lower House (1998-2002)
party votes (%) seats government
PvdA 28,9 45 *
VVD 24,6 38 *
CDA 18,3 29
D66 8,9 14 *
GL 7,2 11
SP 3,5 5
RPF 2,0 3
SGP 1,7 3
GPV 1,2 2
Transposition process
As the Netherlands had not been able to stop the directive from being adopted in the 
Council of Ministers, it was presented with a totally unwanted result that had to be 
implemented in its legal order. It was confronted with a directive that made it possible 
to obtain a patent on genetically modified animals and plants, rather than only on the 
techniques that were used to genetically modify them. For a majority in the Lower House, 
this meant an intolerable break with the 1995 Patent Act. It carried a motion, proposed 
by the PvdA, which requested the government to lodge legal action with the ECJ, to have 
the directive annulled (Parliamentary Papers II 1998/99, 19744, nr. 23). Even though 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs itself was in favor of the directive, the government gave 
in, and brought the case before the ECJ.10 
Even though the main arguments against the directive were ethical in nature, it was 
decided to challenge the directive mainly on procedural grounds. The Netherlands 
claimed that the directive should have been adopted using Unanimity instead of 
Qualified Majority Voting, and that it infringed the principles of subsidiarity and of 
legal certainty. Other claims were that it forced member states to breach international 
obligations such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, that it breached the principle 
of human dignity, and that it stemmed from an unlawful proposal by the Commission11 
(Kamstra et al, 2002, 66-67).
During the ECJ proceedings, the Ministry of Economic Affairs started administrative 
preparations for transposition, arguing that the legal action against the directive did not 
suspend the obligation to transpose it (Parliamentary Papers II 1999/2000, 26568 (R 1638), 
nr. 5). Energetically, it drew up a proposal to amend the 1995 Patent Act, as well as the Seeds 
10  ECJ Case C-377/98; October 19, 1998.
11  Specifically, the Dutch claimed that the Directive does not state that the definitie version that was presented 
to Parliament and Council, had been adopted by the college of Commissioners. Moroever, they argued that 
the text of the final text should have been made available to all members of the college of Commissioners in all 
official languages (Kamstra et al, 2002, 77).
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and Planting Materials Act (Zaaizaad- en Plantgoedwet). The government aimed at a close 
transposition of the directive, which annoyed the PvdA and CDA. During the first discussions 
about the proposal, they argued that the government could have done more to uphold the 
exclusion of plants and animals from patenting. They claimed that the government had gone 
about its implementation duty in too minimalist and formal a way (Parliamentary Papers II 
1998/99, 26568 (R 1638), nr. 4). Moreover, Parliament was unwilling to discuss the proposal 
before the ECJ had given its judgment. The government managed to fend off this request, 
arguing that the ECJ would bring in its judgment before the deadline of July 31, 2000.
Parliamentary proceedings continued while the case was pending before the ECJ. 
Throughout the proceedings, however, the Lower House remained highly skeptical, tabling 
twelve critical amendments (Parliamentary Papers II 1999/2000, 26568 (R 1638), nrs. 9-
19 and 23). The most important one was amendment 1112, which held that genetically 
modified plants and animals would not be patentable (Parliamentary Papers II 1999/2000, 
26568 (R 1638), nr. 11). This way, the PvdA and CDA sought to uphold their victory of 
1994 in the revision of the Patent Act, excluding plants and animals from patentability. The 
government was dead against this amendment (Parliamentary Papers II 1999/2000, 26568 
(R 1638), nr. 22), claiming that it was diametrically opposed to the directive (Parliamentary 
Papers II 2001/02, 26568 (R 1638), nr. 39, p. 1). Parliament, for its part, objected to the 
patenting of genetically modified plants and animals, because this would lead to such broad 
patents that scientific progress would be hindered (PvdA), and because it went against 
ethical and moral principles (PvdA, RPF, GPV, CDA, SP, GroenLinks).
In the meantime, the proceedings before the ECJ took longer than expected. As soon 
as it became clear that the ECJ’s judgment was not to be delivered before the deadline, 
Parliament carried a second motion (Parliamentary Papers II 1999/2000, 26568 (R 
1638), nr. 24). This motion, proposed by the RPF and adopted by all parties except the 
VVD and D66, requested the government to apply to the ECJ for interim measures to 
suspend the transposition of the directive, pending the ruling of the ECJ in the annulment 
procedure (Kamstra, 2002, 67). The government granted the appeal and on 6 July filed 
a request for suspension with the ECJ. However, on July 25 2000, the President of the 
ECJ turned down the request (Parliamentary Papers II 1999/2000, 26568 (R 1638), nr. 
27). Transposition had to take place by July 30, 2000 after all.
As a next step in the process, the Council of State delivered its opinion of the bill, as 
requested by Economic Affairs, with Parliament consenting, about the commensurability of 
the amendments with the directive. The Council of State rejected the controversial amendment 
11, claiming that it went against the relevant directive provision. In the meantime, in November 
2000, the Commission took the first step in the infringement procedure, by sending out a 
12  Other controversial amendments concerned the use of human embryos, the protection of farmers using 
genetically modified seeds, and the prevention of biopiracy. Six out of eight interviewees spontaneously listed 
the patentability of plants and animals as an issue. All other issues were mentioned by at most 3 interviewees, 
which is why they are excluded from the present analysis.
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letter of formal notice to the Netherlands, for non-notification of transposition. No steps were 
taken to speed up transposition: the government decided to wait for the ECJ’s judgment.
A year later, in October 2001, the ECJ finally passed its judgment in the annulment 
case. It rejected the Dutch claim, once and for all making clear that the Netherlands 
had to implement the directive. This led to a deadlock, as Parliament maintained its 
amendments. Parliament insisted that the amendments could be upheld, because the 
directive allowed member states to exclude from patentability those inventions, which it 
considered in line with the public order or morality (art. 6:1 of the directive). Soon, an 
interpretation battle ensued, with both sides asking advice from different authoritative 
institutions, such as the European Commission (government), and a lawyer from the 
University of Amsterdam (Parliament). The battle ended on April 23, 2002, when the 
majority of the amendments, including the most controversial one, were adopted by a 
parliamentary majority, against the wishes of the government, the VVD, and D66.13
Despite the approval of the unwanted amendments by a parliamentary majority, the 
government wished to have the directive transposed as soon as possible, so as to avoid 
being taken to the ECJ for non-transposition. A reasoned opinion could be expected any 
time soon. In the meantime, another problem arose when the directive had to be dealt 
with by the Upper House. With the fall of the Kok II government in April 2002 the 
proposal had been labeled controversial and hence had to wait until a new government 
was in charge. This happened in July 2002, when after a period of political unrest, the 
Balkenende-I government entered into office. This coalition only lasted until October of 
the same year, so that transposition still could not be completed. In December 2002, the 
European Commission sent a reasoned opinion to the Netherlands, further increasing the 
pressure to transpose. Half a year later, the Commission referred the case to the ECJ. 
After yet another year the Balkenende II government entered into power, after which 
the Upper House finally debated the bill. The main parties in the Upper House posed 
various critical questions about the bill, and the directive itself (Parliamentary Papers 
I 2003/04, 26568 (R 1638), nr. A). By this time, the ministry of Economic Affairs 
indicated that it preferred to transpose the directive as soon as possible, if incorrectly, so 
as to prevent being fined by the ECJ. A tight parliamentary majority consisting of VVD, 
PvdA, D66, and the small Christian parties, did not go along with this proposal, arguing 
that the government could not ask from the Chambre de Réflexion to give its consent 
to a bill that went against the directive (e.g. Parliamentary Proceedings I, 8 June 2004, 
31-1678). Instead, these parties proposed that the government submitted a novelle, a bill 
intended to correct a bill that is pending in the Upper House. This bill, which no longer 
excluded modified plants and animals from patentability, went through the Lower House 
within a month, and was passed by the Upper House on 9 November 2004, almost three 
and a half years after the deadline. It entered into force on November 20 of that year.
13  All amendments were adopted, except those relating to the protection of agricultural interests. 
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Table 18 Timeline for transposition of directive 98/44/EC
year date EU-level transposition process Dutch political context
1998 6 July directive adopted
3 August Kok II government installed
19 October request for annulment ECJ
1999 28 May bill submitted to Lower House
17 August report Standing Committee 
Economic Affairs
10 December memorandum concerning report 
and amending memorandum
2000 21 February further report Standing 
 Committee Economic Affairs
22 March memorandum concerning report
26 May – 5 
June
12 amendments tabled
30 May general debate (first reading, 
response)
30 May amending memorandum 
7 June second reading (urgent opinion 
Council of State)
7 June motion on suspension (nr. 24)
14 June voting on motion 24
6 July request for suspension ECJ 
25 July request for suspension 
denied
30 July deadline
21 November urgent opinion Council of State 
on amendments
30 November letter of formal notice
2001 11 – 12 April 2 amendments tabled
9 October ECJ denies annulment 
request
2002 4 April third reading
16 April Kok II government falls
23 April voting
23 April bill submitted to Upper House
14 May bill labeled controversial
15 May parliamentary elections
22 July Balkenende I govt. installed
16 October Balkenende I govt. falls
29 October bill labeled controversial
December reasoned opinion 
2003 22 January parliamentary elections
27 May Balkenende II govt. installed
JULY referral to ECJ 
7 October preliminary report
2004 24 February memorandum of response
29 April further preliminary report
24 May further memorandum of 
response
1 June final report
8 June plenary debate Upper House 
and second reading; debate 
 suspended, awaiting of novelle
7 November new bill submitted to Upper 
House
9 November new bill passed by Upper House
20 November entry into force
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7.2 The gas directive
Energy policy and more specifically the natural gas supply used to be regulated nationally. 
The European Commission sought to change this situation, as it expected that more 
competition would lower energy prices. In the early 1990s it proposed two directives for a 
single European market for energy and natural gas, which had their basis in the 1985 White 
Paper on the Internal Market.14 Discussions on the gas proposal proved more contentious 
than on the electricity proposal, as various member states objected to too much market 
opening. Before being adopted, the proposal was discussed fourt times in the Council of 
Ministers (Van Keulen, 2006, 133-134).
For a long time, the Netherlands resisted liberalization of the gas market, as this was 
feared to impinge on the carefully constructed Dutch ‘gas edifice’ (gasgebouw). This policy 
concerning the production and supply of gas had been constructed in the 1960s after the 
discovery of huge gas reserves in the Northern province of Groningen, with the aim of 
maximizing revenues for the state while safeguarding the security of supply. The system 
consisted of a contract between gas utilities and the state concerning both production and 
supply. The state granted a concession to the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM), 
a joint venture of Shell and Exxon, to produce the gas, in cooperation with the Dutch 
State Mines (DSM). Gasunie, a joint venture of the state, DSM, Exxon, and Shell, was 
established to transport, sell, and supply the gas. The state was to obtain gas revenues 
through taxes on the profits of NAM, Gasunie, and DSM, and through dividends paid by 
Gasunie and DSM (Correljé, 2001, 1-8; Roggenkamp, 2000, 201-202). The organization 
of the gas sector is depicted in figure 10.
Through this ‘gas edifice’, the Dutch state obtained not only a cheap, reliable and clean 
source of energy, but also a positive international trade balance, and last but not least 
a veritable cash cow that permitted the development of the Dutch welfare state. In the 
1980s, the revenues amounted to 15% of the state income, due to the high oil prices, to 
which the gas prices were linked. In the late 1990s the revenues decreased to some five 
percent (Correljé, 2002, 4). The directive was to change this structure, by opening up the 
market to new market parties. Moreover, for the first time since the discovery of natural 
gas in 1923, formal legislation would have to be adopted to regulate the sector (Correljé, 
2001, 1-8). Also, the directive would limit the possibilities to realize general economic and 
environmental objectives through the energy market (Correljé, 1997, 169). For instance, 
it was feared that liberalization would curtail the possibilities of developing energy saving 
programs (Correljé, 1997, 165).
14  COM(1991)548 def and COM (1993)643 def.
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Figure 10 The ‘gas edifice’: the organization of the Dutch gas market before the Gas Act15
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Hence the Ministry of Economic Affairs for a long time vehemently opposed liberalization, 
being ‘among the staunchest opponents of the initiatives of the European Commission’ 
(Correljé, 2001, 8). It argued that it was concerned about the security of supply and 
the split between supply, transport and distribution. In 1995, though, this policy 
was suddenly reversed. The new ‘purple’ government, consisting of PvdA, VVD, and 
D66, pursued an active strategy of liberalization. Minister Wijers of Economic Affairs 
vigorously pushed for liberalization, and soon turned his attention to the gas sector, as 
can be read in the 1995 Third Energy Report, which stated that the Netherlands should 
actively push for opening up the EU’s energy markets. Interestingly, neither Gasunie, nor 
political parties openly voiced concerns over this drastic switch (Correljé, 1997, 171).
At the EU-level, after years of deadlock, the directive was ‘revived’ during the Irish Presidency 
in the second half of 1996. The gas directive became a top priority for Minister Wijers, two 
months before the start of the Netherlands’ 1997 Council Presidency (Westerwoudt, 1997). 
The minister claimed that the directive was supported by a majority of the member states. 
A junior official at the Directorate-General for Energy was assigned to the Gas Directive 
dossier and participated in the EU’s Council working group on energy, which discussed the 
gas directive proposal every other week. Although the Dutch presidency was very active in 
the negotiations, The Energy Council in May 1997 did not reach agreement on the issue. 
The Luxembourg Presidency took over the negotiations and issued a new text proposal in 
November. The Council’s common position reached in December 1997 was adopted in 
February 1998. The Gas directive was approved in the May 1998 plenary session of the 
European Parliament and signed in June 1998.
15  Adopted from Correljé (2002).
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The goal of the directive was to create one large, single gas market in Europe (European 
Commission, brochure, 2000, 1). With article 100a EC as its main legal basis, it 
established common rules for the transmission, distribution, supply, and storage of 
natural gas (directive 98/30/EC, art. 1), the key being with achieving a competitive 
gas market. It primarily focused on downstream activities, i.e. the supply of gas to end-
customers (Department of Trade and Industry, 2000, 1; Roggenkamp, 2000, 203). 
The directive consists of the following key elements (see table 19 for an overview). First 
and foremost, it aims at ensuring non-discriminatory access for third parties to the gas 
transmission and distribution networks. To secure this third-party access, member states 
may choose between negotiated and regulated access. Under negotiated third-party access 
(NtpA) customers can negotiate access with the network operator. Under regulated third-
party access (RtpA), in contrast, the network operator publishes tariffs for access to the 
system. Second, the directive establishes stages of market opening, by specifying the dates 
at which various types of consumers are eligible for access to the system, i.e. can freely 
choose their gas provider. Member states must ensure that in any case, all gas-fired power 
generators and other final customers consuming more than 25 million cubic meters per 
years are eligible. In addition, they must ensure that those consumers are made eligible so 
that initially at least 20% of the gas market is opened up, 28% in 2003, and 33% in 2008 
(directive 1998/33/EC, arts. 1-6). 
Third, the directive provides for unbundling, which means that integrated gas companies 
must separate their accounts in the fields of transmission, distribution, storage, and 
possible other services. Fourth, it stipulates that member states may grant derogations to 
gas companies for existing long-term commitments, the so-called take-or-pay contracts. 
Fifth, it allows member states to impose public-service obligations on gas utilities in the 
general economic interest. Sixth it stipulates that an independent dispute settlement body 
must be set up to regulate disputes relating to access to the system. Finally, it contains 
derogations for emerging markets, a clause that was not relevant for the Netherlands, which 
already was a major European producer and exporter of gas (Van Oostvoorn en Boots, 
1999, 11; Hough and Concha, 2000, 1; Roggenkamp, 2000, 203).
The directive can be characterized as rather open. It specifies only the ‘general 
principles providing for a framework, the detailed transposition of which should be 
left to Member States’ (Recital 9 of the Preamble to directive 98/30/EC). It is hence 
qualified as providing little guidance (Hough and Concha, 2000, 2). First, it contains 
various optional elements, such as the possibility to include derogations for take-or-pay 
commitments, and public-service obligations. Second, some elements contain choices, 
such as the form of third party access. Third, almost all provisions required further 
refinement and operationalization by the member states.
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As to the quality of the directive, the interviewees agree that the directive was quite 
clear. Only two of the ten interviewees claim that the directive was hard to interpret, 
in particular with respect to access. Two other interviewees state that the directive was 
not so much ambiguous as complicated. The goodness of fit, finally, was rather poor. 
By liberalizing a previously state-regulated sector, it changed the pattern of interaction 
among societal actors (distribution companies, large industry, electricity producers and 
Gasunie) and between societal actors and government, which was to play an important 
role vis-à-vis Gasunie, in the sense of access and dispute settlement. There was also a large 
misfit on the policy dimension, in that the directive dramatically impacted the existing 
problem solving approach, policy instruments, and policy standards.
Table 19 Key elements of directive 98/30/EC
element required or optional discretion
form of third party access required yes; binary choice
stages of market opening required yes; minimum
derogations for take-or pay commitments optional yes
public service obligations optional yes
enforcement required yes
derogations for emergent markets optional yes
Actors
The main actor in the transposition process was the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
Already in 1995, the Gas Act Project Group (Projectgroep Gaswet) was established, with 
the task of drawing up a proposal for a new Gas Act providing for liberalization of the 
gas market. The project group consisted of several policy officials from the Oil and Gas 
Department, one from the Electricity Department, and a lawyer from the Department 
of Legal Affairs. In 1998, Annemarie Jorritsma (VVD) had succeeded Wijers as Minister 
of Economic Affairs. Interviewees reported that the working relationships in the project 
group were very good; hence Chinese walls do not seem to have been a problem.
Because transposition was to happen by means of a statute, Parliament played an 
important role in the transposition process (see table 17 above for the composition of 
the Lower House). A majority of the parties, notably VVD, CDA, and D66, supported 
the principle of liberalization, provided that some key conditions were fulfilled. D66 was 
most positive, fully supporting liberalization, while attaching importance to the small 
fields policy and monitoring of the sector. The VVD supported the wish to liberalize, 
but expressed concerns over the position of the horticulture industry. The CDA, while 
supporting liberalization, was highly critical about the way the ministry proposed to 
implement the directive, worrying about the position of the consumers, the small 
fields policy, and monitoring. The PvdA, the largest party at that moment, was even 
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more critical than the CDA, pointing towards consumer interests, the division in tasks 
between government and business, and the important role for government in regulating 
the sector. The smaller left parties Green Left and SP staunchly opposed liberalization, 
whereas the small Christian parties saw liberalization as a fact of European life, which 
should nonetheless be implemented carefully, in view of consumer interests and the 
environment (Parliamentary papers II 1998/99, 26463, nr. 55, p. 3-5). 
According to the majority of the interviewees,  interest groups did not play an important 
role in the transposition process. The Ministry of Economic Affairs formally arranged 
consultation on the Discussion Document Gas flows (Discussienota Gasstromen), which 
was submitted to the various stakeholders, such as Gasunie, consumer organizations, 
electricity producers, and the other ministries in December 1997. Their input, according 
to Economic Affairs, was used to draw up the bill. However, various key players in the 
process characterize the extent of consultation as insufficient and claim that the role of 
interest groups in reality was marginal. As a result, various interest groups resorted to 
targeting members of Parliament during the transposition process, which resulted in a 
veritable avalanche of amendments to the original bill. According to several interviewees, 
the MPs were rather open to lobbying by interest groups, because of the expertise of 
the latter. None of these amendments, however, concerned the core objective of the 
project, i.e. liberalization as such. Like the political parties, the majority of the interest 
groups supported this general aim, while being concerned about either the effects of 
careless liberalization on consumer interests, the prospects for reaching a real competitive 
market, or horticultural interests.
The role of Gasunie in the process is paradoxical. Several interviewees stress its long-
standing and intensive working relationship with Economic Affairs. Allegedly, Gasunie 
was very influential in drawing up the initial bill. At the same time, it is said that Gasunie 
kept a relatively low profile during the remainder of the process. Three interviewees claim 
that Gasunie relied upon Economic Affairs to secure its interests. At the same time, they 
indicate that Gasunie, by following this strategy, lost out on some important aspects.
Summing up, even though some of the non-state actors were indirectly involved, 
and played important supporting roles vis-à-vis either government or Parliament, they 
cannot be labeled real veto players. From the interviews, a general picture of two blocks 
arises. On the one hand, we see Economic Affairs, supported and sustained by Gasunie, 
and a Parliamentary minority consisting of VVD, and D66. On the other hand, there 
was a Parliamentary majority, consisting of CDA, PvdA, GL, and the smaller parties, 
supported by a coalition of interest groups such as distribution companies, large industry, 
electricity producers, consumer organizations, and horticultural organizations. The 
transposition process can be characterized as extremely politicized, as is also evidenced 
by the large number of amendments and by the complexity of the parliamentary process. 
The positions of the actors and the decision-making process that ensued are discussed in 
more detail below.
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Transposition process
The Member states had two years to implement the directive, the deadline being set at 10 
August 2000. However, the transposition process had already commenced earlier by the 
project group Gas Act. Established after the publication of the Third Energy Report, this 
group had as its task to draw up the legal framework for liberalization of the gas market. 
In 1997, this group published a discussion document, which made a first cut at drafting 
the legal contours of a liberalized sector. The activities of the project group were partly 
determined by the forthcoming directive, partly by national considerations (Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 1997, 3). As we shall see later, this qualification adequately captures 
the overall transposition process, which partly originated in the requirements of the 
directive, and partly in the autonomous move towards liberalization initiated by the 
first ‘purple’ government. In the words of one of the interviewees, ‘The Gas Act and the 
parliamentary debate about it had little to do with the directive, because the directive was 
so broad that it could easily be complied with.’
From the early beginning, the Gas Act project group kept an eye on the proposal for 
the first gas directive. At the time the bill was being drawn, the Council of Ministers 
had already reached an agreement on the proposal. For this reason, the EU parameters 
were considered relatively stable (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1997, 5-6). According 
to an interviewee at the ministry, it was clear from the outset that the directive would 
not be hard to implement, because it aimed at a very limited extent of market opening. 
Moreover, it was already expected that the directive would become rather flexible, in that 
it left countries some choices for transposition, such as the form of access and the speed 
of market opening. The Dutch discussion to a great extent focused upon these issues.
On 30 March 1999, some nine months after the directive was adopted, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs submitted its proposal for the new Gas Act to Parliament (Parliamentary 
papers II 1998/99, 26463, nr. 1-2). The original bill was limited in scope, and solely 
intended to implement the directive (Roggenkamp, 2000, 203). As compared to the 
original directive, its main elements were the following. To begin with, the ministry 
proposed negotiated third party access (Roggenkamp, 2000, 205). This choice had already 
been made in 1997, when the ministry argued that in view of the interest of national 
gas companies, and the national economic interests, it was not wise to opt for regulated 
access (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1997, 6). 
Concerning the stages of market opening, it aimed to make eligible those consumers 
taking more than 10 million cubic meters per year immediately, and more than 170.000 
cubic meters by 2002. Small consumers were to choose their provider from 2007 on. 
The bill thus went further than the directive, proposing speedier liberalization. Later 
on, the Ministry of Economic Affairs proposed to open up even faster, aiming at full 
liberalization in 2004 instead of 2007 (Parliamentary Papers II 1999/2000, 26463, nr. 
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   116 05-03-2007   15:53:21
Chapter 7 Biotech versus gas

10, p. 2). The proposed regime would entail an opening up of 45% in 2000, 51% in 
2002, and 100% in 2004 (Parliamentary papers I 1999/2000, 26463, nr. 210b, p. 7). 
Third, the bill made use of the possibility of derogations for take-or-pay contracts6 (art. 
7 of the bill). Fourth, the possibility of formulating public-service obligations was used: 
art. 29 of the bill contained a provision that gas companies had to produce gas in an 
environmentally friendly way. Fifth, dispute settlement was to be regulated on the basis 
of regular competition law, with disputes to be settled by the Director-General of the 
Netherlands Competition Authority (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit or NMa; see 
Parliamentary Papers II 1998/99, 26 463, 1-2, art. 9). 
Several interest groups and parliamentary parties received the bill rather critically, 
claiming that it ‘offered barely any perspective for competition’ (interview). It 
‘implemented the directive in the most minimalist and restrictive sense possible’ (two 
interviews). The main complaint was that the bill did not contain any measures to curtail 
the dominant position of Gasunie, as a result of which newcomers would not have a fair 
chance to enter the market. According to a report by law firm Trénité van Doorne, the 
bill would not effectively change the dominant position of Gasunie, because it would 
retain its monopoly on the exploitation of gas. Formally, it would become possible to 
obtain gas from other providers, but in reality there would be no incentive to do so, since 
it would be impossible for newcomers to offer a cheaper alternative for gas provided by 
Gasunie (Visser and Roggenkamp, 1999, 7).
On the one hand, the bill thus allowed for faster liberalization than required, while 
on the other hand it contained few safeguards to strengthen the position of newcomers 
vis-à-vis Gasunie. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was criticized for having made 
a ‘reactionary reversal’ under minister Jorritsma (interview), who allegedly was less 
enthusiastic about liberalization than her predecessor Wijers. According to one of the 
lawyers who wrote the above-mentioned report, EZ and Gasunie plotted together: 
‘Formally the gas market is liberalized in line with the directive, but there will not be 
any real competition any time soon, so that the Dutch state retains maximum rebates. 
They are hands in glove.’ (‘Splitsing Gasunie’, 1999). Parliament actively sought to 
undo this reversal in policy position, seeking to account for the interests that had been 
neglected by Economic Affairs (interview). Partly induced by lobbies from these interest 
groups, Parliament bombarded Economic Affairs with amendments, 76 in total. The 
ensuing parliamentary debate revolved around the following issues, some of which relate 
explicitly to the directive and the options it contained, while others concern national 
16   These are contracts ‘between a buyer and a seller, whereby the former agrees to purchase from the latter a 
fixed quantity of a product for a given price over a certain period of time. Irrespective of the quantity which 
is finally needed and transferred, the buyer is bound by its commitments and is required to pay for the whole 
volume of sales at the contractual terms agreed upon’. Retrieved January 29, 2007, from  http://ec.europa.
eu/comm/competition/general_info/t_en.html.
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topics. The main issues were the type of access, monitoring and enforcement, the speed 
and extent of market opening, and storage facilities (see table 20).17 
Table 20 Key issues in transposition process
element proposal for Gas Act opinion Parliament1 outcome
form of third party access negotiated hybrid hybrid
monitoring and enforcementCompetition law; NMa DtE DtE
stages of market opening bulk consumers immedi-
ately
medium consumers in 2003
consumers in 2004
full opening in 2007 full opening in 2004, 
conditional on the maturity 
and competitiveness of the 
sector
storage storage only open to 
competition to the extent 
necessary for transport
storage for commercial 
ends also open to compe-
tition
storage for commercial 
ends also open to compe-
tition
The central issue in the parliamentary proceedings was the type of access. Several parties 
in the Lower House heavily criticized the ministry’s choice for negotiated access, ‘because 
one cannot negotiate with a monopolist’ (interview). Opposition party CDA, the most 
visible opponent together with PvdA, filed an amendment to bolster the position of 
newcomers to the gas market. It proposed a hybrid system of access, combining negotiated 
access with guidelines set by the Office of Energy Regulation (Directie Toezicht Energie or 
DtE). The entire Lower House supported this amendment, which was then taken up by 
Economic Affairs (Parliamentary Proceedings II, 5 April 2000, 65-4516). According to 
Jorritsma, it was a ‘nice and creative’ solution.
The second issue was related to the previous one and concerned the monitoring and 
enforcement of the Gas Act. The original bill aimed to regulate disputes through regular 
competition law, by the Netherlands Competition Authority. However, the Christian-
Democrats, supported by VVD and D66, tabled an amendment stipulating that instead, 
the Office of Energy Regulation (DtE) was to monitor the application of the Gas Act. The 
argument was that the DtE, being a sectoral agency, would be better able to monitor the 
gas market, also because of its experience with the liberalization of the electricity market 
(Parliamentary Papers II 1999/2000, 26463, nr. 89). This amendment was approved 
by the entire Lower House (Parliamentary Proceedings II, 5 April 2000, 65-4516) and 
taken up by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
A third issue was the speed and extent of market opening. The ministry’s proposal to 
fully open up the market from 2004 was received rather critically by Parliament. Whereas 
speeding up liberalization was in principle acceptable for VVD and D66, the other 
parties were far more critical out of concern for the position of small consumers. They 
wanted to be sure that the market was ready for full liberalization. Minister Jorritsma 
17 All these issues were mentioned by more than half of the nine interviewees. All of them mentioned the type 
of access, six mentioned monitoring and enforcement, and five interviewees mentioned market opening and 
storage as an issue.
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did not agree with this point, because she believed that liberalization could only lead to 
lower prices, which was beneficial for consumers. In the end, after CDA and PvdA had 
tabled amendments that reset 2007 as the date for full liberalization, PvdA proposed a 
way out of the impasse. It made faster liberalization conditional on the existence of a 
reliable, affordable, and sustainable gas supply, real competition, and information about 
the financial consequences for the Netherlands. CDA withdrew its own amendment to 
revert the dates, arguing that the minister had fulfilled all its other demands.
Finally, an important concern of Parliament was with gas storage. VVD, CDA, and 
D66 wanted to open up storage to competition, whereas the bill only proposed to open 
up to competition those storage facilities needed for transportation. According to the 
three parties, however, storage was a commercial activity, which needed to be opened 
up to competition. At the same time, the CDA stressed that storage was very important 
to safeguard the security of supply to customers (so-called production storage). Gasunie 
used part of its underground storage facilities to store gas for periods with a high demand. 
The CDA explicitly wanted to shield this part of the storage facilities from competition. 
Economic Affairs, for its part, did not want any kind of storage facilities to become 
open to third party access. It argued that storage was not an essential activity, and that 
it was not necessary to enable cross-country gas exports. It argued that the two kinds of 
storage could not be separated. Its main argument, however, was that the directive did 
not regulate this matter, claiming that the ECJ would not tolerate this, and that there was 
no need to be ‘more European than required by the directive’ (Parliamentary papers II 
1999/2000, 26463, nr. 55, p. 25). Yet CDA, VVD, and D66 persevered. They tabled an 
amendment that provided for competition relating to storage for commercial ends, and 
an exception for production storage. Jorritsma agreed with the first point, but refused 
to grant the second demand. The Lower House decided differently, and adopted the 
amendment unanimously.
Partly because of the constructive attitude of Parliament, which was urged by the 
ministry to aim at timely transposition (Parliamentary papers II 1998/99, 26463, nr. 
8, p. 3), the Gas Act was passed in time. Proceedings in the Upper House took another 
two months18, so that it was signed on June 22, and entered into force exactly at 10 
August 2000, the date of the deadline.19 Transposition was hence timely. In addition, 
the directive was implemented correctly, as several reports by the European Commission 
indicate (European Commission, 2000, 2). In an external study of the state of play in the 
member states, Dutch transposition is denoted as complete (Wefa, 2001). Even though 
several interviewees are still critical of the Gas Act, claiming that it does not sufficiently 
provide for liberalization, the Gas Act was in line with the directive.
18 The proceedings in the Upper House are not explicitly discussed here, because they were rather unproblematic.
19  Some articles of the Gas Act entered into force later, but these were not required for transposition.
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Table 21 Timeline for transposition of directive 98/30/EC
year date EU level transposition process.
1998 22 June Directive adopted
1999 30 March bill submitted to Lower House
3 November report Standing Committee Economic Affairs
2 December memorandum concerning report & amending memorandum
2000 10 January further report Standing Committee Economic Affairs
1 February memorandum concerning report
24 February second amending memorandum
24 February – 
13 March
44 amendments tabled
13 March legislative consultation standing committee-minister
20 March response by minister
28 – 29 March 19 amendments tabled
29-3 general debate (first reading)
30 March general debate (response, second reading, second response)
30 March – 4 
April 
13 amendments tabled
4 April 3e amending memorandum
5 April voting
5 April modified bill submitted to Upper House
18 May preliminary report standing committee econ. affairs Upper House
20 June debate; bill passed
22 June bill signed
10 August deadline entry into force
7.3 Analysis
Before explaining the marked difference in duration for the two transposition processes, 
it makes sense to more specifically pinpoint at which stages the two processes diverged. 
Combining the two timelines constructed above, table 22 lists the amount of time that was 
used for each important stage of the two processes. This comparison makes it possible to 
isolate the causes of the delay for the biotech directive and to exclude those variables that 
are irrelevant. 
If we compare the two timelines, the following observations can be made. First, until 
the second reading the processes did not differ very much. Transposition of the biotech 
directive was only two months behind, which is a negligible difference. Second, the table 
shows that most of the delay for the biotech directive originates in Parliament. There 
were two years between the final reading of the bill and actual voting, as compared to a 
mere week for the gas directive. This period therefore will be central to the explanatory 
analysis. In addition, proceedings in the Upper House took some two years longer for the 
biotech directive. This difference is not so interesting from a theoretical perspective, as 
most of the delay was caused by a rather trivial factor, the general political unrest during 
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transposition of the biotech directive, between May 2002 and May 2003. In addition, 
the special procedure of adopting the novelle was rather time-consuming.
Let us now turn to the explanatory analysis, starting with the legal-administrative 
variables. None of the legal-administrative variables can explain the long duration of 
the parliamentary proceedings in the biotech case. First, administrative capacity cannot 
explain the longer duration of the parliamentary proceedings in the biotech case. In 
addition, none of the interviewees indicated that capacity was a problem. In both cases 
timely transposition was a top priority for the ministry; ample personnel was put on the 
dossiers. Despite the high workload of the civil servants in the biotech case, which was 
a consequence of the annulment procedure, they managed to complete the first bill for 
submission to Parliament by the end of May, only two months later than in the gas case. 
Second, the parliamentary proceedings were not slowed down by the complexity of the 
process, as both directives were transposed into one instrument. Finally, Chinese walls 
played no role, as they would have resulted in longer processing times at the ministry, 
instead of in Parliament. In addition, none of the respondents hinted at Chinese walls 
within the ministry.
Table 22 Main stages of the transposition process: relative durations
event Biotech directive (98/44/EC) Gas directive (98/30/EC)
date ∆ t (weeks) date ∆ t (weeks)
directive adopted 6 July 1998 22 June 1998
bill submitted to Lower House 28 May 1999 47 30 March 1999 40
report standing committee Econ. 
affairs 17 August 1999 12 3 November 1999 31
memorandum concerning report 10 December 1999 16 2 December 1999 4
further report standing committee 21 February 2000 10 10 January 2000 6
memorandum concerning report 22 March 2000 4 1 February 2000 3
amendments 26 May 2000 9 24 February 2000 3
general debate 1 30 May 2000 1 29 March 2000 5
second reading 7 June 2000 1 30 March 2000 0
third reading 4 April 2002 95
voting 23 April 2002 3 5 April 2000 1
submitted to Upper House 23 April 2002 0 5 April 2000 0
passed 9 November 2004 133 20 June 2000 11
What about the quality of the two directives? At first glance, this explanation seems more 
promising, as the biotech directive was far more ambiguous than the gas directive. Yet 
this variable cannot explain the difference in timeliness. That is, the Lower House stuck 
to its interpretation after the urgent opinion of the Council of State in November 2000. 
Also, it stuck to its opinion after the ECJ judgment, which clearly explained the disputed 
provision. The delay hence cannot be explained by mere ambiguity.
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Turning towards the goodness of fit, the above description yields an interesting result: 
the misfit was much higher for the gas directive than for the biotech directive. Admittedly, 
the biotech directive clashed with a salient element of the Patent Act that Parliament had 
passed earlier, but technically the biotech directive could be incorporated into domestic 
legislation relatively easily. Moreover, the actual practice of patent granting had already 
been brought into line with the new directive by the BIE, the Netherlands Industrial 
Property Office. Several interviewees indicated that it was not so much the extent of 
misfit, but the enormous saliency of one element of the existing law, i.e. the patentability 
of plants and animals. The gas directive, in contrast, meant an enormous pressure for 
adaptation, as it necessitated a radical overthrow of the carefully constructed gas edifice, 
and as legislation was required while previously, informal arrangements had existed.
Thus the explanatory value of the goodness of fit is limited for these two cases. The gas 
case bears evidence to the overriding force of domestic politics in the face of a misfit: the 
Netherlands suddenly sought to reverse the existing status quo, when the purple coalition 
in 1994 started to push for liberalization of the gas market. Furthermore, in the biotech 
example, the Dutch government sought to overthrow the Patents Act adopted earlier, 
through negotiations in Brussels. This goes against the notion of ‘uploading’ that is at the 
origins of the goodness of fit paradigm. Finally, even if we would qualify the misfit in the 
biotech case as large, the misfit was not larger than for the gas case, and hence cannot serve 
to explain the observed difference in timeliness. For all these reasons, it seems more fruitful 
to focus on domestic preferences and beliefs, instead of existing policies and institutions. 
It seems more promising to study the preferences held by the ministry and the various 
political parties, as these played the key role in the two transposition processes.
At first glance, the unitary actor view seems irrelevant for explaining the differences 
in duration between the two cases, in that it masks the variety of actors that played a 
role. This is especially problematic for the IR hypotheses set out above. In IR rationalism, 
the unitary actor is primarily an analytical tool aimed at simplification, so as to allow 
for comprehensible models. Rationalist scholars adhering to the unitary actor assumption 
generally acknowledge the variety of domestic actors, but argue that their positions can reach 
a single, transitive preference ordering at the aggregate level, especially when the number of 
domestic-level actors is small, or that in last resort, a single individual makes the decision 
as to what position to defend at the international level (for a discussion of these arguments, 
see Hug, 1999). So even when there is a multitude of lower-level actors, according to this 
view their preferences can be aggregated into one national- level preference ordering. 
This can be nicely illustrated by the biotech case: even though the preferences of the 
ministry and the parliamentary majority greatly diverged, the preference of the latter won 
over that of the former. This case sustains the hypothesis that a member state will not 
transpose a directive that it objected to during decision-making. Conversely, in the gas case, 
we see that the Netherlands voted for the directive, and transposed it in time. At the same 
time, unitary actor rationalism is not entirely apt to explain the difference in durations. 
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That is, during transposition of the biotech directive, a third set of actors came into play, 
namely the parties in the Upper House. This explains why in the end transposition was 
correct, even though the Netherlands voted against the directive at the EU-level. On the 
face of it, IR rationalism can explain the difference in durations. However, even if the 
preferences of lower-level actors may be aggregated into a higher-level transitive preference 
ordering, the unitary actor assumption is inherently flawed when different actors control 
the decision-making and transposition stage, as is often the case.
As for IR constructivism, the unitary actor assumption is more problematic. In this 
school of thought, the assumption has an ontological character, as it implies that member 
states as such hold certain norms. This image of ‘national’ norms does not correspond well 
to the highly political nature of the two transposition processes studied. Both cases were 
characterized by fierce clashes between the Lower House20 and government. In both cases, 
coalition partners went against the government, which is rare in the Dutch parliamentary 
system (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002, 312). In the gas directive, there was no actual link 
between the ‘shaping’ and ‘taking’ stages (Börzel, 2003b), as the government over time 
made two drastic policy reversals. In the biotech case something similar happened when 
Parliament suddenly forced the Dutch government to vote against the directive, whereas 
representatives of the latter had supported the Commission’s proposal. In addition, the 
various political parties held different opinions on the directive. The parties opposing 
the directive presented very different arguments. The small Christian parties found 
the directive unethical, whereas the PvdA’s main concern was with legal certainty 
(Parliamentary Papers II 1998/99, 26568 (R 1638), nr. 4). In none of the cases, we can 
identify one clear ‘national’ norm that was threatened, as is central to IR constructivist 
theories of compliance. Considering this diversity in domestic norms, we can conclude 
that IR constructivism is not relevant for analyzing the difference in durations.
If transposition of both directives can be characterized as a domestic political process, 
how can we explain the stark difference in timeliness? Could the bargaining hypothesis 
explain why the deadline was not met in the biotech case? First, it seems that the 
players in the biotech case were less flexible indeed. At the end of the second reading 
it became clear that PvdA was not willing to compromise its amendment 11, and that 
the opposition parties would support PvdA. The ministry was more flexible, ultimately 
giving in to Parliament’s wishes and agreeing with incorrect transposition. In the gas 
case both sides were flexible: the minister surrendered on several counts, and Parliament 
gave in concerning the speed of liberalization. Consequently, the hypothesis that time 
pressure is ineffectual in the face of inflexibility of the players, cannot be rejected. This 
is different for the second hypothesis stemming from bargaining theory, concerning the 
20  It must be stressed that in the Biotech case, the Lower House was divided, whereas in the gas case, 
it adopted all main amendments unanimously. 
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number of issues. Transposition of the problematic biotech case only concerned one issue, 
whereas the gas dossier contained four. This hypothesis hence cannot be sustained.
As for the coordination model by Steunenberg (2006), the following observations can be made. 
In the biotech case, the lower-level actors were the policy and legal divisions of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, which drafted the transposing measure. The parties in Parliament were the 
higher-level coordinators, as they needed to approve of the way the directive was transposed. 
As described earlier, the main issue in this process was the patentability of inventions on 
plants and animals. The directive held that inventions on plants and animals must be 
patentable. As the ECJ made clear, there was no legislative discretion in this aspect. Whereas 
the government, D66, and VVD supported this provision of the directive, a majority in the 
Lower House opposed it. This implies the following preference configuration (see figure 11). 
At first glance, the political parties, which in Dutch legislative processes are the higher-level 
players (Steunenberg, 2006), were divided on the issue, some parties opposing the ministry’s 
proposal, others supporting it. Nonetheless, VVD and D66 cannot be called veritable veto 
players in this case. That is, their opposition to the amendment was inconsequential, and 
they could not stop the parliamentary majority from prohibiting the patenting of plants and 
animals. In other words, the model cannot explain why transposition took so long.
Figure 11 Patentability of plants and animals (directive 98/44/EC)21
PvdA, CDA , GL , SP , RPF , SGP , GPV
Ministry
directive
VVD, D66
all inventions on plants
and animals patentable
no inventions on plants
and animals patentable
When analyzing transposition of the gas directive, a problem arises: the voting model 
developed by Steunenberg (2006) supposes a position of the directive on each issue. 
However, this was not the case for the issue of storage, which was a purely national issue. 
The model does not apply to this type of situations, as the directive is assumed to provide 
a reference point for transposition, or at least a set of sustainable proposals. 
The situation is different for the issues of Third Party Access and of enforcement, which 
were characterized by a similar playing field. The directive provided a range of possibilities 
on both issues. Concerning access, member states could choose between negotiated or 
regulated party access. The minister opted for a minimalist interpretation, proposing 
negotiated Third Party Access. As is depicted in figure 12, the full chamber wanted a hybrid 
system, somewhere in the middle of the range of sustained proposals. Initially, the ministry 
wanted negotiated access. Still, the position of Parliament was the outcome of decision-
making, which is in line with the model. Also, transposition was timely, as predicted.
21  Please note: the political parties printed in bold formed part of the governing coalition.
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Figure 12 Third Party Access (directive 98/30/EC)
no Third Party Access negotive Third Party
Access
Ministry
dmin dmax
hybrid system
full Chamber
regulated Third Party
Access
A similar result holds for the issue of enforcement (see figure 13). The directive stipulated 
that the member states had to ensure monitoring and enforcement of the directive, 
while leaving them the choice of the level of strictness. Whereas the ministry proposed 
a rather loose system on the basis of regular competition law, the Parliament wanted a 
more stringent system, proposing that the better-equipped DtE become the enforcer. 
Again, the higher-level coordinator was unanimous, and in line with the hypothesis, 
transposition was timely.
Figure 13 Enforcement (directive 98/30/EC)
no enforcement
Ministry
dmin dmaxfull Chamber
strict enforcement
Finally, the stages of market opening actually constitute a two-dimensional issue, 
combining the extent and the speed of market opening. Here, the directive stipulates 
that in 2008, at least 33% of the market had to be opened up to competition. However, 
the ministry and all parties agreed to aim at full liberalization, and hence to go beyond 
the directive. The point of contention was when exactly the market was to become fully 
open. The minister, supported by VVD and D66, proposed to reach full opening in 
2004. A parliamentary majority, however, wanted to aim for 2007. Again, VVD and 
D66 could not exert an effective veto. Transposition on this count was timely, which is 
in line with hypothesis 14. However, strangely enough the parliamentary majority did 
not get its way; it was decided that full competition should become effective from 2004. 
The model cannot explain this outcome, as at least PvdA, being a coalition partner and 
hence a veto player, could have frustrated this plan.
All things considered, the results for the coordination model are mixed. The outcomes 
for the gas case are mostly in line with the hypothesis, but the delay in the case of the biotech 
directive could not be explained well. It cannot explain why the parliamentary majority 
did not simply impose its wish any sooner. Similarly, the model cannot explain why the 
parliamentary majority in the gas case gave in to the minority’s wish to fully liberalize 
by 2004. Finally, it must be said that the notion of veto players is a difficult concept. 
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Steunenberg (2006) stipulates that for legislative processes in the Netherlands, the veto 
players could be the various coalition partners. However, as has been shown in the biotech 
case, coalition partners cannot execute an effective veto, when another coalition party 
joins the opposition. The notion of veto players is hence rather inductive: the legislative 
instrument alone does not suffice to identify ex ante which actors have a veto.
How about deliberative theory? The degree of insulation, to begin with, cannot explain 
the observed difference in delay. Some 44 newspaper articles were published on the biotech 
directive, against some 14 on the gas directive. However, Google yields a different picture, 
with much more attention being paid to the gas directive than to the biotech directive 
(882 compared to 542 hits). The number of hits for the gas directive must be put into 
perspective, though, because recently a second gas directive has been adopted. All in all, 
it seems that the two directives were characterized by similar levels of insulation, which 
hence cannot explain the difference in timeliness. Also, interest groups closely monitored 
both transposition processes, even if these did not play a role as veto players.
Concerning discourse quality, the two cases display some important differences. 
Participation, to begin with, was highly restricted for both cases, in that the ministry 
went about consultation rather selectively. In both cases, the various interest groups 
opposing the directive or the transposing bills were dissatisfied with the extent to which 
they had been involved in transposition, and resorted to Parliament to gain access to 
decision-making. However, the problem was even greater for the biotech case, in that 
various parties in Parliament felt excluded. The MPs opposed to patenting of plants 
and animals were infuriated about the fact that the Ministry of Economic Affairs had 
gone to Brussels to bypass the statute Parliament had enacted just before. This grief 
was primarily expressed by PvdA and SP, and to some extent by the CDA. Several 
times, these parties complained that the government had intruded upon Parliament’s 
primacy, and surrendered Dutch sovereignty (Parliamentary Papers II 1998/99, 26568 
(R 1638), nr. 4). Much of the debate on the directive concerned this meta-level problem 
of participation. This was not the case in the gas directive.
Another striking difference concerns the constructive politics indicator. One of the 
respondents who played a key role in both processes, and thus is in the position to 
compare the two processes, argues that emotions reigned in the biotech case, whereas 
the debate about the gas directive was more constructive and more technical in nature. 
This qualification was echoed by several other interviewees, who claim that discussions 
about the biotech directive were so emotionally charged that a constructive exchange 
of arguments was impossible. Furthermore, the degree of respect for counterarguments 
differed greatly between the cases. Granted, in both cases participants tried to justify their 
positions. However, the evidence gathered was simply neglected in the biotech case, as the 
opponents of the directive were utterly insensitive to the findings and recommendations 
of the various independent third parties heard, even when they agreed on obtaining their 
advice with the advocates of the directive. It is fascinating to see how PvdA brushed 
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aside the interpretations of the ministry, the European Commission, the ECJ, and the 
Council of State, maintaining that the directive provided the leeway to exclude plants 
and animals from patentability. In the gas case, in contrast, there was much more respect 
for counterarguments, on the side of both the ministry and Parliament.
It seems that the problems with transposing the biotech directive can be characterized as 
an ‘intellectual war’ of the kind described by Johnson (1998). The conflict seems to have 
two reasons. First, at least some of the opponents of the directive seemed to have a deeply 
felt ethical aversion against the patenting of plants and animals. Especially the Christian 
and left-wing parties had a strong aversion to the patenting of biotechnological inventions 
as such. The position of PvdA was remarkable, though. Even though MP Witteveen made 
clear that she was primarily afraid that the directive would hinder scientific progress, in 
the parliamentary debate PvdA invokes a variety of arguments except scientific progress 
(Parliamentary Papers II 1998/99, 26568 (R 1638), nr. 4). Additionally, it is striking what 
happened after Mrs. Witteveen left the Lower House. PvdA suddenly reversed its position 
when the bill was discussed in the Upper House, arguing that it did not want to sign a bill 
that went against a directive. In the Lower House, PvdA voted for the novelle that corrected 
the previously incorrect transposition of the directive. Assuming that the members of one and 
the same political party subscribe to the same ethical norms, especially when they concern 
matters of life and death, we must conclude that the position taken by PvdA was not driven 
by authentic normative objections, but primarily by concerns with discourse quality.
The real ground for the ‘intellectual war’ about the patenting of plants and animals hence 
seems to be a grievance over the perceived lack of discourse quality, rather than substantive 
normative considerations. The PvdA and some of the other opposing parties were driven into 
an extremely inflexible position as a result of what they perceived as flagrant breaches of crucial 
deliberative maxims. PvdA and CDA, as well as some smaller parties expressed a deep-felt sense 
of indignation about the way in which the ministry went about its negotiations, accusing it 
of secretly negotiating a directive that went full frontal against a hard-fought compromise at 
the national level. Especially PvdA and CDA, who filed the original amendment to the Patent 
Act, to exclude plants and animals were deeply disturbed about the attitude of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. These normative objections concern the procedural level, rather than the 
substance of the directive. It seems that this perceived lack of discourse quality led to problems 
with transposition, which is in line with the expectations of deliberative theorists.
This finding can also be aligned with the positive finding for the flexibility hypothesis, as 
posited by bargaining theorists. As a result of the lack of discourse quality, the opposing parties 
in the Lower House adopted a highly inflexible stance, whereas in the gas case the parties 
were much more flexible, giving in to the other party at crucial points. It thus seems that the 
inflexibility hypothesis is ontologically preceded by the lack of discourse quality. In this way, 
rationalist and constructivist theory can be wedded to each other. Whereas bargaining theory 
zooms in on one aspect of the decision-making process, namely the flexibility of the players, 
among other things, deliberative theory serves to explain this degree of flexibility.
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7.4 Conclusion
This chapter has focused on two rather similar directives transposed by the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. Whereas the biotech directive was transposed with a delay of 
some four years, the gas directive was transposed on time. The focused comparison 
of durations bears out that the delay in the biotech case is primarily located in the 
parliamentary proceedings. As is illustrated in table 23, the legal-administrative variables 
of administrative capacity, quality, complexity, and Chinese walls, do not suffice to 
explain the remarkable difference in duration. The same holds for both IR rationalism 
and IR constructivism: in both cases we see a host of different political actors, having 
different views on how to transpose the directive, which goes against the unitary actor 
assumption advocated by these paradigms. Instead, there are two reasons for the delay. 
Proceedings in the Upper House took so long in the biotech case because of the general 
political unrest in the Netherlands during that period, and because of the complicated 
procedure of adopting the novelle. The discussions in the Lower House were protracted 
by the meta-level discussion between a parliamentary majority and the ministry about 
the desirability of the directive and the way the ministry had gone about the negotiations. 
Whereas several parties in the Lower House had deeply-felt normative concerns about the 
directive, the PvdA and CDA felt mainly aggravated about the lack of discourse quality 
during negotiations, which led these parties to adopt a highly inflexible stance. The 
PvdA, supported by a majority of the parties, refused to withdraw a crucial amendment 
that went directly against the directive. Much of the delay was caused by procedural 
sidesteps by Parliament, such as a request to the ECJ to suspend the directive.
Table 23 Assessment of hypotheses
category variable 98/44/EC 98/30/EC
legal-administrative variables administrative capacity good good
quality high low
complexity (number of measures) 1 1
Chinese walls none none
historical institutionalism goodness of fit good bad
IR rationalism strategic calculation ‘no’ vote ‘yes’ vote
rational choice inst. players’ flexibility low high
number of issues 1 4
dividedness of higher-level players no no
sociological inst. fit with domestic norms not relevant not relevant
deliberative theory discourse quality low high
degree of insulation similar similar
trivial variables political unrest yes no
outcome transposition yes yes
delay 223 weeks -7 weeks
correctness yes yes
Chapter 7 Trucks versus transport operators
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8.1 The masses and dimensions of motor vehicles
When a manufacturer wants to place a new type of vehicle on the market, it must comply 
with various technical requirements. For a long time, these requirements differed among 
the member states, a situation that hindered intra-EC trade. Already in the 1960s, 
the European Commission set out to harmonize these standards so as to guarantee 
the freedom of movement of goods. In 1970 the member states adopted framework 
directive 70/156/EEC on the type-approval of motor vehicles and trailers. This directive 
developed a procedure for the EC type-approval of vehicles. The directive’s objective 
was a situation in which vehicles fulfilling certain standards could be placed freely on 
any member state’s market without having to meet any additional criteria (European 
Commission, 1991). It is an important directive, as member states have been known to 
use technical requirements as barriers to foreign manufacturers. For instance, according 
to one of my interviewees, Sweden for a long time demanded extremely robust roofs for 
trucks, invoking safety concerns, so as to protect its own truck producer Scania.
Under the umbrella of the 1970 framework directive, a great number of follow-up 
directives have been adopted, covering the features and components of various types 
of vehicles, such as breaking systems, lighting, and masses and dimensions (European 
Commission, 1991). By now, harmonization is complete for passenger cars, and for 
two- and three-wheel vehicles. Harmonization is only partial for trucks and buses and 
their trailers. Only a certain number of features and components of trucks and buses 
have been harmonized, whereas others still vary among member states. Manufacturers 
can request certificates for the harmonized parts, which must then be accepted by other 
member states, but they still have to comply with the national requirements for those 
vehicle features that have not been harmonized.
Contents
Two core features of vehicles are their maximum masses and dimensions. These used 
to vary greatly among the member states, but over time they have become subject to 
European regulation. For trucks and buses, two directives are relevant. Foremost, directive 
1996/53/EC1 regulates the maximum dimensions for international and national traffic, 
1   Council Directive 96/53/EC of 25 July 1996 laying down for certain road vehicles circulating within the 
Community the maximum authorized dimensions in national and international traffic and the maximum 
authorized weights in international traffic
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and the maximum weights for international traffic. The core of this directive is that vehicles 
that comply with the standards set in this directive must be admitted to the roads of any 
EC country. With this directive the European Commission sought to remove barriers to 
cabotage, which is the transport of goods in a country other than the base country of the 
respective transport company (Greaves, 2000, 119). Moreover, the directive was intended 
to increase road safety, by abolishing vehicles with excessive weights relative to their power 
unit (European Commission, 1993a).
The second directive, 1997/27/EC, does not apply to traffic, but lists the technical 
requirements that vehicles must meet in order for their producer to obtain a type-approval 
or have a tailor-made vehicle registered by the national authorities. As such, it contains 
requirements relating to production, not actual use. It was one of the last directives 
needed to reach a complete EC type-approval for trucks and buses, as envisaged by 
the before mentioned 1970 framework directive. The directive is extremely technical in 
nature, setting maximum dimensions and explaining how these should be measured. For 
instance, it stipulates that wipers and taillights do not count towards a vehicle’s length.
The 1997 directive had its origin in a Commission proposal dating back to 1991.2 
Negotiations on this proposal primarily took place in Council working groups, with 
industry playing a key advisory role. Because of the high degree of technical specificity of 
the proposal, technical experts played a key role. Nonetheless, decision-making took some 
six years. This can be explained because issue linkage occurred with the highly conflict-
ridden decision-making process for 1996/53/EC. It proved exceedingly difficult to agree 
on maximum masses for national traffic, due to political resistance and infrastructure 
restrictions (European Commission, 1999b). According to one of the interviewees, it is 
highly doubtful whether full harmonization of vehicle masses will ever be reached.
For the Netherlands, negotiations on 1996/53/EC were carried out by the Government 
Road Transport Agency (Rijksdienst voor het Wegverkeer or RDW). The Netherlands 
was one of the active opponents of harmonizing masses for national traffic, the central 
point of contention for the first directive. After an intensive lobby it succeeded in 
excluding maximum masses from the directive, and it got a transitional provision 
relating to maximum permitted dimensions, which the directive reduced (Transport 
en Logistiek Nederland, 2005). The negotiation situation was altogether different for 
directive 1997/27/EC: here, the Netherlands only had some minor, technical objections 
to the Commission proposal (interview).
Table 24 lists the main elements of directive 97/27/EC. The directive’s key provision 
is article 2, which specifies that no member state may refuse to grant EC type-approval 
or national type-approval of a vehicle type, or prohibit the sale, registration, entry into 
service or use of an individual vehicle, on grounds relating to its masses and dimensions 
if these satisfy the requirements set out in Annex I to the directive. The text refers to 
2  Commission proposal COM(91)23 def.syn 348.
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directive 96/53/EC for the maximum dimensions, operationalizing these for the purpose 
of measurement. Whereas it does not harmonize the masses of vehicles, it does prescribe a 
uniform procedure for measuring a vehicle’s mass which member states have to apply upon 
request by a manufacturer. In addition, Annex I sets out rules for the EC type-approval 
procedure. Finally, the directive contains several highly technical derogations. For instance, 
member states could refuse to grant national type-approval to buses of coaches wider than 
2,50 meter until 31 December 1999 (art. 6).
Table 24 Key elements of directive 97/27/EC
element required or optional discretion
requirements for EC type-approval required no
requirements and definitions for measurement required no
derogations optional yes
The interviewees differed in their views on the quality of the directive. Two interviewees 
indicated that the directive was rather clear. One of them even claimed that it ‘is a classic 
example of a clear directive, as it lists which elements of a vehicle should be included, 
and which ones not.’ These interviewees, though, did not play a central role in the 
transposition process. The insiders, on the other hand, agreed that the directive was far 
from crystal-clear. Two interviewees argued that the directive is mainly complex, and not 
so much ambiguous; one of them claimed that the relationship with directive 96/53/EC 
was particularly hard to understand. Two other interviewees found the directive extremely 
ambiguous. In their view, it was not clear whether or not the requirements set by the 
directive were mandatory or optional for the national type approval. It was clear that 
national approval could not be refused when a vehicle met the directive’s requirements. 
However, the question was whether or not member states could maintain less stringent 
national requirements if so desired. 
In other words, it was unclear whether or not the directive provided for full 
harmonization. This would have been disastrous for Dutch transport companies, as some 
of the directive’s requirements were more restrictive than existing national requirements. 
The directive is internally inconsistent, or at least ambiguous on this point. Recital 6 of 
the preamble stipulates that the directive provides a uniform procedure for determining 
a vehicle’s maximum masses whereas article 4 holds that this procedure is optional. In 
addition, the directive was claimed to be inconsistent with Annex IV of directive 96/53/
EC, which held that EC type-approval would be complete with the adoption of the 
directive on masses and dimensions. If this indeed were the case, the requirements of 
directive 97/27/EC would be mandatory (Staatsblad 2001, 448, p. 7).
What was the goodness of fit with existing Dutch policies and institutions? As for the 
maximum weights and dimensions contained in directive 96/53/EC, there was a rather 
bad policy misfit. This misfit was primarily quantitative in nature, as the new directive 
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set new maximum masses and dimensions. For instance, the maximum allowed width for 
vehicles was set at 2.55 meter, whereas this used to be 2.60 m. in the Netherlands. This 
change was feared to have a disastrous impact on the automotive industry, as it would 
imply that manufacturers and transport companies basically had to shrink their vehicles. 
As one of my interviewees explained, transporters want trucks to be as big as possible, so 
as to fit in a maximum-size load, and manufacturers wanted to continue producing there 
existing vehicle types. As one respondent stated: ‘Shrinking trucks is not fun.’
As for directive 97/27/EC, the picture was different. The problematic new dimensions 
and masses, arising from 96/53/EC, had already been transposed into national law 
(Staatsblad 2001, nr. 448, p. 6). Consequently, ‘the directive did not come as a shock’ to 
the truck and transport business (interview). An exception to this generally good fit were 
some of the provisions of the directive that were stricter than national requirements, mainly 
those corresponding to so-called axle lifts (constructions to lift an axle up and down). 
Dutch legislation had to be adapted as follows. First, in view of the EC certificate for 
masses and dimensions, the directive had to be listed in the Voertuigreglement (Motor 
Vehicles Regulation). This only required a short message in the Government Gazette.3 
Modification of the rules for the national type-approval was more complex. The new 
requirements had to be incorporated into the Motor Vehicles Regulation,4 as producers 
could not be refused national type approval if they fulfilled the requirements of the 
directive. In addition, the new requirements had to be operationalized in a new ministerial 
decree and in three existing ministerial decrees.5 In total, five national measures had to 
be adopted or changed, of which the administrative order amending the Motor Vehicles 
Regulation was central.
Actors
In order to reconstruct the transposition process, the role of the following actors must be 
studied. At the lower level, two actors played a role. The first crucial actor was the Central 
Department of Legal Affairs (Hoofddirectie Juridische Zaken, HDJZ). This department 
was responsible for drafting the measures transposing the directive. Next, the legal 
department had to consult the RDW, the organization responsible for the admission of 
vehicles and their parts, as well as monitoring of manufacturers and vehicles. The RDW 
has the technical expertise necessary to deal with the complicated topic of type-approval. 
3  This already happened on 9 February 1999 (Staatscourant 1999, nr. 43, p. 12). 
4   Administrative order of 19 September 2001, amending the Motor Vehicles Regulation. See Staatsblad 2001, 
448. 
5   These were: the ministerial decree measuring methods (Staatscourant 2001, nr. 194, p. 18); Amendment of 
ministerial decree on admission requirements, ministerial decree on permanent requirements and ministerial 
decree on soundness and road behavior (Staatscourant 220, nr. 160, p. 18). 
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For this reason, it was responsible for carrying out the European negotiations on these 
matters. Relating to transposition, its task was to assess the consequences of transposing 
bills for application and enforcement through so-called implementation assessments 
(uitvoeringstoetsen). Both the legal department and the RDW can be viewed as veto 
players at the lower level, as they had to agree on a text transposing the directive.
When push comes to shove, though, both lower-level players were subordinate to two 
policy divisions, who had the final responsibility over policies in the area of transport, 
namely the Directorate-Generals of Road Haulage (Directoraat-Generaal Goederenvervoer, 
DGG), and of Passenger Transport (Directoraat-Generaal Personenvervoer, DGP). These 
two policy divisions were formally responsible for the policy decisions that are made in 
the field of transport, and were hierarchically superior to the RDW. Also, it is common 
knowledge in the department that the policy divisions stand above the legal department, 
whose role is to translate policy choices made by the policy divisions into legal terms 
(interview). The role of the policy divisions, among other things, was to coordinate and 
control the transposition process. The policy divisions were higher-level coordinators, 
in terms of Steunenberg (2006). In practice, though, the policy divisions played a very 
small role, as they deemed the topic too technical and hence uninteresting.
Also relevant were business organizations with a stake in the topic, such as manufacturers, 
transporters and bus companies. The RDW has the task of consulting relevant business 
organizations about relevant regulatory matters, among which transposition. It does 
so through a special institution, COBR-T6, which meets three to four times a year to 
discuss ongoing concerns in the field of road transport regulation, among which new 
directives and their transposition. This body is composed of representatives of the RDW, 
the ministry, and vehicle manufacturers, organized in FOCWA7 and BOVAG8, and 
transport companies organized in TLN9, EVO10 and RAI.11 However, it is entirely up to 
the RDW to incorporate their suggestions and the interviewees consulted on this point 
agree that consultation in the COBR is generally just a formality. According to one of 
them, ‘The RDW will admit no objection whatsoever.’ As a representative of one of 
the interest groups wryly remarks, ‘I have no idea what they did with our criticisms.’ 
Accordingly, these groups cannot be labeled veritable veto players. 
6   Coordinating Consultation Board Business RDW- Technical matters (Stichting Coördinerend Overleg Bedrijfsle-
ven RDW-Techniek).
7   Dutch Branch Organization of Coach-work, Repair and Related Companies (Nederlandse branche-organisatie 
van carrosserie-, schadeherstel- en aanverwante bedrijven).
8  Association of Motor car, garage and allied traders (Bond van Garagehouders).
9  Transport and Logistics Netherlands (Transport en Logistiek Nederland).
10  Dutch Association of Transport Users and Transport on Own Account (Eigen Vervoersorganisatie).
11  Dutch Association of the Bicycle and Automotive Industries (Rijwiel en Automobiel Industrie Vereniging). 
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Transposition process
The transposition process started at the Legal Division of the Ministry of Transport, where 
a lawyer extremely well versed in transport law, a ‘super specialist’ (interview) drafted the 
first implementing bill. After some 1,5 years of work, he submitted the bill to the RDW 
for the implementation assessment. Soon, though, a serious conflict between the two 
ensued, concerning the policy freedom the directive left. The lawyer who had drawn up the 
transposing measure had worked from the conviction that the directive provided for total 
harmonization and that looser national standards were no longer permitted. Accordingly, he 
had dutifully transposed all requirements listed by the directive as obligatory conditions for 
obtaining national type approval. He argued that the EC type approval was now complete 
and that there could be no question of bypassing the new directive’s requirements. This 
interpretation came as a total surprise to the RDW. It argued that the directive did not 
entail total harmonization, and that member states were free to impose looser requirements 
to obtain national type approval as long as they would not discriminate against vehicles 
that did not meet the stricter requirements (Staatsblad, 2001, nr. 448, p. 7; interview). This 
conflict, involving diametrically opposed interpretations of the directive, proved extremely 
hard to resolve.
In trying to win the conflict, the lawyer gathered evidence to support his point of view. 
He composed a memo containing an advanced legal argument, arguing that the directive 
implied total harmonization. His main argument was that this directive was the last 
directive required to finalize the EC type approval system for trucks and buses and their 
trailers, as indicated by Annex IV to framework directive 92/53/EC. This point of view 
was fiercely disputed by the RDW. Having attended the negotiations, the RDW claimed 
that it knew better and that it had been obvious throughout the decision-making process 
that the directive did only provide for partial harmonization, upholding the possibility 
to maintain looser standards for national type approval. The lawyer denied this point of 
view, maintaining his carefully concocted legal argument against all critique.
The conflict itensified when the lawyer tried to strengthen his position with a 
procedural argument. He stated that the RDW only had an advisory role concerning 
application and enforcement, and that it could not substantively criticize proposals for 
transposition.12 The RDW refused to accept this point of view. As a next attempt to win 
the interpretation battle, the legal officer contacted the European Commission. In the 
hope of attaining authoritative support from that side, he wrote a letter to verify that the 
directive provided for total harmonization. Soon, though, he received a phone call from 
a Commission official, who answered his question in the negative. In July 1999, still not 
12   According to one of the interviewees, this point of view is formally correct, but incorrect in an informal sense, 
as the RDW has such profound knowledge of the directive and the negotiations, that it should play a role in 
the transposition process.
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convinced, he sent a formal letter to the European Commission, carefully stating his 
point of view. Again, the Commission answered that the directive did not make EC type 
approval complete, and that the EC requirements could coexist with national ones. The 
civil servant refused to accept the Commission’s answer, allegedly because it had been 
composed by a civil servant too low in the hierarchy (interview). In the words of another 
interviewee ‘He thought he knew better than the EU lawyers.’
All this time, the policy divisions, who formally should have acted as higher-level 
coordinators, did not intervene. The conflict could not be resolved until the civil servant 
from the legal department was replaced, which happened towards the end of 1999, when 
the deadline had already expired. The new lawyer started work in a completely polarized 
environment. Not knowing much about the legal intricacies of this policy field, he started 
out by hearing the parties involved, and spent half a year scrutinizing the directive. On 
this basis, he concluded that the directive indeed did not entail total harmonization, thus 
siding with the RDW. The result was that the new and stricter requirements would not 
become mandatory, which was good news for the RDW, as well as the transport and 
vehicle business. The new civil servant drafted a new proposal for transposition, which he 
circulated in February 2001. 
In the meantime, though, another problem arose. The RDW and HDJZ realized 
that late transposition could have severe consequences. Whereas on some points the 
directive was stricter than the national requirements, on other points the directive was 
more lenient. The RDW and HDJZ feared that companies would take the government 
to court when these stricter demands stayed in place. Therefore, even though the new 
definitions and measurement techniques had not been laid down into legislation, the 
RDW started to informally apply these looser requirements in practice. Interestingly 
enough, the rules that implied a deterioration for the sector were not applied before 
transposition took place, if at all, as here no lawsuits could be envisaged.
The second stage of the transposition process started on 25 October 2000, when the RDW 
was asked to provide ‘building blocks’ for the new bill. Its main request was not to make the 
new requirements on axle lifts mandatory for national type approval, as these were stricter 
than the existing requirements. This wish was supported by DGG, and incorporated into 
the bill by HDJZ (Communication, 6/11/2000). In February 2001, the resulting bill was 
shortly discussed in COBR-T. The interest groups were asked to submit possible comments 
to DGG before March 16, 2001. However, discussions in this body did not take very long 
According to one of the interviewees, the discussions in COBR-T proceeded rather smoothly, 
as the directive was not a ‘biblical message’, but something the vehicle sector had anticipated 
for a long time. Furthermore, the main problem of axle lifts had been dealt with successfully. 
According to another interviewee, not much attention was paid to the transposition of 
directive 97/27/EC, especially when compared to the highly contentious directive 96/53/
EC. On July 18, a so-called triangle meeting took place between the policy divisions, HDJZ, 
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and the RDW, to discuss transposition once again. Interestingly enough, this new institution 
had been created to prevent future problems between the legal department and RDW, and 
improve the coordination by the policy sections. No problems arose in this stage. Soon, 
the proposal was approved by the Council of State, adopted, and notified to the European 
Commission. Transposition was more than two years late.
Regarding correctness, finally, the evidence from the interviews is mixed. The 
Voertuigreglement and the ministerial decrees under its umbrella comprise three types 
of requirements: requirements for admission into traffic, permanent requirements for 
roadworthiness, and users’ requirements concerning actual use on the road. Whereas 
the first type is enforced by the RDW, the police enforces the latter two. The problem, 
according to two of the interviewees, is that the directive has been transposed into the 
admission requirements13, but not into the permanent and users’ requirements. This is a 
problem, because these requirements also concern masses and dimensions. The police has 
to check whether, for instance, trucks engaged in traffic are not too long. Here, the new 
dimensions of directive 96/53/EC had been implemented, but not the new definitions of 
directive 97/27/EC. The police therefore still applies the old rules. In practice, this leads 
to great confusion among policemen and drivers. The main problem is that directive 
97/27/EC holds that lifting platforms with a maximum of 20 cm do not count towards 
the length of a vehicle. However, the police still includes these when measuring the length 
of a vehicle. Recently, as a solution to this problem the police has agreed to informally 
use the new rules, but these lack a clear legal basis in the Voertuigreglement. Another 
interviewee, though, denies that transposition is incorrect, arguing that the police has to 
use the new rules as contained in a ministerial decree under the administrative order.
Table 25 Timeline for transposition of directive 97/27/EC
year date EU-level transposition process
1997 22 July directive adopted
1999 25 March consultation RDW
2 July response HDJZ
6 July response RDW
22 July deadline
26 July letter to European Commission
winter civil servant replaced
2000 25 October consultation RDW
2001 21 February bill circulated to sector
12 April consultation RDW on bill 
7 June draft to minister
12 June draft to government
13 June consultations in COBR-T
6 July draft to Council of State
18 July triangle meeting (RDW, DGG, DGP)
30 August approval by Council of State
19 September adopted1
22 October notification to European Commission
13   The main transposing instrument was the ministerial decree under the Voertuigreglement (Staatscourant, 8 Oc-
tober 2001, nr. 194, p. 18).
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   136 05-03-2007   15:53:29
Chapter 8 Trucks versus transport operators

8.2 Access to the profession of road haulage operator
The freedom of transport is one of the key building blocks of the common European 
market. Traditionally, international transport was regulated by European states, through 
a system transport rights bartering. This system was costly and inefficient, and has 
gradually given way to a regime regulating the quality rather than the quantity of 
European transport. A cornerstone of the new road transport policy is a set of directives 
that regulate access to the profession of transport operator. 
The three directives regulating access to the profession14 aim at the abolition of quantitative 
restrictions on intra-community transport. They harmonize the qualitative criteria for road 
transport undertakings (Mason, 2003, 6) by regulating the mutual recognition of diplomas, 
and by specifying the conditions a prospective transport operator needs to fulfill to run a 
company in the field of road haulage and passenger transport. In 1996, these directives were 
codified into directive 96/26/EC. The system laid down by this directive works as follows: 
if a person wants to start a transport company, he or she must request a permit from the 
national authorities, which is granted if certain requirements are fulfilled. These requirements 
concern good repute, financial standing, and professional competence. Diplomas granted in 
the various member states must be mutually accepted. Thus someone with, say, an Italian 
diploma, could in principle start a transport undertaking in any other member state.
Despite the increased harmonization of the criteria that needed to be fulfilled, the 
Commission felt that the market had not been integrated sufficiently. The criteria still differed 
greatly between the member states, particularly concerning the financial requirements, 
the level of the courses, and the difficulty of the exams. The Commission argued that this 
invited unfair competition, and would lead to a deregulatory race to the bottom. The mutual 
recognition of diplomas, which already existed, led to ‘diploma tourism’, which meant that 
people wishing to start a transport company went to ‘easy’ countries such as the UK to get 
a diploma, which then had to be accepted in their home country (European Commission, 
1993b, 20). In addition, the Commission was concerned about the safety on the road. For 
these reasons, in 1997, the European Commission filed a proposal to amend directive 96/26/
EC. 15 The proposal aimed at tighter harmonization and stricter requirements.16
14   These are: Directive 74/561/EEC on admission to the occupation of road haulage operators (as amended 
by directives 80/1178EEC, 85/578/EEC, and 89/438/EEC), Directive 74/562/EEC on admission to the 
occupation of road passenger transport operator (as amended by Directives 80/1179/EEC, 85/579/EEC, and 
89/438/EEC), and Directive 77/796/EC concerning the mutual recognition of diplomas (as amended by 
directives 80/1180/EEC and 89/438/EEC). 
15  COM(97)25
16   Two interviewees deny that fair competition and road safety where the real grounds for proposing the direc-
tive. Instead they claim that most member states, as well as the established transport companies sought to 
shield the market against newcomers by erecting high qualitative and financial barriers, while protecting the 
established businesses. One argument given for this view is that it makes no sense to regulate safety on the 
road by prescribing better educating for transport operators, as they do not endanger road safety, having an 
office job.
Mastenbroek_totaal_v4.indd   137 05-03-2007   15:53:29

Chapter 8 Trucks versus transport operators
The Netherlands wholeheartedly embraced the Commission proposal, supporting 
the aim for stricter requirements for transport operators (Parliamentary Papers II 
1997/98, 21501-09, nr. 73, p. 3). In the 1990s, the Netherlands was being plagued by 
diploma tourism, as many prospective Dutch transport operators obtained diplomas 
in ‘easy’ countries such as the UK (interview). Allegedly, the Ministry of Transport 
actively lobbied for the directive, and ‘even went to the European Commission to 
make its case’ (interview). 
The Netherlands’ main concern was to improve the standards of professional 
competence, as the Netherlands had strict requirements and relatively demanding 
exams. It thus wanted to protect its own operators and make an end to diploma 
tourism. Together with Finland and Ireland, the Netherlands pressed for a derogation 
to impose supplementary exams on those who got their qualifications in other member 
states (House of Lords Select Committee on European Communities, Session 1997/98, 
Eleventh Report). The Dutch allegedly bargained very hard with the UK on this point. 
They ended up getting a three-year derogation with a possible prolongation of five 
years.17 Finally, the Netherlands wanted to secure higher financial requirements, but 
did not succeed in this respect.
The European Parliament was quite positive about the directive. It only proposed 
some amendments to improve the quality of the directive, among which were clear 
definitions of the terms ‘capital’ and ‘financial service’. However, as the directive was 
adopted on the basis of the cooperation procedure, the Council needed not take into 
account Parliament’s amendments- and did not do so. The directive was adopted on 1 
October 1998, and had to be transposed within only one year.
Contents
The main goal of the directive was to harmonize the criteria for access to the profession 
of road transport operator in national and international transport (see table 26 for an 
overview). According to the majority of the interviewees, the directive modified the 
existing directive 96/26/EC only slightly (for an overview see Mason, 2003). To begin 
with, the scope of the directive was extended to smaller vehicles. Second, the condition of 
good repute was made more stringent, as the directive added environmental protection 
and professional liability as requirements. Also new was the rule that a permit must 
be withdrawn when a serious offence is committed, instead of a serious and repeated 
offence. Third, regarding professional competence, the content and organization of the 
courses and exams was elaborated, and a three-year restriction on diploma tourism was 
added. Fourth, the financial threshold for access to the profession was raised: transport 
17  The derogation was not prolonged.
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undertakings now were to have reserves of at least € 9.000 for the first vehicle, and € 
5.000 for each additional one. Finally, the directive contained some new provisions on 
enforcement, namely that regular checks were to be held every five years, so as to verify 
whether transport companies still fulfilled the criteria mentioned.
Table 26 Key elements of directive 98/76/EC
topic element required or optional discretion
scope -  extended to smaller carriers required no
good repute -  environmental protection and professional 
liability
- ‘repeated’ dropped
required disputed
financial standing - higher threshold required disputed
professional competence -  content and organization of courses and exams
-  three years restriction to diploma tourism
required
optional
no
enforcement - verification every five years required no
The quality of the directive was meager. According to some of the interviewees, the 
directive contained several vague and ill-defined words and phrases. As to good repute, 
it was not clear what was meant by ‘serious offences’ and whether an administrative 
fine also counted as a conviction. Concerning financial standing, it was not stipulated 
whether or not loans also count as ‘capital and reserves’, which led to confusion during 
the transposition process. Also, some interviewees claim that it was not entirely clear 
whether or not the directive provided for full harmonization of the financial threshold. 
Article 1, section 3, second hyphen, stipulates: ‘The undertaking must have available 
capital and reserves of at least € 9000 when only one vehicle is used and at least € 
5000 for each additional vehicle.’ It was not clear whether the word ‘at least’ referred 
to the sums mentioned or to the levels set by the member states. In other words, were 
these sums meant as a minimum that member states could go above if wanted, or as a 
harmonized minimum for the undertakings in all member states?
The interviewees agree that overall, the goodness of fit with existing legislation was 
rather good. Only some technical adaptations of the existing legislation were required. 
The Netherlands already had extensive rules for professional competence in place, 
as well as a financial threshold higher than the one prescribed by the directive. The 
only new point was the condition of good repute. As said, the directive listed two new 
grounds for withdrawal of a permit, and dropped the word ‘repeated’. Whereas some 
interviewees claimed that the Netherlands already complied with this point, others hold 
that this implied a large misfit for the Netherlands, as the existing points system that 
implemented the existing provisions on good repute was based on the notion of repeated 
offences. On the basis of the points system, a permit could only be withdrawn after a 
company had committed serious and repeated offences. Therefore, there was a serious 
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policy misfit. Possibly, the respondents did not acknowledge this because this misfit was 
played down during the transposition process. Finally, it must be remarked that the 
present government wants to decrease the level of regulation as much as possible, which 
indicates that political preferences may outweigh a policy misfit.  
Transposition of the directive required changes in two administrative orders in the 
fields of road haulage and passenger transport, and two ministerial decrees that further 
specify the rules concerning financial standing and good repute for road haulage. In 
addition, the new rules had to be operationalized by various functional agencies, which 
will be discussed below. For road haulage alone, six national measures needed to be 
changed or adopted to transpose the directive.
Actors
Already during the negotiations, a project group was formed to transpose the directive (see 
figure 14). That is, actually this group was established to carry out a revision of the Road 
Haulage Act (Wet Goederenvervoer over de Weg). Initially, the plan was to deregulate the whole 
sector, and to use the prospective directive as an input into this process, as this set minimum 
standards. However, when in 1998 social democrat Netelenbos became Minister of Transport, 
the plans changed, as she was less enthusiastic about deregulation than her liberal predecessor 
Jorritsma. The working group then started work on transposition.
The working group consisted of representatives from the relevant policy divisions of the 
ministry, the directorate-generals of Road Haulage and Passenger Transport. Around 1997, 
people from the Central Department of Legal Affairs were added to the group, both those 
responsible for road haulage and passenger transport. Formally, again, the two policy divisions 
were veto players. Yet, the decision-making setup was not entirely parallel to that of directive 
97/27/EC, as only one level of decision-making was involved. The policy divisions were 
involved from the start. For this reason, the legal department played a weaker role than in 
the previous case. It cannot be labeled a veto player, as the policy departments decided, when 
push came to shove; they bore the substantive responsibility.
Furthermore, there were no other veritable veto players. The National Transport 
Inspectorate18 was frequently involved, receiving communications and attending meetings. 
The same held for the National and International Road Haulage Organization (NIWO)19. 
This independent administrative body is the Dutch licensing authority for road haulage 
companies. NIWO did not form part of the working group, but it was involved throughout the 
process. It played a role translating the transposed directive into workable policy guidelines for 
application and enforcement A similar position was held by the two foundations responsible 
18  Rijksverkeersinspectie or RVI, the prospective implementer of the directive in the field of passenger transport.
19   National and International Road transport Organization (Nationale en Internationale Wegvervoer Organisatie)
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for taking exams in the field of transport, the SEP20 for passenger transport, and the SBE21 
for road haulage. These were responsible for incorporating the new requirements into their 
internal regulations. All of these organizations played a secondary role, being responsible for 
translating the main lines of the new measures into operational guidelines. Therefore they 
cannot be called veritable veto players.
Figure 14 Composition of the project team (directive 98/76/EC)
Road haulage section
Legal affairs department
(road haulage specialist)
project team
NIWO
(responsible for application)
SBE
(responsible for application)
Passenger transport section
Legal affairs department
(passenger transp. specialist)
RVI 
(responsible for application)
SEP
(responsible for application)
Several interest groups in the field of road haulage and passenger transport played a 
role in the process. For road haulage, the relevant groups were the trade unions FNV 
Bondgenoten22 and Bedrijvenbond CNV23, and business organizations TLN24, KNV25, and 
EVO26. For passenger transport, these were KNV Taxi, KNV Busvervoer, and Mobis. All 
these groups were consulted formally at the time the first measure had been drafted, 
when the draft was sent tot the so-called Consultative Bodies for Road Haulage and 
Passenger Transport.27 These are two advisory boards, relating to road haulage and 
passenger transport. Also, for road haulage these groups were involved in meetings 
organized by the NIWO, where the transposing measures were further elaborated into 
workable guidelines.
Notwithstanding their formal involvement, it follows from the interviews that the 
interest groups cannot be labeled veritable veto players. The policy divisions had the 
final responsibility for the policy area concerned. Furthermore, they are claimed not to 
have taken much interest in the directive, as it did not differ so much from the existing 
situation. The saliency for the interest groups was rather low. In the field of passenger 
20  Foundation for exams in Passenger Transport (Stichting Examens Personenvervoer).
21   Foundation for Examens in Professional Transport (Stichting Bureau Examens voor het Beroepsvervoer).
22  Dutch Trade Union Federation (Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging).
23  National Federation of ChristianTrade Unions (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond).
24  Transport and Logistics Netherlands (Transport en Logistiek Nederland).
25  Royal Dutch Transport (Koninklijk Nederlands Vervoer).
26   Dutch Association of Transport Users and Transport on Own Account (Eigen Vervoersorganisatie).
27  Overlegorganen Goederenvervoer and Personenvervoer or OGB & OGP.
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transport there were no differences of opinion to speak of. In the field of road haulage, 
the five groups were divided on several counts: while KNV and EVO generally favored 
liberalization, the three others wanted stricter regulation than prescribed by the directive. 
Accordingly, the ministry felt free to do what it deemed best (interview). Also, an 
interviewee remarks that the minister decides after all. All things considered, discussion 
on the directive was mainly an internal matter, taking place among the policy divisions 
and the legal department.
The transposition process
The transposition process consisted of three key stages.28 The first stage occurred at the Ministry 
of Transport, where the project group drafted the transposing legislation. The lawyers were 
responsible for the real drafting and the policy experts from DGG and DGP for substantive 
guidance. The second stage took place in the advisory boards. Consultation did not lead to 
any problems, as the established business organizations very much favored the new directive, 
hoping to fight the ‘bunglers that got easy diplomas abroad’. The third stage took place in the 
NIWO, which further detailed the legal provisions, making them suitable for application in 
specific cases. For instance, it further developed the financial requirements, specifying how 
exactly a prospective transport manager must prove he or she has the required financial means 
at his disposal. Such specifications were laid down in policy guidelines. These discussions here 
were mainly operational in nature, staying within the bounds given by the formal transposing 
measures. This part of the process will therefore not be discussed any further.
The first step of the transposition process was fairly politicized. The interviewees agree 
that the process revolved around three main issues. The main issue concerned the new 
requirements for good repute. Previously, this requirement had been transposed by means of 
a so-called points system. Transport operators were given penalty points four offences against 
good repute, such as violations of the rules on driving times. After gathering a certain number 
of points, NIWO could withdraw a transport operator’s permit. In reality, though, the system 
did not work. Because of privacy legislation, the courts refused to pass information on offences 
to the NIWO. The NIWO was hence unable to apply the points system to withdraw permits. 
Furthermore, breaches of employment conditions, as specified by directive 96/26/EC, do not 
fall under criminal law, but under civil law. Breaches of employment conditions hardly ever 
are reported, as most employees are reluctant to file a lawsuit against their employer.
The ministry’s legal department thus recommended replacing the points system with 
a new system. They proposed that the judges themselves could be made responsible for 
withdrawing permits. However, there was much resistance to this view. To begin with, the 
28   The following discussion will focus on the process for 1998/76, as there is less information on the transposi-
tion process for passenger transport, due to personnel changes at the ministry.
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established transport businesses were not particularly keen on a new system, as they were 
averse to increasing the risks of losing their permit. According to one of the interviewees, ‘the 
points system was initially designed with the knowledge that it would not work anyway.’ The 
main interest of the industry was to keep out unwanted competition, while protecting its 
own position. On the other side of the spectrum, the trade union FNV wanted a good and 
effective system to protect drivers against bad employers. The views of the policy sections 
diverged. Initially, the directorate-general for road initially did not want a better system, 
fearing negative publicity for the minister. Later, it changed its opinion, indicating that it 
wanted to meet the FNV’s wishes. However, it was opposed by the directorate-general for 
passenger transport, which did not want a better system. After intense internal discussions, 
no solution could be found and it was decided to maintain the ineffective system.
A related issue concerning good repute was that directive 98/76/EC speaks of ‘serious 
offences’, whereas directive 96/26/EC speaks of ‘repeated and serious offences’. However, 
the notion of repetition was the building block of the points system. As article 34 of the 
Road Haulage Decree (Besluit goederenvervoer over de weg) stipulates, a road haulage 
operator does no longer comply with the criteria of good repute if, in a three years period, 
he is repeatedly convicted of serious offences. Therefore, officials from the legal department 
argued that the system had to be modified. The policy divisions did not support this wish. 
The lawyers composed several memos, explaining why this went against the directive, but 
the relevant policy expert decided that the existing positions would suffice for ‘Brussels’.
Another issue concerned the threshold for financial standing. As said, the directive raised 
the amounts required to start a transport undertaking to € 9.000 for the first, and € 5.000 
for each additional truck. Yet the Netherlands wished to maintain its higher threshold of € 
18.000. This implied that for companies with one truck, the Dutch criteria were higher than 
those of the directive. There was great consensus among the policy departments, businesses 
and the trade unions that this was desirable, so as to keep out unwanted newcomers. The 
legal department, however, maintained that the directive did not allow for this possibility. 
They argued that the phrase ‘at least’ related to the amount of capital to be held by the 
undertaking, and not to the level of the threshold set by the member states.
Eventually, the greatest part of the directive was transposed in time, as the 
administrative order amending the existing administrative orders in the fields of road 
haulage and passenger transport entered into force on 1 October 1999 (Staatsblad, 
1999, 352). However, when the deadline expired, several loose ends remained. First, 
a ministerial decree further specifying the rules on financial standing had to be brought 
into accordance with the directive. This happened in time (Staatscourant, 1999, nr. 180, 
p. 9.), but as turned out later a technical mistake had been made with the amounts, which 
was corrected more than two years later (Staatscourant, 11 december 2001, nr. 240, p. 
18). Second, on 3 May 2000 a further ministerial decree was adopted to change the rules 
concerning good repute, incorporating the new provisions from the directive concerning 
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professional liability and environmental protection (Staatscourant, 3 May 2000, nr. 86, p. 
19). Finally, when in 2002 the possibility of requesting supplementary exams from foreign 
transport managers was not extended, the corresponding provision had to be dropped from 
the relevant ministerial decrees. This happened on 30 September 2002.
A point that was disputed by the various interviewees concerns the correctness of 
transposition. Of the nine interviewees addressing this issue, only two interviewees 
are convinced that transposition was complete and correct. The others indicated that 
there were problems with the provisions for good repute, as these still implied repeated 
offences. Another problem concerned the continued infeasibility of the points system, 
as set out above. The old system did not work, but no new system was devised either. In 
addition, whereas the directive specifies that a permit be held by a person, the penalty 
points were given to the company, as a legal entity. Hence it is impossible to withdraw 
a permit in these cases, as was the outcome of a court case in 2000.29 Another point of 
criticism concerns the NIWO’s guideline that a road haulage operator must continuously 
and effectively manage the transport undertaking from the place at which the company 
is based. In 2005, a transport company filed a lawsuit against the NIWO, which was 
forced by the court30 to drop this requirement, stipulating that transport undertakings 
could also be managed from abroad. 
Table 27 Timeline for transposition of directive 98/76/EC
year date EU-level transposition process
1998 1-10 directive adopted
11-11 first meeting project team
1999 22-1 discussion in consultative bodies (OGV & OPV)
29-1 consultation NIWO
2-2 legal check Ministry of Justice
2-2 opinion OGV
16-2 opinion OPV
12-3 government
1999 8-4 to Council of State
29-6 advice Council of State
16-7 further report (in response to Council of State)
6-8 draft adopted
1-10 deadline entry into force administrative order and ministerial decree (financial standing)
5-11 notification
2000 3-5 modification of ministerial decree (good repute)
2001 11-12 modification of ministerial decree (financial standing)
2002 30-9 change in two ministerial decrees (supplementary exams abolished) 
29  College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven, 19 July 2000, nrs. AWB 99/515 and AWB 99-536.
30  College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven, 3 March 2005, nr. AWB 04/409 S1.
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8.3 Analysis
In contrast to the previous chapter, it is not necessary to make a specific comparison of 
the durations of the two cases. As emerged from the discussion of the late transposition 
of the directive on masses and dimensions, the delay was primarily caused by problems 
in the first drafting stage. After the second draft was circulated to the sector and the 
RDW, it took another two months before it was sent to the Council of State. This period 
is comparable to the time needed for the directive on access to the profession. Also, 
afterwards there were no striking delaying factors in the case of directive 97/27/EC. The 
key to the two-year delay must hence lie in the first drafting period. What differences can 
we identify between the first stages of the two transposition processes?
First, the cases illustrate the limited explanatory value of the goodness of fit. Whereas 
the fit for directive 97/27/EC was relatively good, directive 98/76/EC fit very badly with 
existing policies, especially on the point of good repute. So there is no clear link between 
the fit and timeliness. At the same time, there seems to be a relationship with correctness, 
as transposition of 98/76/EC was incorrect regarding good repute, which was exactly 
the ill-fitting point. Upon closer inspection this relationship turns out to be spurious. 
The underlying variable seems to be the political preferences of the minister in charge. 
In 1998, when Netelenbos (PvdA) was Minister of Transport, a move was made towards 
stricter regulation of the transport sector. The current government, however, highly values 
deregulation. Under Minister Peijs (CDA), the ministry has been working on a proposal 
to revise the Law on Road Haulage (Wet Goederenvervoer over de Weg). The minister’s 
goal has been to roll back the regulative framework for transport companies as much as 
possible, doing away with the rules that go beyond the directive’s minimum (interview). 
For instance, the ministry wants to lower the financial threshold to the minimum set by 
the directive, and increase the weight above which the criteria apply. More importantly, 
the ministry proposed to do away with the points system altogether, which would mean 
that the requirements of the directive are no longer complied with at all.31 In conclusion, 
this case shows that the goodness of fit does not have a logical bearing on smooth and 
continued compliance, because political preferences may change over time.
Turning towards the legal-administrative explanations, the delay may have been the 
result of a lack of administrative capacity. In the case of directive 97/27/EC, the legal 
civil servant spent almost two years drafting the transposing measure. After this had 
been criticized by the RDW, he spent another three months composing his response. 
At that time, there was only one legal officer with the expertise required to transpose 
type approval directives, and he was allegedly overworked. At the same time, one of the 
respondents familiar with the situation at the department argues that it was not so much 
31  An interviewee from FNV bondgenoten already indicated that it would lodge a complaint with the European 
Commission if the points system were abolished altogether.
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a lack of capacity, but a matter of perfectionism. The civil servant concerned used to 
spend at least one and a half year on each proposal for transposition, without consulting 
interested parties. He would then produce a beautifully consistent, but hermetically sealed 
text. This would not necessarily lead to delay, as other directives were transposed in time 
nonetheless. In the case of 97/27/EC, though, this practice infuriated the RDW so much 
that they reacted with a 20-page response. By itself, though, a lack of administrative 
capacity cannot explain the observed difference in durations.
The quality of the directives cannot explain the observed difference in timeliness 
either, as both directives were reported to be highly ambiguous. Besides, in the case of 
97/27/EC the problems continued even after the European Commission had given a 
clear interpretation of the directive. The analysis bears out that the degree of ambiguity 
is not a given fact, but a highly subjective characteristic. It is striking that lawyers more 
often find directives ambiguous than policy experts, who ‘see what they want to see’ in 
directives, depending on the political preferences held by the minister in office (interview). 
Ambiguity especially seems to play a role when it comes to ascertaining the level of policy 
discretion. In both cases, policy experts and lawyers debated the degree of harmonization 
provided for by the directive. However, such ambiguity does not necessarily lead to delay, 
as we have seen for the issue of financial standing in the case of directive 98/76/EC, in 
the case of which the policy department simply decided that it wanted to go further than 
the directive prescribed.
The complexity of the transposition process does not offer a satisfactory explanation 
either, as transposition of the directive on access to the profession was much more 
complex, as two policy divisions were involved, and legislation in these two policy areas 
had to be revised. In the field of road haulage only, six measures needed to be adopted 
or changed, which exceeds the five measures needed for masses and dimensions- three of 
which could be combined into one and the same decree.
On the face of it, the existence of Chinese walls seems a more relevant explanation for the 
difference in duration, as this hypothesis focuses on communication problems between 
negotiators and lawyers. At the same time, the mechanism underlying the Chinese walls 
hypothesis is rather benign in nature, stressing uncertainty and unintended consequences. 
The argument is that, when the lawyers are not involved in decision-making, transposition 
may be problematic due to problems of interpretation or unforeseen legal consequences 
of a directive. This view is voiced by one of the lawyers interviewed, who indicates that it 
would help to be involved in the negotiations: ‘You could ask for information, context, 
background, so that you can better interpret the directive.’ Yet, in the two cases, the 
problems between HDJZ and the policy divisions were less benign. The problem was not 
one of uncertainty or unintended consequences, but of continued differences of opinion. 
In the masses and dimensions case, the responsible civil servant maintained his legalistic 
interpretation of the directive even after the European Commission had turned it down. 
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Moreover, in the case of 98/76/EC, the problems did not so much arise because the 
legal officers involved had not attended the negotiations, but because they maintained a 
different view of how transposition should be done. Moreover, the fact that the points 
system did not work was already known during the negotiations, as it was designed with 
a view to infeasibility. A lack of anticipation did not play a role here. Then how can we 
explain the conflicts that occurred between negotiators and lawyers in both cases?
First, it must be stressed that again, IR constructivism is not useful for explaining 
the difference in duration between the two transposition processes. Both processes were 
characterized by conflicts between groups with different normative views of how the 
directive should be transposed, which goes against the expectation that national norms 
exist. Another problem that arises concerns the scope condition that Dimitrova and 
Rhinard’s (2005) theory does not apply to technical directives. Both directives were fairly 
technical, but at the same time various actors held diverging views. Since it is hard to 
imagine a directive that is more technical than the one on masses and dimensions, it can 
be questioned whether this scope condition of technicality should be maintained.
IR rationalism, for its part, performs worse than in the case of the internal market 
directive analyzed in the previous chapter. That is, the Netherlands supported the 
proposals for both directives. Like the biotech case, the masses and dimensions case 
shows that the unitary actor assumption central to IR rationalism is problematic when 
different actors are involved in the stages of decision-making and transposition. That 
is, when different sets of actors control the two stages, a member state’s position in 
decision-making does not predict a member state’s position in transposition, even if in 
both processes a transitive preference ordering at the aggregate level exists. It hence seems 
more suitable to adopt a multiple actor view.
Rational choice institutionalism describes decision-making as a process for aggregating 
substantive preferences into a particular outcome. Evidence for the bargaining hypotheses, 
is mixed. The number of measures needed for transposition was similar for the two 
directives, and can hence not explain the observed difference in durations. The players’ 
flexibility, cannot explain the difference in outcome either. In both cases, the legal officials 
involved and the policy divisions were highly inflexible, not willing to compromise their 
position. The difference between the cases was that the resulting deadlock lasted long for 
the masses and dimensions case, whereas it was inconsequential for the second case, in 
which the legal department did not have a veto position and therefore had to yield.
On the face of it, the coordination model seems highly appropriate to analyze the two 
transposition processes. However, it cannot explain the delay that occurred in 97/27/EC, 
as this conflict cannot be captured in terms of substantive preferences. Instead, it took 
place at the meta-level. The debate concerned the role of RDW, with HDJZ refusing 
to accept the RDW as a veto player. In addition, the two parties debated endlessly on 
another meta-level issue, namely the size of the set of sustainable policies. Rather than 
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taking a substantive policy preference, the legal official argued that the set was much 
smaller than believed by the RDW, thus implying that looser national requirements were 
out of the question. 
In the case of 98/76/EC, something similar occurred. Rather than having a substantive 
preference for devising a new and effective points system, the lawyers believed that a new 
system was simply required, because the old system fell outside the scope of sustainable 
policies. In this respect, it is very interesting to see that the policy department argued 
that the Commission would not go after the Netherlands, as it would look ‘good enough’ 
for Brussels. The conflict took place at the meta-level. The same holds for the issue of 
financial requirements: much of the debate concerned the question of whether or not 
harmonization of the financial amounts was complete or minimal. The coordination 
model hence is not adequate for analyzing the difference in timeliness. An important 
scope condition for the model to apply is that the set of sustainable policies is known.
How about deliberative theory? To begin with, the degree of insulation is not capable of 
explaining the difference in timeliness, as none of the cases received newspaper coverage 
at all. Interest groups scrutinized both directives intensively. Finally, a Google search 
yielded 70 results for the professional competence directive, and 89 for the one on masses 
and dimensions. Hence insulation cannot explain the difference in timeliness.
How about the discourse quality of the two processes? In the case of 97/27/EC, 
discourse quality was very low. When it comes to the openness of participation, the 
RDW felt aggrieved by a lack of involvement in the drafting stage, and by the minimalist 
interpretation of its advisory role provided by the lawyers of HDJZ. Vice versa, that lawyer 
most probably felt aggrieved by the fact that he was not consulted during negotiations. 
Several people from the legal service express their annoyance about the fact that the RDW 
dominated the negotiations, without involving the lawyers. Furthermore, there seems to 
be an important problem with the respect towards counterarguments, as the legal officer 
brushed aside the interpretations of the European Commission that went against his 
own point of view. Also, the RDW breached the maxim of justification, claiming that 
it knew better because it had attended the negotiations. In addition, the fierce clash of 
personalities that occurred implied that the process was far from constructive. As several 
interviewees report, after a while the two sides were not even on speaking terms, which 
made arguing impossible. 
In the case of 98/76/EC, the discourse quality was reported to be rather low for the 
field of road haulage. Here, the lawyers also complained about their lack of involvement 
in the negotiations. As became clear from the interviews, this is a more general problem 
at the ministry. As one interviewee remarks rather pitifully: ‘They don’t let me join them. 
(…) The good ones inform us, but often they even forget that. Involving the lawyers is 
simply not the habit at Transport.’ On the other side of the spectrum, a policy officer 
complains: ‘They even want to join us to Brussels! They would prefer to constantly sit 
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next to you, to sit on your chair. (But) policy isn’t made by lawyers.’ Second, concerning 
respect towards counterarguments, the carefully argued memos written by the legal 
officer to defend his views of the issues of good repute and financial standing were not 
considered seriously by the policy officers. None of the interviewees on that side even 
remembered reading them. Finally, personalities are also reported to have clashed here, 
and the process hence was far from constructive.
The two directives hence score similarly low on discourse quality. This leads to 
the following puzzle: why was transposition timely for the one, and not for the other 
directive? An important scope condition seems to be with hierarchical intervention. 
Numerous interviewees reported that turf wars diminish at higher levels in the hierarchy. 
In the case of directive 97/27/EC, transposition was stalled because the responsible 
policy department, Road Haulauge, did not intervene. As was indicated by five of the 
seven interviewees, its role was highly unsatisfactory. The division did not intervene 
in the conflict, allegedly because it did not understand the technical complexities of 
the directive, and because the topic had low political priority. It was claimed to have 
lacked leadership and expertise. The conflict hence remained at a lower level, instead 
of being solved higher up in the hierarchy. In contrast, transposition of 98/76/EC was 
timely because the policy divisions were involved from the start. Even though the legal 
officials tried to persuade them that the points system needed to be abolished and the 
financial threshold needed to be lowered, the former did not have the formal power to 
push through their point. The policy divisions played an adequate role in coordination 
and control, as opposed to the masses and dimensions case. As there were no conflicts to 
speak of between the two policy divisions, transposition was timely.
The cases also show an additional factor that aggravates problems with discourse 
quality, namely the different images of transposition held by lawyers and policy officers. 
In both cases, arguing was made hard by the fact that the policy experts and lawyers spoke 
different ‘languages’ and had different views of the transposition duty in general. The 
lawyers generally take great pride in honestly interpreting the directive and its contents. 
In the words of one of the interviewees: ‘As lawyers we are trained to be perfectionists. 
We often have almost theological discussions about those directives, aiming at getting 
it completely right. We do so out of professional skill and pride.’ It is striking that the 
interviewees from the legal department generally do not speak of ‘issues’ or ‘conflicts’ 
in the transposition process, but rather of ‘problems’, understood as ambiguities arising 
from the directive, and differences in understanding.  Along these lines, the policy experts 
see the lawyers as self-perceived guardians of the law, somewhat out of touch with the 
real world, interpreting directives far too strictly and perfectionist. As a policy expert 
remarks, ‘They want to do it too well and too accurately.’ Another interviewee remarks 
that the lawyers should take a more acquiescent stance, and merely translate policy ideas 
into legislation.
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Vice versa, the lawyers complain that the policy experts are too lenient when it comes 
to EC law. National political objectives are deemed central by policy experts, and are 
thought to take primacy over EC law. Allegedly, policy experts will go to great lengths to 
dodge unwelcome directives, and lawyers are expected to assist them in doing so. This 
is acknowledged by one of the policy experts, who acclaims that transposition may be 
difficult ‘when we have ideas that run counter to a directive’. The problem, according 
to a lawyer, is that in the end, ministers can ‘score’ with national policies, but not with 
transposition. It hence seems that policy experts on the one hand and lawyers on the 
other hand, have incompatible normative views of transposition. That is, the underlying 
standards of appropriateness held by the two groups seem to diverge. The policy experts 
take a rather political stance, viewing transposition as secondary to national politics, and 
finding it legitimate to dodge EC law if called for. The lawyers, however, generally are 
committed to legal purity and perfectionism, attaching primacy to the implementation 
duty of member states.
Finally, as the interviews bore out, the problems between the legal department 
and policy divisions are more than an idiosyncratic cause of delay. As six of the eight 
interviewees indicated, transposition problems are regularly caused by conflicts between 
policy experts and lawyers. Whereas some interviewees were rather neutral in their 
wording, others were more outspoken, sketching a situation of trench war, or of two 
different tribes coexisting. One of them even estimated that a quarter of the delays are 
caused by such conflicts. It also must be noted, though, that the legal department is 
internally divided on its role vis-à-vis the policy departments. Whereas one group of 
lawyers takes a very legalistic and perfectionist stance, attaching primary importance 
to the rule of EC law, another group agrees that political considerations should take 
primacy over legal concerns. One of the interviewees belonging to the latter group holds 
held that it is the role of legal officers to ‘help out “policy” by conceiving of tricks’. 
How about the conflict with the RDW, though, which delayed transposition of 
97/27/EC? This seems not an idiosyncratic finding either, as the interviewees agree that 
the difficult relationship between the ministry and the RDW is a notorious cause of 
transposition problems. Allegedly, the key problem is that all technical expertise is with 
the RDW, while the policy sections do not play a clear, supervisory role. A couple of years 
ago, the legal department has tried to mitigate this problem by organizing regular ‘triangle 
meetings’ between the policy divisions, the legal department, and the RDW. According to 
one interviewee, these meetings have indeed solved the problem, as problems are solved 
much faster. Other interviewees, however, claim that the meetings do not function well, 
as the policy sections still do not take a real interest in transposition.
Chapter 8 Conclusion
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9 Conclusion
9.1 Quantitative results
The first goal of this study was to assess the size of the transposition deficit for the 
Netherlands. Whereas the European Commission’s scoreboards suggest that the Dutch 
perform rather well in transposing directives, the data I gathered suggest otherwise. From 
a quantitative analysis of all directives enacted between 1995 and 1999, the Netherlands 
has a serious problem with timely transposition. Almost 60% of the directives were 
transposed late, and these delays have amounted to several years. Moreover, the problem 
with timeliness seems to be structural, in that the Dutch record has not improved 
considerably since the late 1970s. Put simply, the Netherlands has a structural and serious 
problem with timely transposition.1
The second question this study addressed is how to explain differences in the 
timeliness of the transposition. It started out by setting out the Dutch governmental 
discourse on transposition, as it developed over time. Since the late 1970s, the Dutch 
have tried to brush up their transposition record. Central to these efforts has been the 
self-image of being seriously committed to compliance. Subsequent Dutch governments 
have a self-image of perfectionist compliance, which at times goes wrong due to legal and 
administrative problems. The reasons they have given for transposition delays are rather 
benign in nature, such as short deadlines, the length of the legislative procedure, capacity 
problems, and the low quality of directives.
The Dutch discourse has close parallels to the first wave of transposition research, 
which flourished in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Scholarship in this period lacked 
strong theoretical frameworks, combining insights from implementation research, 
public administration, and legal studies. Just like the Dutch governments over time have 
done, most of this literature portrayed compliance as a rather apolitical process, which 
at times grinds to a halt due to legal or administrative complexities. Specifically, authors 
in this first wave of scholarship referred to factors such as tight deadlines, the low quality 
of many directives, legal complexity of transposition processes, and so-called ‘Chinese 
walls’: strong dividing lines between negotiators and lawyers.
The Dutch discourse and the first wave of academic research were central to the first 
quantitative stage of this study. The statistical analysis showed that legal-administrative 
1   Such transposition problems are also widespread in other member states. Recent studies on the transposition 
records on Germany, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, and the UK have found average transposition deficits of 
39 % for transport directives (Kaeding, 2006), 57 % for social policy directives (Haverland and Romeijn, in 
press), and 65 % for the fields of utilities and food safety (Berglund, Gange, and Van Waarden, 2006). Steu-
nenberg and Rhinard (2006) reported an average deficit of 66 % for all these policy sectors combined, while 
noting that often the delays are not to severe: in 28 % of the cases, transposition was seriously late.
Chapter 8 Conclusion
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causes explain a lot of the variance in timeliness. Especially the legal measure used for 
transposition is an important variable. This makes sense because there are important 
procedural differences between ministerial decrees on the one hand and statutes on the 
other. The most important variables are the period of time until the deadline, the ministry 
in charge of transposition, and the legal instrument used. Also, the quality of directives, 
measured by the proxy of EU decision-making procedures, is an important explanatory 
variable, as well as the difference between transposition into new versus existing national 
legislation. In addition, there are important differences between the ministries, possibly 
due to problems with Chinese walls. The Ministry of Transport has the worst problems 
with timely transposition, whereas the Ministry of Economic Affairs is among the fastest. 
Finally, the mere passage of time and the prospect of the deadline elapsing substantively 
increase the conditional probability of transposition.
However, residual analysis indicates that the statistical model only tells part of the story. A 
small but significant number of directives are badly explained by the model, especially cases 
with long delays. What could be the clue to this imperfect fit? First, the outliers might be due 
to measurement problems. Some of the legal-administrative variables could not be measured 
well, such as the quality of the directive, the complexity of the transposition process, and 
the existence of Chinese walls. Also, administrative capacity could not be included into the 
analysis at all. Alternatively, the outliers might be caused by omitted variables. The statistical 
analysis only included variables from the ‘benign’ paradigm. Yet this is only part of the story.
9.2 Towards better theories
As said, the first wave of scholarship on transposition was rather eclectic and atheoretical. 
This changed in the late 1990s, when the first wave gave way to a second, more theoretical 
research agenda, inspired by historical institutionalism. As part of the booming 
Europeanization agenda, various scholars developed and tested the hypothesis that the 
ease of compliance, of which transposition is one of the stages, depends on the goodness 
of fit between EU policy demands and existing national policies. It could hence be the 
case that the outliers are a result of a bad fit.
However intuitively appealing, the goodness of fit hypothesis has been criticized 
repeatedly in recent years. Various case studies have shown its limited explanatory 
power. The main problem is that the hypothesis is too static and deterministic in nature, 
assuming that national governments and parliaments want to maintain the status quo at 
all costs. In reality, domestic actors may overcome a misfit, deliberately deciding to change 
national policies and institutions. Alternatively, they may decide to change a well-fitting 
status quo, depending on their substantive points of view. Therefore, it makes sense to 
portray transposition as a process driven by these points of view directly, rather than by 
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the policies and institutions derived from actor preferences or norms in an earlier stage. 
The third wave of research claims that we should bring domestic politics back into the 
equation, if we want to explain the variegated pattern of compliance in the EU.
At first glance, the plea to bring politics back seems a recipe for trouble. There is a 
multitude of ‘political’ paradigms, comprising myriad specifications that we could use to 
explain EU compliance. I propose to classify these theories using two dimensions. Some 
contributions assume a unitary actor, focusing on national governments, whereas others 
explicitly zoom in on the several domestic stakeholders that may be involved. Also, we 
could differentiate between rationalist and constructivist explanations. 
Combining these two dimensions, we obtain four ‘political’ paradigms, within which 
we could envisage various theories to explain delays in transposition. First, we could 
portray transposition as strategic calculation by member states. Delay is then caused by a 
lack of political will of a national government. Second, transposition could be regarded 
as norm diffusion, according to the tenets of IR sociological institutionalism. Then, 
transposition is a process by which the norms contained in a directive must be adopted 
by member states, following a process of learning, or persuasion by international actors. 
The speed of this process is thought to depend on the depth of the national norms that 
are challenged by the directive. Third, we could break open the black box and model the 
domestic game of transposition using rational choice institutionalism. I have discussed 
several hypotheses originating in bargaining theory and a two-stage coordination model. 
Fourth and last, we could focus on the discursive aspects of transposition, portraying it 
as a deliberative process between domestic actors holding diverging normative points of 
view. Crucial to the timely resolution of such processes is the quality of these discourses. 
Violations of the maxims of deliberation, such as the exclusion of players or overt 
disrespect, can lead to a deadlock, which delays transposition.
9.3 Qualitative results
In order to sort out the explanatory relevance of the four theories developed, I carried out two 
focused comparisons on selected outliers and well-explained cases. Controlling for the legal-
administrative characteristics of these directives, I analyzed two pairs of directives: one pair 
transposed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and one pair by the Ministry of Transport. For 
the former pair, the laggard was a directive on the patenting on biotechnological inventions. 
This directive was transposed with a delay of some four years. This case was contrasted with 
a directive on the liberalization of the gas market, which was transposed on time. For the 
Ministry of Transport, the delayed case concerned a directive on the masses and dimensions 
of certain classes of motor vehicles. The timely case was a directive on access to the profession 
of road transport operator. What are the main results of these two focused comparisons?
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In the first place, the case studies showed the limited explanatory power of the goodness 
of fit. Whereas the gas directive displayed a huge misfit, transposition was timely and 
correct. Both the biotech and the motor vehicle directive were transposed with a delay, 
despite their relatively good fit. The directive on access to the profession, finally, illustrates 
the political mechanisms that are at play in the background. Recently, the Dutch 
government proposed to change the transposition measures put in place previously, 
because political preferences have shifted. Instead of over-complying on several aspects, 
it now proposes to get back to the minimum standards prescribed by the directive. This 
shows that domestic political dynamics may outweigh either a good or a bad fit.
Do the political explanations indeed fare better than the goodness of fit hypothesis? 
To begin with, the analyses show that the unitary actor perspective is not very helpful for 
explaining the outliers. Severe domestic conflicts occurred in all four cases studied, either 
between Parliament and the ministry, or between sections in one and the same ministry. 
The actors involved had conflicting views on the desirability and meaning of the four 
directives studied, which is why a unitary actor perspective is not helpful. The presence 
of actors with conflicting positions is especially challenging for IR constructivism, for 
which the unitary actor assumption has an ontological status, implying the existence 
of coherent national norms. Consequently, it is not helpful to portray compliance as 
norm diffusion. This conclusion may not sound groundbreaking, but the unitary actor 
conception is still dominant in IR constructivism. I believe it is a current challenge for 
constructivists to modify their theories to allow for domestic diversity. 
For IR rationalism, the problem is less severe, as in this school of thought the 
unitary actor assumption is mainly an analytical device geared at simplification of 
complex decision-making situations, so as to allow for more straightforward modeling. 
Notwithstanding divergent domestic preferences, there may still be a transitive ordering 
at the aggregate level, as for instance was the case for the two internal market cases. At 
the same time, the assumption is problematic for cases in which different sets of actors 
control the stages of taking and shaping. In such situations, a member state’s decision-
making position may not well predict its position during transposition, for the aggregate 
preference orderings in those two stages may differ. This occurred in the biotech case, 
where due to intervention of the Upper House a much-contested transposing bill was 
rewritten. Accordingly, I would like to conclude that recent pleas to link the decision-
making stage to the transposition stage are not necessarily fruitful.
Now turning to the multiple actor explanations, a first candidate is rational choice 
institutionalism. Evidence for the bargaining hypotheses was mixed. The performance of 
the number of issues was rather disappointing, as none of the cases performed as expected on 
the basis of the hypothesis. The flexibility hypothesis faired better, at least for the internal 
market directives. Whereas in the biotech case the players were extremely inflexible, in 
the gas case they were willing to compromise on key issues. For the transport directives, 
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the comparison is a bit harder. In both cases, the players from the legal department on 
the one hand and the policy divisions on the other hand were highly inflexible. However, 
in the second case, relating to access to the profession, the lawyers were forced to yield 
to the policy divisions, which is why their inflexibility did not protract the process. The 
effect of inflexibility on duration thus depends on the role of the actor concerned. 
The coordination model described and tested on the four cases could not adequately 
explain the differences in timeliness. For the delayed biotech case, the model predicted 
timely but incorrect transposition, as there was a majority of parties in Parliament who 
wanted to prohibit the patenting of plants and animals, which was the main issue. For 
the gas case, the results were better, as the model rightly predicted timely transposition for 
the two issues on which the Lower House, the higher-level coordinator, was undivided. 
For the transport cases, the model could not be applied, as the players did not agree on 
the set of sustainable policies, which is an assumption of the model. Much of the debate 
in these cases revolved around this issue, rather than around substantive differences of 
preference as posited by the model. Yet, the model proved highly useful, in that the two-
level dynamics sketched could be well applied to the various cases.
Another remarkable outcome of the case studies concerns the role of interest 
groups. Contrary to expectation, they cannot be labeled veto players. When it comes 
to transposition, the Dutch system is not as corporatist as expected, evidence of the 
broader trend of institutional weakening of the incorporation of interest groups into 
policy-making (Andeweg and Irwin, 2002, 145). Especially for the internal market 
cases, consultation of stakeholders was highly restricted. Whereas the biotech association 
NIABA had a more than close working relationship with the ministry, other interest 
groups were excluded, and were forced to gain access through Parliament. Something 
similar happened in the gas case, where Gasunie was closely involved in the formulation 
of the bill, while other interest groups had to target MPs. Several interviewees argue that 
this pattern is structural, as the ministry extensively consults its close allies, excluding 
groups with adverse opinions. For the Ministry of Transport, the picture is slightly 
different. Consultation is arranged formally, in that transposing measures are discussed 
in representative bodies that meet regularly. Nevertheless, the interviewees indicated that, 
when push comes to shove, the ministry decides. Also, in recent years consultation has 
become less intensive, allegedly because the ministry is currently withdrawing from the 
sector, due to its focus on self-regulation. In brief, it appears that interest groups cannot 
be qualified as veto players in the Dutch transposition process.
The final ‘political’ candidate theory was deliberative theory, which portrays transposition 
as a process in which various stakeholders deliberate, trying to reach consensus on the 
way in which a directive is transposed. The main hypothesis derived from this theory is 
that it is easier to reach consensus, in the face of diverging views on the transposition 
of a directive, when the discourse quality is high. In other words, discourse quality is 
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an intervening variable, in that good deliberation can lead the participants to accept 
outcomes they otherwise would not accept: it fosters input legitimacy. This hypothesis 
proved highly useful for explaining the two outliers researched. Transposition of the 
biotech directive, as well as the masses and dimensions directive, was characterized by 
severe breaches of the principles of good discourse. In the biotech case, several political 
parties were outraged about the way the Ministry of Economic Affairs went about 
transposing the directive. They felt bypassed, and criticized the fact that the ministry 
was too closely involved with the biotech industry. Consequently, they took up a highly 
inflexible position, as set out above, and battled until the ministry yielded to their 
demand to exclude plants and animals from patentability. In the gas case, in contrast, 
both the political parties in the Lower House, and the ministry, gave in to the other party 
on several counts. 
The results are a bit more puzzling for the transport cases. That is, transposition at 
this ministry as such is plagued by a structural problem with discourse quality. A large 
number of lawyers working at the legal department believe that the RDW and the policy 
divisions structurally exclude them from the negotiations stage. At the same time, the 
RDW and the policy divisions accuse the legal department of taking too formalistic a 
stance regarding transposition. In both cases, this mutual lack of trust and involvement 
resulted in fierce conflicts between lawyers and policy experts. In the masses and 
dimensions case, the legal department felt excluded by the RDW, which was responsible 
for the negotiations. Conversely, the RDW was indignant about the minimalist role 
the legal department reserved for it during the transposition process. In the other case, 
relating to access to the profession, the lawyers adopted a very strict interpretation of the 
directive, being frustrated about their lack of involvement during the negotiations. In 
both cases, the perceived lack of discourse quality made it hard to resolve the differences 
of opinion that existed, with the two sides adopting a highly inflexible stance.
Yet, the consequences of this lack of discourse quality differed greatly between 
the cases. In the first case, the conflict between RDW and the legal department was 
protracted, because the policy divisions did not intervene. In the second case, the legal 
department could not get its foot through the door, as the responsible policy department 
simply overturned the lawyers’ strict interpretation concerning the points system and the 
financial threshold. A tentative conclusion would be that hierarchical intervention is the 
key to ending conflicts of discourse quality. 
The important role of coordinating bodies higher up in the hierarchy is not captured 
well by the deliberative theories discussed and tested in this study. This point is the 
stronghold of the coordination model developed by Steunenberg (2006). The cases 
bear out that it is fruitful to combine the notion of two-level games to deliberative 
theory. The ease with which substantive conflicts are solved appears to depend both 
on the degree of discourse quality and on the adequacy of higher-level control, if the 
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conflict concerns lower-level players. Another interesting link between rationalist and 
constructivist theories concerns the concept of flexibility, as crucial to bargaining theories. 
As argued above, inflexibility played an important role in delaying the biotech case. This 
inflexibility, though, can be explained by the lack of discourse quality experienced by 
the political parties opposed to patenting. Deliberative theory can thus be viewed as 
ontologically prior to bargaining models, in that discourse quality shapes the players’ 
degree of flexibility.
Does this mean that we can cast off those legal-administrative explanations that did 
not form part of the statistical analysis? To begin with, a lack of capacity played a role in 
the motor vehicle case, where the policy department did not have the time to develop 
the expertise needed to steer the transposition process. Also, it explains why in this 
case transposition was characterized by many loose ends. Capacity problems are often 
invoked as a reason for delays. The legal sections were claimed to be plagued by capacity 
problems. At the same time, I doubt whether this variable is truly ‘benign’ in nature. As 
it turns out from twelve interviews, the capacity assigned to transposition depends on 
the political priorities set by a minister. This is also underscored by the gas case, which 
ran very smoothly because minister Jorritsma attached high priority to the directive. 
Often, this is not the case. Transposition is claimed to suffer when a minister’s political 
priorities make other demands on the lawyers. Making national policies is politically 
more rewarding than transposing directives. And if a minister dislikes a directive, 
priority is often even lower. In brief, there is an intricate relationship between capacity 
and priority.
Other seemingly ‘benign’ variables are also underpinned by political considerations. 
The analysis has shown that interpretation problems allegedly stemming from low quality 
of a directive may be linked to political preferences (also see Falkner et al, 2005). As it 
turned out from the case studies, ambiguity is not an objective feature of a directive, but 
a subjective qualification that often serves political goals. In the transposition process of 
the biotech directive, the discussion waged on the meaning of the directive was utterly 
strategic in nature, in that it was made secondary to the views of the participants. This 
also explains why the opponents brushed the evidence produced by the stakeholders 
aside in the three problematic cases. Third, the variable of Chinese walls indeed seems to 
cause delays. However, the mechanism is not ‘benign’ in nature, but political, revolving 
around discourse quality.
What does this mean for the statistical model developed earlier? To begin with, 
we need to answer the question whether the outliers are real outliers, or whether they 
reflect omitted variables. At first glance, it seems that at least the biotech case is partly 
a real outlier, in that much of the delay was caused by the general political unrest in 
the Netherlands. More interesting from a theoretical perspective, though, are the other 
explanations identified by the case studies. Ideally, we should include the variables political 
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conflict, discourse quality,2 and hierarchical intervention into the statistical analysis, and 
run this again to see if the outliers disappear. We would expect an interaction effect 
between political conflict and discourse quality, and between political conflict, discourse 
quality, and hierarchical intervention.
Here, however, we run into a limitation of the mixed-methods framework. The 
problem is that discourse quality can hardly be measured quantitatively. As discussed, 
the discourse quality index developed by Steenbergen et al (2003) is not suitable, as it 
only reveals a part of the transposition process, and is only applicable to the legislative 
procedure, whereas most of the transposition occurs through delegated legislation. 
Therefore, it is at present infeasible to complement the statistical model. In my view, 
this is a more general downside of mixed-methods designs in the social sciences. They 
are often employed because using quantitative methods only is not attractive, due to 
the messy concepts that populate social sciences. Consequently, we are likely to identify 
rightly those variables when performing a nested analysis, while still not being able to 
reintegrate those omitted variables found. 
Since we cannot test the full model, all we can do is philosophize about the effects 
of the omitted variables on the statistical model. The question is whether the parameter 
estimates obtained earlier in this study are likely to be robust, i.e. remain unaltered if we 
could include the omitted variables. The estimates would be altered if the included and 
the omitted variables correlate with each other. It is thus important to theorize about the 
relationship between the variables of discourse quality and hierarchical intervention on 
the one hand, and the variables present in the statistical analysis on the other hand.
Probably, some of the effects of discourse quality were already captured by the 
‘lead ministry’ variable. In the case of the Ministry of Transport, the distrust between 
negotiators and lawyers is a well-known structural problem, which may explain the bad 
score for the ministry. If, however, we could measure discourse quality on a case-by-case 
basis, the effects of ‘lead ministry’ would probably diminish. I expect no relationship 
between discourse quality and the instrument used, for the case studies have shown 
that problems not only occur in parliament-executive relations. The same holds for 
Commission versus Council directives, and for new versus amending legislation. So I 
expect that the parameter estimates are rather robust against the inclusion of the omitted 
variables, except for the ministry variable. Adding discourse quality would probably 
increase the explained variance of the model, reducing the number of outliers. At the 
same time, the biotech case would probably remain an outlier, due to the delaying effect 
of political instability. Finally, one remark is in place here: the case studies have identified 
discourse quality and a lack of hierarchical intervention as conditions that together are 
sufficient to cause delay. However, they are not likely to be necessary conditions. Keeping 
2   Alternatively, we could include the players’ degree of flexibility into the model, as we have seen that this fol-
lows from the degree of input legitimacy.
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with the idea of equifinality, it might well be the case that other variables serve to explain 
the other outliers. Including discourse quality would probably improve the fit of the 
model, without making it perfect.
9.4 On the importance of procedural politics
In conclusion, this analysis sustains the finding of  Falkner et al (2005), i.e. that the 
Netherlands is a member of the world of conditional compliance. The foregoing analysis 
seriously calls into question the Dutch self-image of a slow, but perfectionist complier. 
Due to capacity limitations, and the central role of political interests and meta-level 
conflicts, transposition often is far from perfectionist in reality. Especially the correctness 
of transposition is subject to political considerations. In the words of one of the 
interviewees: ‘We think we are the best pupil in the class, but we aren’t.’ At the same 
time it must be noted that the majority of the lawyers interviewed do adhere to the image 
of perfectionism, taking transposition very seriously. Yet, as these do not play a key role 
in transposition, when push comes to shove, politics are indeed central in explaining 
transposition in the Netherlands.
An important finding of this study is that, in theorizing the domestic politics of 
transposition, we should not only look at substantive points of contestation between 
domestic actors. The cases relating to gas and access to the profession have shown that 
such differences may be resolved rather quickly. In addition, we should incorporate meta-
level features of transposition processes into our explanations. For instance, the degree 
of discourse quality and the speed of hierarchical intervention in case of substantive 
conflicts appear to be important causes of transposition problems. Whereas most of the 
third wave literature focuses on substantive politics, such ‘procedural politics’ have not 
received much attention.
The European project intrudes deeply into our domestic systems. It not only 
affects the contents of our policies, but also the way of doing things. Existing logics of 
appropriateness are disturbed in an indirect fashion, as domestic actors have to learn new 
roles (also see Berglund, Gange, and Van Waarden, 2006). Parliament, for instance, has 
to get used to its new role as implementer of directives, and policy experts will have to 
devise new working relationships suited for the job of transposition. Not only should we 
bring substantive politics back into the equation, in explaining the effects of Europe, we 
should also better appraise the effects of the EU on the roles of domestic actors, and the 
relationships between them.
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9.5 On correctness and application
This research has revolved around the question of transposition timeliness. One remaining 
question that must be answered concerns the importance of the findings of this thesis. 
The conclusion is that the Dutch have a structural problem with timely transposition. 
First, the Dutch record has not been improved since the 1970s, even though the problem 
appeared on the political agenda several times. Second, the deficit found contrasts 
starkly with the Dutch self-image of loyalty to the EU and perfectionist compliance. 
Yet, the importance assigned to the deficit depends on the normative standpoint of 
the observer and the criteria used. What is an acceptable level of non-compliance? To 
begin with, imperfect implementation is claimed to be normal, as it occurs in almost all 
political settings (Peters, 1997, 189). In view of the layered structure of the European 
Union, and the fact that member states control transposition, ‘the wonder is not that 
inadequate implementation exists but that it has been kept within manageable bounds’ 
(Anderson, 1988, 112). Moreover, most directives eventually are transposed, as the 
statistical analysis shows. This may be a result of the effective enforcement strategy of 
the European Commission and the ECJ. If found out and challenged, in most cases of 
faulty transposition compliance is ensured in the end (Tallberg, 2002, 620). A way out 
of this problem of lacking normative standards for timeliness is with the final correctness 
of transposition, and the extent to which transposed directives are enforced and applied 
in reality. 
Unfortunately, it proved infeasible to gather quantitative data on the correctness of 
transposition. This would have been too laborious, because of the highly complex nature 
of most directives and the corresponding national rules. Neither is one advised to take 
infringement procedures as an indicator, as these reveal only the tip of the iceberg. The 
Commission does not even have time to closely monitor the implementing measures, 
and is often cautious to challenge member states in cases of incorrect transposition. The 
ministries seem to be aware of this. One interviewee from the Ministry of Transport 
claimed that they have a very good working relationship with the Commission, and 
that interactions proceed on the basis of trust. It seems that this trust is not always 
warranted, since several interviewees mention that ‘tricks are played’ when transposition 
is in danger of being late or incorrect. For instance, one interviewee from the Ministry 
of Transport admitted that in case of delays a pro forma transposition measure might 
be published in the Government Gazette, in order to avoid being challenged by the 
European Commission.
Infringement procedures therefore are not a good basis for assessing the incidence 
of incorrect transposition. Yet, this study allows me to draw a tentative conclusion on 
the correctness of transposition in the Netherlands, by combining the detailed insights 
derived from the 45 interviews held. In all these interviews, even though they primarily 
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concerned those directives researched, I asked the interviewees to reflect on transposition 
in general. Four interviewees, three of whom are lawyers, state that the Netherlands 
always try to implement correctly, sustaining the image of perfectionism sketched in 
chapter 3. Another twelve explicitly subscribe to the image of willful defection, claiming 
that the key to correctness is with the political preferences of the responsible units. As 
one civil servant claims, ‘You do not try hard when a directive is politically unwanted.’
On the basis of the interviews, the Dutch self-image hence appears to be contradicting. 
Rather than being loyal and perfectionist, the government often acts strategically, 
by intentionally transposing directives incorrectly. This for instance occurred in the 
second transport case, when the ministry felt secure it would get away with the faulty 
transposition of the good repute requirement. At the same time, it must be remarked 
that the fear of infringement procedures offers an important check on this behavior. 
Several interviewees mention the influence of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice 
in this respect. Both are claimed to be very much averse to infringement procedures out 
of concerns for the Dutch reputation, and thus to put pressure on ministries that try to 
dodge EC directives. At the same time, it must be doubted to what extent they are able to 
monitor transposition well enough. The BNC and ICER lack authority (interview), and 
are dependent on the information provided by the ministries. Therefore, ministries that 
try to get their way with unwanted directives are probably rarely challenged. In addition, 
the chances that an infringement procedure will be started are perceived to be low. This 
is illustrated well by directive 98/76/EC, in which case several policy experts discussed 
the chances of the Commission finding out about the far from perfect transposition, and 
decided to take the risk.
Finally, delayed transposition is not always detrimental to building the EC legal 
order. The case studies have shown that transposition is only one of the key stages of 
compliance, and possibly not even the crucial one. To begin with, some of the directives 
studied were applied, even though they had not been transposed yet. This happened for 
instance with the biotech directive, which was already applied by the office responsible 
for patent granting while the transposing measures were still being debated in Parliament. 
In the case of masses and dimensions, the RDW was already applying the new measures, 
even though the directive had not been transposed, because it feared being litigated at 
the national level. Concerning the access to the profession, and the gas directive, finally, 
the enforcers were being criticized for over-complying, in the sense that they adhered 
to an overly stringent interpretation of the transposing measures. On the whole, there 
seems to be no automatic relationship between transposition and actual application and 
enforcement. Future research should pay more attention to this relationship.
Late and incorrect transposition can be overcome in other ways as well. Often faulty 
transposition is untenable due to developments in the other member states. For instance, 
concerning the motor vehicle directive, several interviewees complained that the RDW 
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applied the directive too strictly. Allegedly, Germany is more lenient, granting EC type-
approvals more easily. For this reason, many Dutch producers apply for EC type-approval 
in Germany, which opens up the Dutch market to them. Such U-turn constructions are 
more widespread. For instance, the partial over-compliance with the directive on access to 
the profession is under pressure because Dutch companies increasingly hire truck drivers 
from Eastern European countries to circumvent the stringent Dutch requirements. The 
market may play an important role in correcting over- and under-compliance. 
All things considered, the Netherlands has a problem with timely and correct 
transposition. Event though it is not the central question of this study, the case studies 
showed how the effects of faulty or late transposition may be mitigated by the rather 
independent role of national agencies and courts, as well as market forces. These corrective 
dynamics so far have received scant attention in the literature on compliance and hence 
offer a promising avenue for further research.
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Appendix I: Interview guide
Category Topics
1 introduction - introduction
- research on transposition problems
- anonymity
2 directive - background
- contents
- quality
- negotiation position Netherlands
goodness of fit - existing legal and practical situation
- differences
transposition process - involvement interviewee
- main actors
- instruments
- issues
- positions of the actors
- outcomes
- other problems
result - timeliness 
- correctness
- enforcement
3 conclusion - summary
- useful documents
- other interviewees
- report
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Appendix II: List of interviewees
Transposition in the Netherlands – general
-	 Asser Institute 
-	 Clingendael
-	 Dutch Permanent Representation to the EU
-	 European Commission, Secretariat General
-	 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate-General European Integration
-	 Ministry of Economic Affairs, Legislation and Legal Affairs Department
-	 Ministry of Economic Affairs, Directorate-General for Economic Policy
-	 Ministry of Justice, Legislation Department
-	 	Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Central Dept. of Legal 
Affairs
Legal protection of biotechnological inventions (1998/44)
-	 Netherlands Industrial Property Office (Bureau voor de Industriële Eigendom)
-	 Dutch Society for the Protection of Animals (Dierenbescherming)
-	 European Commission, Directorate General Internal Market
-	 European Commission, Directorate General Internal Market*
-	 Ministry of Economic Affairs, Legislation and Legal Affairs Department
-	 Ministry of Agriculture, Nature, and Food Quality, Department of Legal Affairs
-	 Dutch Biotech Industry Association (Nederlandse Biotechnologie Associatie)
-	 Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid)*
Internal Gas Market (1998/30)
- ’t Lam, Mr. M.R.
- Christian Democratic Alliance (Christen Democratisch Appèl)*
- Office of Energy Regulation (Directie Toezicht Energie)
- Energy Research Center Netherlands (Energieonderzoek Centrum Nederland)
- European Commission, Directorate General Energy and Transport 
- Minister of Economic Affairs - Mw. A. Jorritsma*
- Ministry of Economic Affairs, Department Energy Market
- Gasunie
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-  Free Trade Organization for Electricity and Gas (Vrijhandels Organisatie voor 
Electriciteit en Gas)
-  People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie)*
Masses and dimensions of motor vehicles (1997/27)
-	 	Dutch Branch Organization of Coach-work, Repair and Related Companies (Nederlandse 
branche-organisatie van carrosserie-, schadeherstel- en aanverwante bedrijven)
-	 	Dutch Association of the Bicycle and Automotive Industries (Rijwiel en Automobiel 
Industrie Vereniging)
-	 Government Road Transport Agency (Rijksdienst voor Wegverkeer)
-	 Transport and Logistics Netherlands (Transport en Logistiek Nederland)
-	 Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management DG Road Haulage3
-	 	Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management DG Passenger Transport
-	 	Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Central Dept. of Legal 
Affairs*
-	 	Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Central Dept. of Legal 
Affairs
Access to the profession (1998/76)
- European Commission, DG Energy and Transport
- European Commission, DG Energy and Transport*
- Dutch Trade Union Federation (Dutch Trade Union Federation)
-  National and International Road Haulage Org. (Nationale en Internationale Wegvervoer 
Organisatie)
- Transport and Logistics Netherlands (Transport en Logistiek Nederland)
-  Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, DG Passenger 
Transport*
- Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management,  DG Road Haulage*
-  Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Central Dept. of Legal 
Affairs 
-  Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Central Dept. of Legal 
Affairs
- Vallenduuk, Mr. J.B.
3  Currently: Directorate General for Transport and Aviation (Directoraat Generaal Transport en 
Luchtvaart).
Samenvatting
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Samenvatting
De Europese Unie maakt beleid op een groot aantal terreinen. Dit beleid is onder andere 
vastgelegd in richtlijnen: juridische maatregelen die de lidstaten verplichten een bepaald 
doel te bereiken, zonder precies voor te schrijven hoe dit dient te gebeuren. De lidstaten 
mogen zelf de vorm en middelen kiezen die het beste bij hun nationale rechtsstelsel 
passen. Oftewel, lidstaten moeten de richtlijnen implementeren in nationaal beleid. Zij 
moeten een richtlijn eerst omzetten in bindende nationale wet- en regelgeving en deze 
vervolgens toepassen en handhaven. Zij krijgen hier een bepaalde periode voor toegekend; 
iedere richtlijn bevat een tijdslimiet waarbinnen de implementatie moet geschieden.
De implementatie van Europese richtlijnen loopt echter niet altijd zonder slag of 
stoot. Vaak zijn lidstaten te laat met de omzetting en derhalve ook met de toepassing en 
handhaving. Ook worden richtlijnen niet altijd correct geïmplementeerd. De Europese 
Commissie ziet dit ‘implementatietekort’ als een grote bedreiging voor de Europese 
rechtsorde. Europese integratie is een wassen neus als richtlijnen niet gelijktijdig en correct 
worden geïmplementeerd in alle lidstaten. Ontduiking van het gemeenschappelijke beleid 
leidt tot rechtsongelijkheid voor burgers en bedrijven en belemmert de economische 
groei. De Europese Commissie beschouwt een tijdige en juiste implementatie van 
richtlijnen dan ook als een topprioriteit. Hierbij krijgt transpositie de meeste aandacht, 
omdat dit de eerste fase van het implementatieproces is.
Ook theoretisch gezien is transpositie een interessant onderwerp. De naleving van 
Europees beleid door lidstaten is noch een volledige Europese, noch een volledige 
nationale aangelegenheid. Het onderwerp bevindt zich op het snijvlak van de leer der 
Internationale Betrekkingen en de vergelijkende politicologie/bestuurskunde. Het is een 
uitdaging om theorieën te ontwikkelen die recht doen aan deze meerlagigheid. Sinds het 
einde van de jaren tachtig hebben verschillende wetenschappers dit getracht te doen, 
met wisselend succes. We kunnen drie stromingen in dit onderzoek onderscheiden. 
Eind jaren tachtig vormden enkele juristen en bestuurskundigen de eerste stroming. 
Deze beschouwden transpositie als een apolitiek proces, dat spaak kan lopen door 
juridisch-bestuurlijke problemen, zoals de complexiteit van richtlijnen en het gebrek aan 
bestuurlijke kracht van een lidstaat. Het onderzoek in deze eerste periode was over het 
algemeen eclectisch en a-theoretisch van aard. 
Eind jaren negentig kwam de Europeaniseringsbenadering op. Deze stroming was 
gebaseerd op het neo-institutionalisme en zocht de verklaring voor transpositieproblemen 
in een gebrekkige inhoudelijke aansluiting tussen Europees en nationaal beleid. Als 
Europese richtlijnen niet passen bij het bestaande nationale beleid, zo was de gedachte, 
dan bemoeilijkt dat de transpositie. Deze hypothese bleek empirisch echter niet 
houdbaar. Het probleem was dat de hypothese te statisch is, aangezien nationale actoren 
de bestaande status quo in een beleidsveld juist vaak willen veranderen. De laatste jaren 
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wordt transpositie dan ook in toenemende mate beschouwd als een politiek proces, dat 
vast kan lopen door conflicten tussen nationale politieke en/of bestuurlijke actoren. Deze 
meer politicologische benadering krijgt steeds duidelijker gestalte en is uitgewerkt op 
zowel rationalistische en constructivistische wijze. 
Helaas is er nog weinig degelijk empirisch onderzoek gedaan naar de verschillende 
verklaringen. Het meeste empirische onderzoek dat is gedaan richt zich op slechts 
enkele richtlijnen en baseert zich maar op één theoretische stroming, waardoor het 
onmogelijk is om de houdbaarheid van een groot aantal variabelen te beoordelen. Deze 
studie ambieert dat wel te doen. De vraag die centraal staat is hoe verschillen in de 
tijdigheid en correctheid van transpositie kunnen worden verklaard. Dit wordt gedaan 
voor Nederland, omdat het creëren van een betrouwbare database voor alle lidstaten te 
tijdrovend zou zijn. Nederland is bovendien een zeer interessante casus, aangezien het in 
binnen- en buitenland te boek staat als een zeer trouwe lidstaat met grote bestuurskracht. 
Als hier problemen met transpositie optreden, dan is dat zeer waarschijnlijk ook het geval 
in lidstaten met een minder consciëntieus imago.
Alvorens de centrale vraag te beantwoorden, wordt eerst vastgesteld hoe groot het 
probleem met tijdige transpositie in Nederland eigenlijk is. Hierover bestaan op Europees 
niveau geen valide gegevens. Om de omvang van het transpositietekort vast te kunnen 
stellen wordt een database gecreëerd met alle richtlijnen die zijn aangenomen van 1995 
tot en met 1998, alsmede de bijbehorende nationale maatregelen. Een beschrijvende 
statistische analyse van deze gegevens laat zien dat Nederland inderdaad een probleem 
heeft met de tijdige transpositie van EG-richtlijnen. Ongeveer 40 procent van de 
richtlijnen wordt te laat omgezet; de vertraging kan oplopen tot enkele jaren. Bovendien 
is het probleem structureel van aard: de transpositiescore is nauwelijks verbeterd sinds 
het einde van de jaren zeventig.
Om de vraag naar de verklaring van te late transpositie te kunnen beantwoorden, wordt 
gebruikt gemaakt van een gemengde onderzoeksstrategie, waarbij kwalitatieve analyse is 
ingebed in een kwantitatief onderzoek. Eerst wordt door middel van de statistische techniek 
‘survival analyse’ getracht een verklaring te bieden voor verschillen in transpositieduur. In 
deze analyse worden voornamelijk bestuurlijke en juridische factoren bekeken. Zo kan 
worden onderzocht in hoeverre transpositie een apolitiek proces is. De statistische analyse 
laat zien dat dergelijke factoren zeer relevant zijn om problemen met tijdige transpositie te 
verklaren. Om te beginnen zijn er grote verschillen tussen de ministeries. Het Ministerie 
van Verkeer en Waterstaat is het langzaamst en het Ministerie van Economische Zaken 
het snelst. Ook worden Commissierichtlijnen, die vaak technischer en minder ambigu 
zijn, sneller omgezet dan andere richtlijnen. Tot slot maakt het uit of een richtlijn kan 
worden omgezet in een bestaande nationale maatregel of dat een compleet nieuwe 
maatregel benodigd is. Ook het type nationale maatregel is een belangrijke verklaring voor 
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omzettingssnelheid: wetten in formele zin en algemene maatregelen van bestuur kosten 
meer tijd dan ministeriële regelingen.
Tegelijkertijd blijkt uit de statistische analyse dat bestuurlijke en juridische problemen 
slechts een deel van de verklaring vormen. Een klein maar significant aantal richtlijnen 
wordt niet goed verklaard door het statistische model; verscheidene transpositieprocessen 
duurden veel langer dan op grond van het model kon worden verwacht. De volgende 
stap is dan ook om de additionele variabelen te identificeren die deze vertragingen 
kunnen verklaren. Hiertoe worden twee ‘uitbijters’ geselecteerd: transpositieprocessen 
die veel langer duurden dan men op basis van het statistische model zou verwachten. 
Beide richtlijnen worden in een kwalitatieve analyse vergeleken met richtlijnen uit 
diezelfde steekproef die wel goed door het model worden verklaard. Hierbij wordt ervoor 
gezorgd dat de richtlijnen zo veel mogelijk op elkaar lijken wat betreft de juridisch-
bestuurlijke aspecten, zodat het onderscheidingsvermogen van de vergelijkende studies 
maximaal is. Het eerste paar bestaat uit twee interne marktrichtlijnen: richtlijn 1998/44 
betreffende de rechtsbescherming van biotechnologische uitvindingen (ruim vier jaar te 
laat omgezet) en 1998/30 betreffende gemeenschappelijke regels voor de interne markt 
voor aardgas (tijdig omgezet). De tweede vergelijking betreft twee transportrichtlijnen: 
richtlijn 1997/27 inzake de massa’s en afmetingen van vrachtwagens (ongeveer twee jaar 
te laat omgezet) en richtlijn 1998/76 inzake de toegang tot het beroep van ondernemer 
van goederen-, respectievelijk personenvervoer over de weg (tijdig omgezet).
Om de verschillen tussen de twee paren van richtlijnen te kunnen verklaren wordt 
om te beginnen gekeken naar enkele juridisch-bestuurlijke verklaringen waarvan de 
kwantitatieve operationalisatie discutabel of onmogelijk was. Dit zijn de kwaliteit van 
de richtlijn, de complexiteit van het transpositieproces, het bestaan van ‘Chinese muren’ 
tussen onderhandelaars en omzetters en bestuurlijk vermogen. Hiernaast wordt gebruikt 
gemaakt van de tweede en derde golf van transpositieonderzoek. Zo wordt gekeken naar 
de verklarende waarde van de ‘goodness of fit’. Daarnaast worden enkele politicologische 
theorieën van transpositie op een rij gezet en ontwikkeld. Een probleem hierbij is de 
enorme verscheidenheid aan bestaande en reeds toegepaste paradigma’s en theorieën 
die mogelijk relevant zijn voor het analyseren van transpositieprocessen. Om orde in 
deze veelheid te scheppen wordt de volgende classificatie gebruikt. Ten eerste wordt een 
onderscheid gemaakt tussen paradigma’s met een unitaire actor assumptie en paradigma’s 
die uitgaan van meerdere binnenlandse actoren. Een tweede onderscheid betreft het 
rationalisme versus het constructivisme. Dit leidt tot vier paradigma’s, waarbinnen enkele 
specifieke theorieën worden onderscheiden. 
Het eerste politicologische paradigma dat wordt gebruikt voor de kwalitatieve analyse 
is het rationalisme uit de leer der Internationale Betrekkingen. Op basis hiervan kan 
men transpositie zien als een gevolg van strategische afweging door lidstaten. Vertraging 
wordt dan veroorzaakt door een gebrek aan politieke wil van een lidstaat. Het tweede 
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paradigma is dat van het constructivisme uit de leer der Internationale Betrekkingen, dat 
impliciet een unitaire actor assumptie aanhangt. Transpositie wordt dan gezien als een 
proces van normverspreiding, waarin lidstaten ten gevolge van leerprocessen of socialisatie 
internationale normen overnemen. De snelheid van transpositie hangt dan af van de diepte 
van de bestaande nationale normen die moeten worden veranderd. De derde benadering 
is die van het rationele keuze institutionalisme, waarbinnen verschillende nationale 
actoren samen verantwoordelijk zijn voor transpositie. Hier wordt aandacht besteed aan 
onderhandelingstheorie en een ruimtelijk model dat de coördinatie tussen verschillende 
spelers centraal stelt. Tot slot wordt een vierde benadering ontwikkeld, gestoeld op recente 
deliberatieve theorieën. Transpositie wordt dan gezien als een proces van deliberatie, 
waarin nationale actoren met divergerende normen het eens moeten zien te worden over 
de omzetting van een richtlijn. Dit is niet alleen afhankelijk van hun inhoudelijke normen 
die betrekking hebben op een richtlijn, maar ook van de kwaliteit van de beraadslaging. 
Overtredingen van procedurele normen, zoals het uitsluiten van actoren, kan leiden tot een 
patstelling in de beraadslaging en dus tot vertraagde transpositie.
De casusbeschrijvingen laten vier zeer verschillende transpositieprocessen zien. De 
biotechrichtlijn, om te beginnen, werd veel te laat omgezet, doordat een meerderheid van 
de Tweede Kamer het omzettingsvoorstel van de regering niet steunde. Transpositie van 
de gasrichtlijn, daarentegen, vond op tijd doorgang ondanks felle politieke strijd tussen de 
Tweede Kamer en de regering. De richtlijn over massa’s en afmetingen van vrachtwagens 
werd twee jaar te laat omgezet, ten gevolge van een hoog oplopend conflict tussen juristen 
van het ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat en ambtenaren van de Rijksdienst voor het 
Wegverkeer. De richtlijn over toegang tot het beroep van vervoersondernemer kon op tijd 
worden omgezet ondanks vergelijkbare conflicten tussen juristen en beleidsambtenaren 
van het ministerie, omdat tijdig werd ingegrepen door het hogere ambtelijk niveau.
Wat zijn de belangrijkste resultaten van de twee vergelijkende studies? Ten eerste 
bevestigen de gevalsstudies de beperkte verklarende waarde van de ‘goodness of fit’ 
hypothese. Ten tweede laten ze zien dat unitaire actor benaderingen van beperkte waarde 
zijn voor het analyseren van transpositieprocessen. Alle vier de transpositieprocessen 
werden gekenmerkt door felle politieke strijd tussen belanghebbenden. Deze bevinding is 
vooral problematisch voor het sociaal constructivisme, omdat de unitaire actor assumptie 
hier een ontologische status heeft, in tegenstelling tot het rationalisme uit de leer der 
Internationale Betrekkingen. Over de verklaringen die uitgaan van meerdere nationale 
actoren kan het volgende worden opgemerkt. De steun voor de onderhandelingshypothesen 
is gemengd. De sterkste hypothese betreft de flexibiliteit van de spelers: hoe minder 
flexibel de actoren, hoe langer de transpositie duurde. Het coördinatiemodel, 
daarentegen, is minder succesvol voor het verklaren van transpositiesnelheid. Het model 
is lastig toe te passen op de vervoersrichtlijnen, omdat de verschillende actoren daar 
niet zozeer inhoudelijk van mening verschilden, maar elkaar op meta-niveau betwistten, 
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bijvoorbeeld aangaande de precieze betekenis van elementen van de richtlijn. Het laatste 
paradigma, deliberatieve theorie, biedt het meeste aanknopingspunten voor het verklaren 
van de verschillen in transpositiesnelheid. Bij de twee vertraagde richtlijnen, betreffende 
biotechnologie en massa’s en afmetingen van vrachtwagens, bestonden grote problemen 
met de kwaliteit van het discours; betrokkenen ervoeren grote problemen met input 
legitimiteit. In het geval van de biotechrichtlijn voelde een parlementaire meerderheid 
zich gepasseerd door de regering, in het geval van de richtlijn over massa’s en afmetingen 
van vrachtwagens voelden de juristen zich onheus bejegend door beleidsambtenaren 
tijdens het onderhandelingsproces. Op deze wijze kan er een verband worden gelegd 
tussen deliberatieve theorie en formele onderhandelingstheorie, in de zin dat het gebrek 
aan discours kwaliteit zich vertaalde in een zeer rigide opstelling van deze actoren. Tot 
slot blijkt uit de gevalsstudies dat incorrecte transpositie, zoals die optrad in het voorbeeld 
van de toegang tot het beroep, vaak intentioneel is en stoelt op inhoudelijke politieke 
bezwaren tegen een richtlijn.
Al met al kan worden vastgesteld dat Nederland een probleem heeft met de tijdige 
transpositie van richtlijnen. Vertraging van transpositie kan wordt voor een groot deel 
verklaard door juridisch-bestuurlijke factoren. Daarnaast is het nuttig met een meer 
politicologische bril naar transpositieprocessen te kijken. Transpositie is vaak een politiek 
proces, waarin verschillende nationale actoren het met elkaar eens moeten zien te worden. 
Om deze processen te analyseren moeten we echter niet alleen de inhoudelijke voorkeuren 
van deze actoren analyseren, maar ook de manier waarop het transpositieproces verloopt. 
Een gebrek aan input legitimiteit voor belangrijke politieke of ambtelijke actoren kan 
transpositieprocessen ernstig vertragen en daarmee de Europese eenwording in gevaar 
brengen.
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